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1 
The Relationships among 
Energy, Security, 
and the Economy 
RAJU G.C. THOMAS 
With the oversupply of oil on world markets and the fall in international oil 
prices from $32-41 per barrel in 1980 to mid-1989 levels of $15-20 per 
barrel, the international energy crisis that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war appears to have passed.I The world has shifted from devising strategies 
of crisis management to strategies-albeit rapidly fading-for avoiding 
similar crises in the future. Such were the lessons learned from the 
sustained energy crisis of the 1970s, which severely affected both the 
industrialized and developing countries for almost a decade. 
For the Western industrialized nations, economic dependency and 
vulnerability in the hands of a small number of developing countries, 
mainly in the Islamic Middle East, came as a rude shock. In the crisis, only 
a radical reevaluation of Western diplomatic and strategic policy in the 
Middle East could keep the oil flowing to the West.2 Attitudes toward the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, particularly the Palestinian issue, had to be adjusted 
in the West-especially in the United States-so as not to alienate the 
conservative Arab oil-producing states. Whereas few Americans had pre-
viously known the difference between Persians and Arabs, or between 
Shiite and Sunni Muslims, these distinctions were quickly learned. Mon-
archies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia assumed considerable importance, 
both as major suppliers of petroleum and as markets for massive sales of 
military hardware, intended to reverse the flow of petrodollars. 
The competition among the industrialized weapons suppliers, especial-
ly between Eastern and Western bloc countries, and the sudden ac-
cumulation of advanced weapons among oil-exporting countries of the 
Middle East threatened to upset the military balances that had prevailed 
among Israel, the conservative and radical Arab states, and Iran. At the 
same time, the prolonged oil crisis established the economic and strategic 
interdependence of the Western industrialized countries and the Islamic 
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Middle East. It became clear that conflicts and domestic political up-
heavals in the Middle East could not be ignored, since every major 
disturbance implied the threat of a disruption in the oil flow to the West. 
The economic consequences for the developing countries were no less 
severe, although the Western nations had substantially more prosperity at 
stake. For example, oil demand in the United States in 1973 was 28.61 
barrels of oil equivalent per capita, compared with only 1.38 barrels per 
capita for the Less Developed Countries.3 Nevertheless, in many indus-
trializing countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Brazil, economic shocks 
from the oil crisis led to severe foreign exchange shortages and the curtail-
ment of various development programs. Unlike wealthy countries, low-
and middle-income states were unable or unwilling at the time to trade 
arms for oil to correct their trade imbalances. (The notable exception is 
Brazil, which more recently has managed to step up its overseas sales of 
small arms and ammunition.) Instead, some of these states resorted to 
other economic tactics. For example, by encouraging unskilled and semi-
skilled labor to work in the Middle East oil-producing countries, India, 
Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan were partly able to offset the high cost 
of oil imports through petrodollar remittances from their "export" labor 
forces. Despite the economic near-catastrophes suffered as a result of the 
much higher oil prices demanded by the oil-exporting countries of the 
Middle East, the diplomatic strategy of the developing countries took on 
an unexpectedly supportive role for the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), in the hope of obtaining special economic con-
cessions and trade and investment benefits. 
An offshoot of the 1970s energy crisis was the belief by some of the 
developing countries that a long-term solution could be found by embark-
ing on or accelerating nuclear energy programs. The dramatic drop in oil 
prices that began in the mid-1980s has not necessarily reversed the com-
mitment to nuclear energy development in many industrializing states. 
The choice of this energy alternative, especially by countries with prevail-
ing or perennial security fears-among them India, Pakistan, South Af-
rica, South Korea, and Taiwan-has renewed the concern that resources 
and capabilities acquired in the nuclear energy sector could make more 
difficult the control of nuclear weapons proliferation. 
While the world in 1989 is no longer in the midst of an energy crisis, it 
should be clear that there are underlying relationships among (a) a nation's 
energy needs and external dependency; (b) its economic and political 
stability; and (c) its broader security concerns. The intensity of these 
relationships will, of course, vary from country to country in the developed 
and developing worlds, and within each country over time. Perhaps in the 
current framework of an international oil oversupply and low prices, the 
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basic relationships may appear obscure, and "crisis prevention" inap-
propriate. Much of the new mood of optimism arises from oil discoveries, 
increases in energy efficiency, especially through advances in com-
puterized automation, and the prospect of tapping alternative energy 
sources. However, none of these conditions appears to guarantee the long-
term resolution of the energy problem. Lessons and legacies forgotten are 
no less relevant. For example, the rapid consumption of oil discovered in 
the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and Alaska since 1974 only underlines 
the inevitable limitations of world oil reserves. Energy conservation 
through automation also has its limits. While computer technology may 
fine-tune energy usage in vehicles and buildings, such systems, costly in 
themselves, can only slow, not halt, the escalating demand for energy. Nor 
is there yet any clear alternative energy with the exception of atomic 
power, which in itself constitutes part of the "energy-economy-security" 
problem. 
When dealing with security in the energy context, we are concerned 
with a broad and an unavoidably subjective connotation of the term. Such a 
maximalist interpretation encompasses economic, political, strategic, and 
military security as against the more familiar minimalist interpretation 
that focuses on military threats and defense programs alone. Economic 
security thus suggests national resource sufficiency and, in particular, 
access to goods and services in world markets at affordable terms. Political 
security suggests the maintenance of domestic stability, whether based on 
rule by the consent of the governed or on various degrees of authoritarian 
measures; either way, law and order prevail and economic, political, and 
social activities are conducted with little or no hindrance. Strategic and 
military security is partly outward-looking and may be guaged by the 
degree and intensity of perceived external threats and the military ca-
pabilities that can be marshaled to meet those threats. It is also partly 
inward-looking, in that it involves the diversion of domestic resources and 
services to meet those threats. 
The energy crisis of the 1970s struck at the heart of all three forms of 
security concerns. For many industrializing countries, including India, 
Brazil, Pakistan, and South Korea, the periodic spurts in OPEC oil prices 
produced severe imbalances in foreign trade and severe dislocations in 
domestic economic plans. Whereas at one time the oil import bill was 
about 20-30 percent of their export earnings, it quickly rose to some 50-80 
percent by the mid-1970s. 4 Oil shortages and higher prices hit key eco-
nomic sectors, including the fertilizer and plastics industries and air and 
road transportation services. The resulting inflation aggravated these 
countries' economic troubles. 
Economic crises invariably lead to political instability. As the people of 
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a nation feel the effects of economic stress, they are likely to vent their 
anger on the government in power, whether democratic or authoritarian. 
The Indian democracy collapsed with the declaration of the "emergency" 
between 1975 and 1977 because of economic stresses and public dissatisfac-
tion. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes in South Korea, Pakistan, 
and Brazil began to feel the pressures of political liberalization and poten-
tial revolution as a result of the economic crisis at home. 
Strategic and military concerns arise more indirectly as oil exporters 
accumulate arms either to protect their economic resources and new-
found prosperity, or simply because they can afford to buy sophisticated 
arms with surplus petrodollars, whether needed or not. Security issues 
arising from the new arms race are complicated by the competition among 
arms sellers from both the Western and Eastern bloc countries, which 
results in client military states such as American-backed Saudi Arabia and 
Iran under the Shah on the one hand, and Soviet-backed Iraq and Libya on 
the other. Oil importers, especially the advanced industrialized states, 
may also choose to deploy their military capabilities to protect their 
international energy sources and supply lines. 
Instability may arise not only from new strategic relationships between 
the regional energy exporters and the internationally powerful energy 
importers but also from the relationships between developing countries 
themselves. Many of the new security concerns have been confined to the 
Middle East and South Asia, for which the oil crisis produced strategic 
interdependence. The massive purchase of arms from both West and East 
by oil-exporting states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya also 
contributed to the Indo-Pakistani arms race. Concerned about Pakistan's 
military links with Saudi Arabia and with the Shah's Iran, and apprehen-
sive about the general arms buildup in the Middle East and possible arms 
transfers to Pakistan, India speeded up its decisions on weapons acquisi-
tions from the industrialized states and other decisions on general force 
modernizations at home.s The Indian focus on nuclear energy programs 
also raised the prospect of diversions to a nuclear weapons program and of 
Pakistani counterresponses to such Indian intentions. 
Energy crises, in short, strike at both the economic and defense sectors. 
Energy policy options among the industrializing countries must, in turn, 
be adapted or even overhauled to take into account the dual effects on 
security and the economy, because the balance struck between defense 
and development programs is tied to fluctuations in the energy market, 
both at home and abroad. Defense and development programs invariably 
call for expensive imports of machinery and machine tools, and foreign 
exchange for such imports is depleted by undue dependence on foreign 
energy supplies. 
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The energy factor thus plays a crucial role in the traditional "defense 
versus development" debate in the industrializing world. This debate 
usually revolves around the impact of defense expenditures on the national 
economy or, conversely, how economic conditions affect a nation's ability 
to embark on costly defense programs. There are two broad perspectives 
on the defense-development debate. 6 On the one side are those analysts 
who depict the opportunity costs of defense programs in terms of the 
development plans of Third World states. On the other side are those 
analysts who emphasize the spinoffs of defense spending that are favorable 
for the economy through economies of scale in civilian sectors, mainly the 
electronics, aerospace, automotive, and shipbuilding sectors. However, 
the relationship between defense and development as affected by interna-
tional and domestic energy pressures is seen in the constraints on defense 
purchases abroad because of depleted foreign exchange reserves, and the 
constraints on defense procurement at home in a sluggish and unstable 
economy caused by energy shortages. 
In sum, it should be clear that a nation's energy policy and management 
carry significant implications for both its security and economic domains. 
Energy shortages at home require adept diplomacy and adequate bargain-
ing power abroad to fill the breaches. External and internal security, as 
well as external trade policies and economic development plans, have roots 
in the successful or unsuccessful management of energy policy. While the 
international energy crisis may appear to lie behind us, the basic linkages 
among energy, security, and the economy remain, and energy policy 
management must aim at either maintaining the present equilibrium or 
advancing to safer levels. As fossil fuels are rapidly depleted, energy crises 
will take new forms, and the current search for energy alternatives at home 
has tended to point to nuclear energy as the potential solution, which in 
itself poses security problems for the next decade. 
Figure 1.1 delineates the manner in which issues of energy, security, 
and the economy affect the broader aspects of defense and development 
planning. Such an analytical approach begins with an assessment of avail-
able domestic and external energy resources. Indeed, the degree of a 
country's energy surplus, self-sufficiency, or deficiency is the determinant 
of the other issues of this study. On the supply side, a nation must 
determine its actual and potential domestic energy resources and then 
measure them against its actual and potential demand for energy. The 
shortfall between supply and demand will indicate the degree to which a 
country must rely on overseas purchases of energy. 
External energy dependence raises problems of both accessibility and 
affordability. The question of accessibility concerns political obstacles that 
may have to be faced by a country in dealing with energy-exporting 
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countries. Two significant cases are Israel and South Mrica. Indeed, the 
beginning of the Arab oil em bar go to the West and the ensuing worldwide 
oil crisis was provoked by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and Western policies 
on the Palestinian issue. Neither Israel nor South Africa has had access to 
Arab oil at any time in the past, and the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 
terminated Iranian supplies of oil to both countries. Politically more 
isolated, South Mrica had to rely on purchases from "underground" sup-
pliers that bypassed the international economic sanctions supported by 
almost all Third World countries, and on alternative domestic sources of 
energy. India, too, faced some difficulty. Despite its consistent support for 
the cause of the Palestinians, India had to engage in greater diplomatic 
maneuvering among the OPEC members of the Middle East than its 
Islamic neighbor, Pakistan, to ensure the steady supply of oil and oil 
products. Diplomacy became especially critical after the 1981 outbreak of 
war between Iran and Iraq, the two countries of the Middle East that had 
traditionally supplied much of India's oil imports. Shortfalls had to be 
supplemented with extensive energy imports from the Soviet Union. 
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Similar problems were faced by countries such as Brazil, Argentina, 
Taiwan, and South Korea, all of which have had to cope with varying 
degrees of external energy accessibility and affordability. However, sup-
plies from OPEC countries in areas of lower tension than the Middle 
East-Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Gambia, and Indonesia-as well as 
the emergence of Mexico as a major exporter of oil outside the OPEC bloc, 
helped to temper the political and economic severities of the oil crisis 
during the crucial1974-83 decade. In the case of Cuba, which has been 
more isolated than most other Latin American countries, economic depen-
dence on the Soviet Union was further increased. One of the lessons of the 
oil crisis era is that political accessibility to overseas sources of energy 
cannot always be taken for granted. 
Economic affordability depends on the importing country's ability to 
negotiate favorable prices, or-where such prices are officially non-
negotiable because of the OPEC cartel's price fixing policies-to negotiate 
favorable lending and supply terms and to obtain other economic relief 
The economic negotiating skills of nearly all of the energy-importing 
countries are taxed to the fullest in a crisis. 
The effects of energy pressures are thus felt both in terms of security and 
in the economic arena. As delineated in figure 1.1, problems of external 
security arise from arms races fueled by petrodollars, or from temptations 
to use military force to resolve some of the repercussions of acute energy 
shortages that may cripple a country's economy. Threats to internal se-
curity arise from domestic violence or revolutionary movements caused to 
some degree by energy-related economic dislocations and depressions. In 
the economic arena, governments must monitor the impact of severe trade 
imbalances and foreign exchange shortages on development programs if 
they are to minimize the adverse economic consequences. 
The broader relationships among energy, security, and the economy 
may be considered from two dual, interacting perspectives by each coun-
try attempting to resolve the problems arising from these relationships 
(fig. 1.2). From the first perspective, each state must make two assess-
ments, one relatively objective, the other more subjective: (1) the extent to 
which it is dependent on external energy resources, both short- and long-
term; and (2) the intensity of external threats that it faces. The level of 
external dependence on energy resources, and the severity of threats to its 
national security, may be perceived to range on a scale from high to low. 
The second perspective concerns the policy management of energy and 
security whereby each state must attempt to achieve two goals: (1) mini-
mize the adverse impact of external energy dependence on its economy; 
and (2) minimize the threats it perceives to its national security. Such 
policy efforts may be perceived as having proved either a success or a 
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Fig. 1.2. Basic relationships among energy, security, and the economy 
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failure, again with variations in between. Needless to say, both the threats 
perceived and the degree of energy dependence, as well as the nature of 
national economic and security management, are much more complex 
than this two-part diagrammatic analysis. For simplicity's sake, however, 
the two levels of analysis may be conceptualized under the two matrices in 
figure 1.2. 
Within the loose frameworks suggested here, the degree of external 
energy dependence may be seen as relatively higher in the cases of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Cuba, and Argentina than in the cases of India, 
South Mrica, and Brazil, which have achieved modest levels of energy self-
sufficiency. Of these countries, Pakistan and South Africa may perceive 
greater external threats to their national survival than do Brazil, Argen-
tina, or even India. The successes or failures of policy responses under 
such different conditions are also varied and mixed. Despite high-level 
threats and high external energy dependence at the commencement of the 
oil crisis, South Mrica has perhaps more successfully managed these 
problems through economic and security policies than Pakistan, although 
Pakistan's case can by no means be considered a failure. We are dealing 
here with degrees and intensities among different states, the assessment of 
which must necessarily be largely subjective. The two matrices essentially 
serve as conceptual reference points whereby states within the energy-
economy-security triangle may be addressed. 
The theme of this book, then, is the effects of domestic energy shortages 
and external energy dependencies on the security and economic policies 
of certain key industrializing states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
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Issues confronting these states are analyzed in the dual context of crisis and 
post-crisis. Eight such states have been selected for this study: South 
Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Cuba, Brazil, and Argen-
tina. They represent varying levels of economic development but gener-
ally fall under the two broad categories of middle-income and low-income 
countries. All of these states were severely dependent on oil imports at the 
height of the oil crisis in the 1970s and have since embarked upon or 
stepped up nuclear energy programs at home. 
The countries included in this study may be grouped under three 
categories. 7 The first group consists oflndia, South Korea, and Taiwan. At 
the height of the international energy crisis, the economies of these states 
were hit hard by soaring oil import bills. All three states have also em-
barked on nuclear energy programs. 8 Given the concurrent security con-
cerns in their regions, this development has heightened international fears 
of nuclear proliferation. There are both similarities and differences in the 
domestic energy situations of the three nations, in their economic condi-
tions at home, in their regional security concerns. Whereas all three were 
hard-hit economically at the height of the international energy crisis, only 
India had the domestic resource potential to overcome its dependency on 
external energy sources. By contrast, much of the coal in the Korean 
peninsula is found in the north rather than in the south, and Taiwan has few 
energy resources of its own. On the other hand, vigorous external trade 
policies on the part of South Korea and Taiwan, which have vastly im-
proved their trade surpluses, have combined with the current abundance 
of oil in the international market to stabilize the "energy-economy" rela-
tionships in these two countries. These positive economic developments, 
however, have not slowed down their nuclear energy programs. 
The security fears and the temptations to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability in South Korea, Taiwan, and India arise from threats perceived 
in mainland China's growing nuclear weapons capability, although more 
immediate security fears in South Korea and India arise from North Korea 
and Pakistan, their neighbors; no doubt perception of a Chinese threat is 
much less than in earlier decades. Note also that South Korea and Taiwan 
have signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while India has 
not, but signing the NPT may not provide sufficient clues about future 
policies, since article 10 of the treaty allows any signatory state to withdraw 
by giving three months' notice. The more pertinent questions are, What 
are the potential nuclear weapons capabilities of these states? and How 
strong are the security motives in these countries that may compel them to 
acquire nuclear weapons in the future? 
South Africa and Pakistan fall into a different category than the first 
three, although they share certain similarities. It might be argued that 
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there are far greater internal and external security pressures in South 
Africa and Pakistan and consequently greater temptations to acquire 
nuclear weapons. South Africa's abundant coal resources are no guarantee 
of energy availability at all times, since the working of coal mines is 
dependent on a hostile black labor force, and the nation has no major 
petroleum resources. On the other hand, nuclear energy appears to be a 
viable energy source, given South Africa's abundant uranium resources-
the second largest in the world after those of the Soviet Union-and its 
self-reliance in uranium enrichment technology since the mid-1979s. 
South Africa is of particular concern for this study, given its minority white 
population surrounded by a hostile majority of blacks, its minority status as 
white-ruled state surrounded by hostile black states, and its confrontation 
by a hostile Third World that includes Arab members of OPEC. The 
linkages between energy and security are prominent in South Africa. 
The significant question is what defense or deterrent purpose a South 
African nuclear weapons program would serve even if the country could 
divert its nuclear energy program in that direction. Unlike Pakistan, which 
faces the potential of a nuclear India, and unlike Israel, which conceivably 
faces the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states such as Syria, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Libya, the white regime of South Africa need fear no 
such threat from the black African states-with the possible exception of 
distant Nigeria. A South African move to acquire nuclear weapons would 
serve largely to reinforce domestic psychological confidence, although 
such possession would also carry credibility as a threat against surrounding 
black states that cannot retaliate in kind. 
The Pakistani situation is different. Although Pakistan has substantial 
natural gas resources, its coal and oil resource potential is limited, and its 
hydroelectric development potential is restricted by the high siltation 
levels of the Indus River. Pakistan's close diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf kingdoms-together with income received 
from the stationing of troops and military advisers in Saudi Arabia and the 
"export" of a large Pakistani labor force to the Gulf-have enabled Pakistan 
to stabilize and invigorate its own economy for the time being. However, 
Pakistan's search for energy self-sufficiency as manifested in its nuclear 
energy programs has raised serious international doubts about its ultimate 
objectives. Unlike the nuclear programs oflndia, South Korea, or Taiwan, 
Pakistan's was perceived to emphasize acquisitions, first of reprocessing 
technology and then of enrichment technology, that would provide it with 
a weapons capability. These capabilities-though legitimate objectives for 
a nuclear energy program-were sought before a serious nuclear energy 
program was implemented, raising questions about Pakistan's ultimate 
intentions. 
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In the energy context, a third set of countries consists of Argentina and 
Brazil, which resemble the others in many ways both during and after the 
international energy crisis. These two countries were hard-pressed to 
obtain petroleum from OPEC, given their rapidly declining foreign ex-
change reserves, but were steadily able to overcome such pressures by 
seeking alternative sources of oil supplies and by exploiting domestic 
resources. While coal resources in Argentina are insignificant, Brazil has 
meaningful quantities, although hardly sufficient to meet its total energy 
needs. Like India, however, both Argentina and Brazil have modest 
petroleum resources, the development and production of which have 
grown substantially during the last ten years. Argentina also has significant 
quantities of natural gas, which has begun to contribute to its energy self-
sufficiency. 
The difference between these two countries and those in the other two 
groups is the absence of major security concerns in Latin America. The 
unexpected Falkland Islands war between Argentina and Great Britain in 
1982 may yet provoke Argentina into a nuclear weapons program, given 
the nuclear weapons of its adversary in that war. That in turn would surely 
raise security fears in Brazil that would compel it to counter the Argentin-
ian program. For the present, the likelihood of another Anglo-Argentinian 
war appears remote, and conditions have returned to those that prevailed 
before the 1982 war. However, the major nuclear energy programs of both 
Argentina and Brazil raise concerns about possible diversion to weapons 
capabilities, if for no other reason than that of national pride and interna-
tional prestige. Strangely, despite the absence of immediate security fears 
between Brazil and Argentina, the escalation of nuclear energy programs 
in both states has followed an action-reaction spiral that is characteristic of 
arms races, suggesting the possibility of a latent nuclear weapons race 
between the two. Although both Brazil and Argentina have signed the 
Treaty ofTlatelolco, which seeks to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone 
in Latin America, Argentina has not ratified it, and Brazil has not incorpo-
rated the treaty as part of its domestic law, leaving subsequent govern-
ments an opening to ignore its provisions. 
Cuba does not fit any of the above three categories, but its significance 
in this study arises from a number of factors: the security concerns that 
Cuba's actions raise in the western hemisphere, the major Soviet econom-
ic and military involvement there, the Cuban decision to embark on a 
nuclear energy program, and its refusal to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
Cuba has only modest domestic oil resources; much of its liquid energy 
must be imported, nearly all of it from the Soviet Union. Cuba has no coal 
resources, and its hydroelectric potential is limited by the size ofits rivers. 
For the present, the Cuban energy program being set up with Soviet 
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nuclear power plants is not of concern, but the transfer of Soviet technical 
knowhow may make possible the diversion to weapons production in the 
future. Moreover, the safety standards of the nuclear power plants to be 
supplied by the Soviet Union are not yet known. If Chernobyl-type 
accidents occurred at Cuban nuclear power plants, they could threaten the 
physical safety of the United States along its southern rim, as well as parts 
of Mexico, Central American, and the Carribean islands. Especially note-
worthy is that Cuba has not signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 
This book examines the crisis and postcrisis energy conditions and 
policy approaches of eight key states in the industrializing world. The focus 
is dual: energy impacts on each state's national economy and on its national 
security. The parallels and variations discovered in the experience of the 
eight selected states may well serve as models for national policymakers in 
these and other countries. 
NOTES 
1. See New York Times, Nov. 18, 1988. 
2. For two studies at the height of the energy crisis, see Joseph S. Nye and David A. 
Deese, eds., Energy and Security (Boston, Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1980); and 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Energy and Security, ed. Greg-
ory Treverton (Westmead, England: Gower Publishing, 1980). 
3. Stuart Sinclair, The World Petroleum Industry: The Market for Petroleum and 
Petroleum Products in the 1980s (London: Euromonitor Publications, 1984), p. 35. 
4. Assessed from World Bank, World Tables 1987 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
1987). 
5. See Raju G.C. Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and 
Implications of the Jaguar Decision," Orbis 24, no. 1 (April1980): pp. 85-102. 
6. For a comprehensive study of this problem, see Nicole Ball, Security and 
Economy in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
7. These categories were first developed in Raju G.C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear 
and Space Programs: Defense or Development?" World Politics 38, no. 2 Oanuary 
1986): pp. 315-19. 
8. See James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah, eds., Nuclear Power in Develop-
ing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). 
2 
India 
RAJU G.C. THOMAS 
The influence of energy issues on India's security and development pol-
icies first took on significance in 1974 following two important events, one 
external and the other internal. Externally, the quadrupling of oil prices by 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries toward the end of 
1973, from about $3 per barrel to $12 per barrel, threw into disarray the 
commencement of India's Fifth Five Year Plan in 1974 and compelled 
India's economic planners to revise and stretch the Fifth Plan over a period 
of six years. Internally, India's test of an underground atomic device in May 
1974 brought into question the ultimate purpose of its nuclear energy 
program, which has, before and since, been declared as serving peaceful 
domestic purposes only. 
Today, more than 15 years later, the conditions that India faces are 
fundamentally different. Instead of depending heavily on oil imports, 
India now produces more than two-thirds of its oil needs. Its economic 
performance has improved dramatically since international oil prices be-
gan to drop from highs of$41 per barrel in 1980to mid-1989levels of$15-20. 
India is now the dominant military power in the South Asian region, with 
arms capabilities that rival those of the oil-rich states. The transformation 
in India's strategic setting has changed the nature of the issues confronting 
India and the emphasis and direction of its policy-making. While the basic 
components of the energy-economy-security equation remain, their rela-
tive importance and the nature of their relationships have changed. 
The two major events ofl974-oil pricing shocks and the Indian atomic 
test-highlight some of the linkages of energy, security, and development 
policies in India. Heavy dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf 
states, Libya, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s had implications for Indian 
diplomatic, economic, and military policies. Apart from the obvious need 
not to alienate these states if oil was to keep flowing on affordable commer-
cial terms, it was important for India to step up exports to the oil-supplying 
countries to prevent a foreign exchange crisis that would have crippled the 
Indian development program. There was also a military dimension to the 
international oil crisis. The Middle East oil-exporting states were some of 
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the largest buyers of sophisticated arms from the industrialized countries. 
The proximity of some of these states to the subcontinent, and the overt or 
latent military links of states such as Saudi Arabia and Libya with Pakistan, 
seemed at the time to have strategic relevance in assessing the security of 
India. Special purchases of oil and military equipment from the Soviet 
Union also accentuated India's economic and military reliance on Moscow. 
While the international oil crisis of the last decade eroded India's 
security environment and adversely affected its development programs, 
India's nuclear energy program, in turn, has raised fears in Pakistan of an 
imminent nuclear weapons threat in the region. In the West, moreover, 
the atomic test of 197 4 sparked a general fear of the collapse of the state of 
affairs that had been tentatively promoted with the passage of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Even though India and several other 
prominent countries still have not signed the treaty, its very existence was 
expected to exert pressure on such states not to embark on a nuclear 
weapons program. While the international energy crisis affected India's 
strategic environment and its economic development programs, India's 
nuclear energy policy in turn has affected the regional and global security 
environments. 
The passing of the international energy crisis by the mid-1980s has 
brought greater economic prosperity in India, both because of successful 
efforts to tap oil resources, especially in the offshore Bombay High oilfield 
on the western coast, and because of the declines in international oil 
prices. The favorable energy environment was further supported by a 
series of good annual monsoon rains until the drought of 1987, which was 
readily offset by the economic recovery and growth of the 1980s and the 
buffer food stocks that had accumulated. However, the political and se-
curity implications of India's spreading nuclear nexus are troubling. 
Nor has the long-term energy question been resolved for India. Its 
known oil reserves are low, probably not sufficient beyond the end of this 
century, and greater dependence on external oil in the future cannot be 
discounted. While India has substantial reserves of coal, there are various 
technical, economic, and political limitations on the extensive use of coal 
in the industrial, transportation, and household sectors, and the genera-
tion ofhydroelectric power has its own set of problems and limitations. As a 
consequence, the promise of nuclear energy continues to draw the atten-
tion of India's economic planners and policymakers. 
Within the triangular linkage of India's energy, security, and develop-
ment policies, the interactions are complex and varied. For analytical 
convenience, two basic aspects of the problem initially will be examined 
here: (1) the manner in which conventional energy issues affect Indian 
development and security policies, and (2) the implications of India's 
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nuclear energy policies for its development and security planning. The 
first level of analysis will examine Indian policy responses to international 
and domestic energy shortages and pricing policies, while the second level 
will focus on the nature of nuclear energy policy-making in India and its 
effects on domestic development and regional security. 
CoNVENTIONAL ENERGY 
From the standpoint of conventional energy development, the sources 
and patterns of energy utilization in India-especially the degree of 
dependence on external sources of energy-were the subject of several 
official inquiries conducted by the Ministry of Energy and the Planning 
Commission following the international energy crisis of the 1970s. They 
sought to determine India's total energy needs until the year 2000, and 
they adopted interim as well as long-term policies to resolve those needs. 
From the security standpoint, the procurement of conventional energy 
raises problems of both internal and external nature. Domestic political 
violence is caused directly by shortages, supply dislocations, or high prices 
of conventional energy and indirectly by energy-related economic failures. 
This factor was particularly relevant in the case of oil procurements in the 
middle to late 1970s. Coal-related internal security problems arise pri-
marily from supply dislocations caused by strikes by railway workers or 
coal miners. Problems of external security, similarly, may be caused by 
supply dislocations arising from wars in the Middle East or by OPEC 
supply and pricing policies, as demonstrated by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
and subsequent OPEC pricing policies, and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 
which caused the partial loss of supply from these two countries. Indi-
rectly, the various arms buildups in the Middle East have had some 
relevance for the strategic military balance in South Asia. 
India has three conventional sources of commercial and industrial 
energy: oil, coal, and hydroelectric power. Oil of various kinds and oil 
products are used primarily in the transportation, petrochemical, and 
household sectors of the economy. The other two energy sources-coal-
fired thermal and hydroelectric plants-provide more than 95 percent of 
electricity generation in India. Coal is also used in locomotives in some 
sections of the Indian railway network. In the rural economy, where more 
than 75 percent of the Indian population lives, there is still considerable use of 
firewood and agricultural and animal waste. The extensive use of cow dung as 
fuel in the rural areas has led to the setting up of several biogas plants under 
the Indian five-year plans. I The number of such plants grew from 6,900 in 
1973 to 610,000 in 1986. In addition to biogas, the government of India has 
been exploring the potential use of geothermal, tidal, and solar power. 
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With a population of about 850 million in 1989, India's per capita 
consumption of petroleum is among the lowest in the world; among nations 
with sizable populations, only Bangladesh consumes less petroleum per 
capita. On the supply side, the Planning Commission's energy assessment 
in 1979 estimated that India had about 295 million metric tons (MT) of net 
recoverable oil reserves, of which 109 million MT (37%) was onshore and 
186 million MT (63%) offshore. More recent estimates place total Indian oil 
reserves at about 471 million MT.2 Gas reserves were estimated at 90 
billion cubic meters, of which 67 billion cubic meters (74 percent) was 
onshore and 23 billion cubic meters (26 percent) offshore. 3 The oil reserves 
are clearly small compared with those of some of the major oil-producing 
countries of the world: Saudi Arabia (23 billion MT), Mexico (4 billion), the 
United Kingdom (2 billion), and Indonesia (1 billion). India's proven 
reserves are hardly sufficient to sustain its oil needs over the next decade. 
Domestic production of petroleum in India rose from 11.9 million MT in 
1978 to an estimated 17 million in 1980, while imports held steady at 14.4 
million MT in 1978 and 15 million in 1981. The 1978 Indian production and 
import figures compare with 51 million MT of domestic production and 67 
million MT of imports for the United Kingdom, 104 million MT of produc-
tion and no imports for China, and 8 million MT of domestic production 
and 43 million MT of imports for Brazil. 4 By fiscal year 1984-85, India 
consumed 38.8 million MT of crude oil, of which 29 million were produced 
at home and 13.6 million imported. This move toward self-sufficiency is all 
the more creditable since India also exported 6. 5 million MT of crude oil, 
for net imports of only 7.2 million.5 
Oil and security. The increased demand for crude oil in India since 1978 
has been met almost exclusively through stepped-up domestic produc-
tion. Nevertheless, imports remain relatively substantial as demand stead-
ily increases, and the disrupting effects of the international oil crisis that 
started in 1973 are not likely to be easily forgotten. Historically, the 
variations in and uncertainties of oil supply and prices have affected the 
Indian economy in two ways: the impact on India's economic development 
planning in general and the more specific consequences for certain sectors 
of the economy that are directly or indirectly dependent on oil. 
At the broader level, the escalating oil prices between 1973 and 1981 
drained India's foreign exchange reserves and created adverse trade bal-
ances. India's oil import bill rose from $264 million in 1972 to $1.4 billion in 
1975 and $1.8 billion in 1978.6 A series of price hikes after 1978 raised 
international prices to $31 to $42 per barrel and caused India's 1981 oil 
import bill to climb to approximately $7.5 billion, 7 consuming 80 percent 
of India's export earnings and constituting almost 50 percent of the total 
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import bill. 8 (In comparison, the oil import bill had been less than 10 
percent of the export earnings in 1973 and only 25 percent in 1974, 
immediately before and after the Arab-Israeli war, when OPEC prices 
were raised from approximately $4 per barrel to $12 per barrel. )9 By 1986, 
however, imported oil costs fell to only 19 percent of India's export earn-
ings, indicating that the situation had been stabilized.IO 
After the initial jump in oil prices in 1974, government planners had 
assumed a certain degree of international stabilization of both oil supplies 
and prices, with steady incremental increases of about 10 percent annually. 
For instance, the outline of the Sixth Plan, drafted in 1978, projected a 
demand of 36 million MT in 1982-83, of which 18 million MT was expected 
to be imported.n The anticipated price then was $24 per barrel ($175 per 
MT), for a total import bill of $3.15 billion. Because of the unexpected 
OPEC price hikes after 1978, this projection turned out to be less than half 
the actual 1981 import bill of $7.5 billion-a level that had not been 
anticipated until1988. 
OPEC oil prices thus had adverse effects on India's economic develop-
ment plans during this period, despite the low per capita consumption. 
Indeed, the Fifth Five Year Plan, launched in 197 4, was terminated in 
disarray early in 1978, although it should be noted that other economic and 
political factors also contributed to this situation. Between 1978 and 1980, 
the government of India switched to annual plans while it took stock of 
economic conditions. The Sixth Five Year Plan was then launched in 1980, 
only two years after the end of the Fifth Plan. During this period, the 
increasing diversion of critical foreign exchange reserves to relatively small 
amounts of oil imports deprived key government projects and kept private 
industrial development from importing necessary machinery and parts. 
Such withdrawals of potential investments in the public and private sectors 
tend to produce reverse multiplier effects on the economy as a whole. 
Specifically, accelerating costs of imported oil affected the transporta-
tion, petrochemical, agricultural, and household sectors of the economy. 
Transportation typically takes nearly 50 percent of the available refinery 
products, with the Indian Railways alone consuming about 20 percent. 
The domestic household sector annually consumes 30 percent, mainly in 
the form of kerosene for cooking. The petrochemical industrial sector 
absorbs about 13 percent, mainly for the production of fertilizers, basic 
polymers and organic chemicals, plastics, manmade fibers, drugs, de-
tergents, paints, pigments, and dyes.l2 The agricultural sector accounts 
for about 5 percent, principally to fuel tractors and diesel pumps for 
irrigation. Only 1 percent of oil is used to generate electric power. 
Several extended economic and political disruptions tend to occur in 
India along with dislocations in oil supplies and higher oil prices. Higher 
18 RAJU G.C. THOMAS 
operating costs in the petrochemical industries and transport industry 
tend to increase sharply the prices of a range of intermediate and consum-
er products, as well as urban transport services, which affect the spending 
power of the more politically vocal middle classes. Higher prices for 
kerosene are a hardship for urban and rural lower middle classes, who use 
this basic fuel for home cooking. Consequently, while the household 
sector may consume only one-third of available oil, higher oil prices draw 
adverse political reactions from the active, vocal section of the Indian 
population concentrated in cities and towns. Higher oil prices and disrup-
tions in supplies may limit both fertilizer production and the availability of 
diesel oil for irrigation pumps and tractors, thus curtailing agricultural 
production as a whole, with ominous political repercussions. 
The disruptive effects of the oil crisis on agricultural production have 
been checked to some extent by favorable monsoon rains in most years 
since 1970. The exceptions were 1974, when there was only 0.1 percent 
growth in the Indian GNP, and 1979, when it declined by 4.5 percent.l3 
The monsoon failure ofl973, in conjunction with the broader effects of the 
oil crisis, pushed the 1974 inflation rate to an unprecedented 27 percent, 
causing a general economic failure.l4 The large-scale political demonstra-
tions against the Congress government of Indira Gandhi that followed in 
early 1975led eventually to the declaration of an "emergency" in June and 
a suspension of democratic rights.l5 The partial monsoon failure in 1979, 
followed by steep increases in oil prices during 1980 and 1981, produced 
similar but less destabilizing economic and political conditions. 
Another economic and political aspect of the oil crisis in India was the 
discrepancy in the prices of imported oil and domestic oil. For instance, 
the domestic oil price until 1981 was pegged at $4.50 a barrel for the 
onshore variety and $6 per barrel for the offshore.l6 In 1981, prices were 
standardized at $18 per barrel for both onshore and offshore oil-still much 
lower than international oil prices. The Indian government, in other 
words, was heavily subsidizing the overall cost of oil for the Indian consum-
er during the height of the crisis period, despite the exorbitant import 
price and high taxes on petroleum and petroleum products. 
The pricing policy for domestic oil in the early 1980s led to major 
political disturbances in the state of Assam, where the bulk of domestic 
onshore oil is produced. Political agitators in Assam demanded that their 
state be compensated for its production at OPEC oil prices. Demonstra-
tions in 1981 forced the closure of the 1 million MT Bongaigon refinery and 
caused intermittent shutdowns of the 1 million MT Gauhati refinery and 
the smaller refinery at Digboi. Subsequently, similar public demands 
were voiced in the state of Bihar, where oil is refined, leading to the 
temporary closure of the Barauni refinery. 
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Along with the internal security problems in India caused by the oil 
crisis during the 1973-82 decade, the arms buildup in the Middle East, 
funded by the accumulation of petrodollars, posed two potential threats to 
India. There were fears both that Middle East arms purchases might 
eventually find their way into Pakistan during another subcontinental war 
and that some of the surplus petrodollars might be used to finance and 
assist Pakistan in developing a nuclear weapons capability. In the 1960s, 
Iran and Jordan had transferred a few F -86 Sabre combat aircraft to 
Pakistan,l7 and the practice of sending Pakistani military training missions 
to Islamic countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates suggested that Pakistan might acquire familiarity in the deploy-
ment of weapons acquired by the oil-rich states of the region. The nuclear 
threat-the prospect that Pakistan might develop the "Islamic bomb"-
was allegedly being financed either directly or indirectly by Libya and 
Saudi Arabia, with uranium supplies coming from Libya via the Muslim 
state of N iger.l8 
Neither of these two prospects have so far been realized. Indeed, the 
fall in international oil prices and the declining revenues of the OPEC 
countries have begun to sever Pakistan's military ties with the oil-produc-
ing Arab states. Pakistani army divisions in Saudi Arabia have been with-
drawn, and other military training personnel in the Gulf states are being 
cut back. Economic declines in the Gulf sheikdoms have also ended the 
employment of a large immigrant labor force from India and Pakistan. The 
return of this labor force to the subcontinent has produced regional social 
and economic pressures. In India, much of the Gulflabor had come from 
the state of Kerala, ruled by the Communist Party-Marxist (CPM) either 
directly or through coalitions with other left-leaning parties, including the 
Congress. Property purchases by this wealthy returning emigre group 
have caused real estate prices to rise rapidly, and this new special land-
owning class has produced resentment among traditional landowners and 
agrarian workers. 
Coal, the main source of commercial energy in India, provides almost 
65 percent of total electricity generated in the industrial sector. Coal 
reserves in India are substantial, projected to last another 100 years at 
compounded rates of consumption. In 1985, the Geological Survey oflndia 
assessed total coal reserves in India at 156 billion metric tons for coal seams 
of0.5 meters and thicker recoverable from depths to 1,200 meters.l9 
Despite such large proven reserves, the productivity of operations 
under the government-owned corporation Coal India Limited and its 
subdivisions is low when compared with Western standards. The average 
output per man-shift for Coal India is 0. 79 MT in underground mines, 
considerably lower than the range of about 2.5 to 4 MT in Western Europe 
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and 8 to 12 in the United States, Australia, and South Africa.20 The figures 
reflect the low level of mechanization in India, where cheap labor is 
abundant. Indian productivity, however, compares favorably with that of 
China, where output per man-shift is about 0.5 MT for underground 
mines and 1.6 for open-pit mines. Although India's Sixth Five Year Plan 
(1980-85) had allotted an average annual investment of 8 billion rupees in 
the coal industry, compared with only 2.13 billion during the previous four 
years, the mechanization process is likely to remain slow because of 
political and social pressures to absorb the vast pool of labor in India. 
The energy crunch in India during the 1970s as a result of the interna-
tional oil crisis led to greater economic rationalization in the coal industry. 
Until1981, coal prices in India were set below the cost of production, and 
the pricing system excluded the rate of return and depreciation from 
estimates of the cost of production. Wages and salaries, for instance, which 
generally accounted for 70 percent of the cost of production, were not 
adequately assessed and incorporated when determining coal prices. 
Under this subsidized system of accounting, Coal India Limited posted a 
loss ofRs 7 billion between 1974 and 1979. 
After 1981, pricing was linked to the cost of production, and the govern-
ment allowed Coal India to set prices that would earn a return on invest-
ment. The modest profit of Rs. 300 million in fiscal year 1981-82 was 
expected to grow toRs. 1 billion the following year.2l The Sixth Five Year 
Plan (1980-85) paid greater attention to the needs of the coal industry. 
Greater emphasis was placed on coal exploration, so as to raises the annual 
rate of production from 119 million MT in 1980-81 to 155 million MT in 
1984-85 and 161 million in 1985-86.22 By way of comparison, annual coal 
production was 33 million MT in 1950-51, 56 million in 1960-61, and 76 
million in 1970-71. Much of the acceleration in coal production was accom-
plished through greater mechanization in coal drilling, the reconstruction 
of older coal mines, and the development of new mines. 
Assessing the total potential of hydroelectric resources in India is 
difficult because the flows of Indian rivers vary widely, ranging from 
thousands of cusecs in the monsoon season to a few cusecs in the dry 
season.23 Consequently, estimates ofhydroelectric potential in India usu-
ally amount to identifying specific targets in each river basin with the 
potential for hydroelectric power generation that is both technically feasi-
ble and economically viable. Based on these criteria, the first systematic 
survey of the Central Water and Power Commission, conducted between 
1953 and 1960, identified 260 possible targets with a potential annual 
energy generation of about 221 tetrawatt-hours (TWH). The estimate was 
revised in 1978 to 396 TWH. However, the installed hydroelectric generat-
ing capacity in India in 1978 was only 39 TWH, or just 10 percent of 
India 21 
estimated potential, a share that changed little during the next decade. 
Moreover, the utilization of the available potential has not been uniform 
among the different regions. 
The Planning Commission's energy report also assessed the potential of 
India's hydroelectric capacity in terms of megawatts (Mw) at a specified 
load factor. In other countries, a load factor of 60 percent tends to repre-
sent the potential in terms of capacity, but in India the average load factor 
of hydroelectric plants is about 42 percent. At this load factor, the total power 
potential was estimated at 100,000 M w, while the corresponding total installed 
capacity in 1978-79 was only 10,830 M w. The Planning Commission noted that 
the utilization of only 10 percent oflndia's hydroelectric potential amounted to 
considerable wastage; renewable hydroelectric potential is being lost each 
year because of the failure to harness India's rivers. 
If we assume that energy security is best achieved in India through the 
development of conventional sources rather than nuclear energy, then 
both coal and hydroelectric power will continue to dominate. If this is the 
case, certain internal security problems may arise. The problem with coal 
is that it is located almost exclusively in the volatile northeast sector of the 
country. Coal production to supply power plants throughout the country is 
vulnerable to disruption, especially in West Bengal, where violent labor 
strikes and general political unrest have been extensive. 
Similar complications could interrupt the transportation and distribu-
tion of coal throughout India by railway, since the All-India Railwaymen' s 
Federation is one of the largest and most powerful labor unions in India, 
with a membership of about 2 million. A nationwide strike would not only 
bring all railway passenger and goods traffic to a halt, but would also 
paralyze coal-fired power plants and thereby industrial activity through-
out India. The seriousness of this internal security threat is probably best 
exemplified by the crisis ofl97 4, when the All-India Railwaymen' s Federa-
tion successfully launched a nationwide strike of its nearly 2 million 
members.24 With most power plants carrying less than two weeks of coal 
supplies, power had to be severely rationed in major industrial cities that 
were dependent on electricity from coal thermal plants. 
Energy supply dislocations due to the 197 4 railway strike intensified the 
energy crisis induced by OPEC supply and pricing policies, causing a 
severe economic crisis in fiscal year 197 4-75. The economic growth rate fell 
to less thar 2 percent, and inflation rose from 8 percent in 1972-73 to 16 
percent in 1973-7 4 and to 29 percent in 197 4-75.25 The economic crisis, in 
turn, produced widespread civilian violence that threatened to undermine 
the stability of the country. Unable to control the growing internal political 
chaos in 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi invoked the emergency 
powers of the constitution on an unprecedented nationwide scale. Under 
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these powers, the democratic process in India and the fundamental rights 
of citizens were suspended. To be sure, it would be unfair to attribute the 
national political crisis of 1975 to the railway-induced coal shortages and 
the OPEC-induced oil price shocks ofl974, but these energy happenings 
were among the internal security problems of the mid-1970s. 
There have been no major internal security-related disruptions of hy-
droelectric power, such as sabotage of power plants during violent indus-
trial unrest or rioting on a communal basis (religious, linguistic, caste, or 
tribal). However, India has failed to harness such power in the politically 
turbulent northeast sector, where the potential for such energy develop-
ment is among the highest. Less than 0.5 percent of the hydroelectric 
potential has been developed in the northeast, 26 a fraction of the 10 
percent nationwide development of hydroelectric potential. 
The northeast sector oflndia, which comprises West Bengal and Assam, 
and the tribal states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Manipur, and 
Tripura, has been perennially riddled with industrial unrest, violent 
communist movements, religious and linguistic conflict, and tribal guer-
rilla warfare seeking to establish independent homelands. Since this 
sector is the site of two major river basins-those of the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra and their tributaries-an argument might be made that the 
failure to develop the immense hydroelectric potential even moderately is 
due to political turbulence. 
The availability of alternative energy sources may help explain the 
failure to develop the hydroelectric potential in the northeast, which is 
also rich in coal and oil resources. However, coal is more expensive than 
hydroelectric power for electricity generation in India, even in the north-
east, and oil in India is intended almost exclusively for the transportation 
and the petrochemical industries. Given these circumstances, hydro-
electric energy would appear to be the logical choice for the region. 
The failure to tap the hydroelectric potential may arise also from 
"planning" assessments-that is, technical difficulties foreseen in harness-
ing the rivers, or from the lack offinancial resources to invest in the region. 
However, government support for the development of cheap hydroelectric 
power would attract private industrial investment and contribute to eco-
nomic growth in the region. Despite good reasons for greater central 
government investments in the region, the failure to do so would suggest 
that political instability may be the primary reason why government 
planners have avoided exploitation of its hydroelectric potential. 
NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Whatever the drawbacks, coal, thermal, and hydroelectric power plants 
will continue to generate the bulk of electricity in India for several decades 
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to come. Nevertheless, the growth in thermal and hydroelectric generat-
ing capacity is not expected to keep pace with industrial and urban 
demand. Energy projections in India beyond the year 2000 suggest se-
rious shortfalls of up to 20 percent. That crucial gap cannot be filled by 
increasing oil production, since, domestic oil reserves are too limited to 
meet industrial demand and, in any case, will be depleted in fifteen to 
twenty years. All future oil imports are expected to be absorbed by the 
petrochemical, household, and transportation sectors of the economy. 
Likewise, as noted earlier, the concentrated geographic location of coal 
and the vulnerability of railway transportation mean that coal cannot 
guarantee continuous energy supply throughout India. Under these cir-
cumstances, Indian planners and politicians perceive nuclear power as 
critical. 
Leading Indian nuclear scientists and economic planners are convinced 
that nuclear power is the only long-term solution to India's energy needs. 
The following statement by Raja Ramana, director of the Bhabha Atomic 
Research Center and secretary oflndia's national Department of Atomic 
Energy, is reflective of the views of the nuclear scientific community in 
India: "Looking at it [the future of nuclear energy] with the experience of 
the past and the terrifYing energy problems of the future, I can think of no 
other source of energy that has been discovered to date except nuclear 
energy, which can solve the energy problems of this country during the 
next 25 years and beyond. If I do not make the case now and point out to 
the urgency of accepting its inevitability, I will have done a great dis-
service. "27 
Thus, despite the relatively small contribution of nuclear power to the 
Indian economy, it plays a critical role. The current and projected uses of 
nuclear energy, however, carry political, economic, and security implica-
tions. The basic question remains: Are nuclear energy programs in India 
intended primarily to maintain India's nuclear weapons option? 
The Department of Atomic Energy was set up in 1954 as the executive 
agency of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, which had been estab-
lished six years earlier. Technological and economic self-sufficiency was 
the key words for the atomic energy program as mapped out in 1947, soon 
after independence, by Homi J. Bhabha, first director of the Department 
of Atomic Energy. 
Bhabha's long-term plan envisaged three stages of development.28 The 
first stage was to establish natural uranium-fueled pressurized heavy 
water reactors based on the Canadian design known as CANDU. Heavy 
water reactor (HWR) technology was preferred to the U.S. -designed light 
water reactor (LWR) technology because HWRs did not require enriched 
uranium but could eventually utilize thorium. India has only about 52,000 
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metric tons of commercially exploitable uranium reserves, while thorium 
reserves total about 320,000 metric tons. HWRs furthermore, were per-
ceived to be economically more efficient than LWR systems and had the 
added military advantage of producing plutonium-the fissile weapons-
grade material-as a byproduct. Except for the Tarapur Atomic Power 
Plants, which use enriched uranium, all existing nuclear plants, as well as 
all those planned for the near future, use natural uranium and pressurized 
heavy water. However, there have been some recent moves by the govern-
ment of India to obtain two Soviet LWRs of 1000 MWe each, with the 
possibility oflater building similar reactors in India.29 
The second-stage nuclear reactors were to be fueled by plutonium as 
well as uranium-233 derived from thorium placed in the blanket. The third 
stage of nuclear development was expected to be based on thorium-fueled 
fast breeder reactors, which would lead to a self-sustaining thorium-
uranium fuel cycle. Since India has vast resources of thorium, the nuclear 
energy program was expected to become commercially viable beyond the 
year 2000. A fast breeder test reactor based on a French design has already 
been constructed at the Research Reactor Center at Kalpakkam, Madras. 
Nearly all the major components of the reactor were fabricated in India. 
Although the Bhabha plan (later elaborated by the next director, Vikram 
Sarabhai) did not recommend LWRs, successful negotiations with the 
United States led to an agreement in 1963 for the construction and 
installation of two LWRs at Tarapur in Bombay, known as TAPP-1 and -2. 
The two LWRs were provided to India on a turnkey basis by the General 
Electric Company of the United States. The Indian government, private 
Indian industry, and labor provided 30 percent participation in setting up 
TAPP, 30 which has been operating since 1969. The mainstream line of 
nuclear development in India, however, was based on the Canadian-
designed HWRs, starting with construction of the Rajasthan Atomic 
Power Plant. The two heavy-water units of 200 MWe each at Rajasthan 
(RAPP-1 and -2) were supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission of 
Canada. The Rajasthan plants have been operating since 1973 with 70 
percent participation and funding by Indian industry and labor. Since 
then, two HWRs with capacities of220 MWe each have been indigenously 
designed and constructed at Kalpakkam near Madras (MAPP-1 and -2), and 
two similar reactors at N arora in Uttar Pradesh (N APP-1 and -2). Four more 
similar reactors are under construction at Kakrapar in Gujerat and at Kaiga 
in Karnataka. An additional six such reactors are to be developed and 
installed by the year 2000. Almost all of the development will have been 
done exclusively by Indian technology, industry, and labor. 
It is not clear that all of these projects will be completed on schedule, 
and the projections may be highly optimistic. Only the Tarapur, Rajasthan, 
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and Kalpakkam plants were generating power for commercial purposes by 
1988, although the Narora plants were expected to be in operation by 1989. 
Thus, while government projections indicate an installed nuclear generat-
ing capacity of8,620 MWe by the year 1991 and 10,000 MWe by the year 
2000, other parliamentary and ad hoc forecasts have been less optimistic. 31 
For example, the Estimates Committee in 1978 forecast 6,000 MWe by 
1991, and a 1979 ad hoc report of the Working Group on Energy Policy of 
the Planning Commission predicted the installation of only 5, 000 MWe of 
nuclear power by the early 1990s.32 Failure to approach these goals led to 
the immediate purchase of two 1,000-MW light water reactors from the 
Soviet Union in 1988. These two reactors were to be installed in the 
southern region ofTamil Nadu to meet power shortages in both that state 
and Kerala. 
Whatever the discrepancies in projections of installed nuclear power 
over the next two decades, comparative cost estimates by the pronuclear 
power lobby in India suggest that this source of energy may have a cost 
advantage over coal-fired thermal plants, despite indications to the con-
trary. According to Raja Ramana, secretary of the Department of Atomic 
Energy, the apparent higher cost of nuclear power over thermal power 
arises from the nature of cost accounting applied to these two sources of 
energy.33 
An assessment of the average cost of nuclear-generated electricity 
includes the capital outlay in areas like the production of heavy water and 
the setting up of a means of controlling the nuclear fuel cycle. On the other 
hand, according to Raja Ramana, the extensive costs of developing coal 
mines and transporting the coal to power plants throughout India are not 
included in the assessment of the average cost of coal-generated elec-
tricity, mainly because the development of coal mines, the construction of 
railway lines, and the acquisition of wagons and locomotives are not 
undertaken exclusively for generating electricity from coal-fired thermal 
plants. Ramana said, 'The point usually overlooked is that for each coal-
fired power station replaced by a nuclear power station, the need to 
develop coal mines and to organize transportation facilities will be propor-
tionately reduced, and thus, the capital outlay required for these purposes 
would be significantly reduced."34 
Allegations of military motives behind India's nuclear energy program 
are based on the security pressures, especially nuclear threats, perceived 
to stem from China and Pakistan, and on the questionable commercial 
viability of nuclear power vis-a-vis coal-fired thermal and hydroelectric 
power in India. 
Since China exploded its first atomic bomb in October 1964, there has 
been debate over whether India should acquire its own nuclear weapons to 
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counter the Chinese threat. In the policy arena, there are three basic 
alternatives: maintaining the nuclear weapons "option" (India's current 
policy), exercising that option, or rejecting it. The nuclear weapons option 
leaves open the possibility of embarking on a military program. The 
primary and specific purpose of this policy has been to increase the 
pressure on the superpowers to provide credible nuclear guarantees 
against the nuclear threat from China and potentially from Pakistan so as to 
improve the climate of regional security. The secondary and more general 
purpose is to exert pressure on the nuclear "haves" to reduce and eventu-
ally eliminate their own nuclear stockpiles so as to improve the climate of 
global security. Maintaining the military option justifies India's nuclear 
energy programs even if the outlay substantially exceeds the costs of 
developing alternative sources of energy. 
If India should decide to exercise its nuclear option by embarking on 
the "dedicated path" toward weapons production, the country's policy 
would be secondary or even incidental to the need to acquire weapons for 
security purposes. The strategic implications of a weapons program-
quite different from the case of merely maintaining the weapons option-
would trigger a three-way nuclear arms race among India, Pakistan, and 
China. Pakistan would almost certainly respond with an overt weapons 
program of its own, while some of the Chinese missiles now directed 
against the Soviet Union would almost certainly be targeted instead at 
India. The net result might be less security for India at a higher economic 
cost. The first Indian atomic test of May 197 4 appeared to have set this 
process in motion. Although India quickly reverted to the policy of main-
taining the nuclear weapons option after the outcry in the United States 
and Canada, the 197 4 test increased the determination in Pakistan to 
acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons. 
India's third alternative would be to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and give up its nuclear weapons option. While the technological capability 
would persist through the continuation of the nuclear energy program 
(despite International Atomic Energy Agency inspection and other safe-
guards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty), this course of action would at 
least dampen the Indian temptation to acquire nuclear weapons and lessen 
the probability of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The establishment of 
a nuclear-free zone in South Asia would in fact serve as a model for similar 
zones in other regions of the world. This third approach would also open 
greater international technological cooperation for India in the peaceful 
uses of the atom, including nuclear energy. 
India's current policy of maintaining the nuclear weapons option serves 
the needs of both defense and development programs. By wielding the 
military option, India has avoided the vulnerability of a unilateral renun-
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ciation of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the security risks of 
embarking on nuclear arms races with China and Pakistan on the other. 
Indeed, thus far this approach has threaded an effective course between 
the extremes of action (a nuclear weapons program) and inaction (uni-
lateral renunciation). At the same time, despite some American and 
Canadian efforts to stall the nuclear energy program, a degree of coopera-
tion is likely to persist to avoid pushing India toward the dedicated path of 
nuclear weapons production. 
Maintaining the military option clearly suggests deliberate ambiguity 
about the purpose of India's civilian nuclear energy program. External 
allegations of military motives rest mainly on the questionable commercial 
viability of nuclear power as compared with coal-fired thermal and hydro-
electric power in India. Cost estimates in the United States, West Ger-
many, Japan, France, and other Western nations suggest that the earlier 
optimism about LWRs, HWRs, and fast breeder reactors as a source of 
energy was misplaced. The scarcity and high cost of uranium resources, 
the high capital cost and growing technical complexities in nuclear plant 
design and operation, fears of plant meltdowns and other radioactive 
hazards, and the risk of tempting terrorists with critical targets-all are 
claimed to have greatly reduced the prospects for commercial nuclear 
energy. 
The Indian counterargument is that pessimistic claims regarding the 
future of nuclear power are motivated by Western efforts to curb nuclear 
proliferation rather than being objective assessments. From this point of 
view, for instance, it was no coincidence that President Jimmy Carter 
followed both a domestic policy of curbing the growth of nuclear power and 
an international policy of curbing nuclear weapons proliferation. 35 Any 
demonstration of the viability of nuclear power in the United States would 
feed a worldwide demand for nuclear reactors. Eventually, control over 
the nuclear fuel cycle in Third World countries would set the stage for 
production. 
In India, however, a nuclear weapons program would be much less cost-
effective than current conventional defenses. In India's case, there appears 
to be no relevance to France's argument under President Charles De 
Gaulle in the early 1960s that a nuclear weapons program would reduce the 
overall cost of defense by reducing the need for conventional forces. In 
India, a defense program is often judged by whether it is labor-intensive or 
capital-intensive. In a nation with an abundance of cheap labor, capital-
intensive proposals such as those of the Indian air force and Indian navy 
require a convincing strategic justification. The labor-intensive programs 
of the Indian army have generally consumed about two-thirds of the annual 
funds allocated to Indian defense. 36 Pakistan has responded with similar 
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types of military planning, setting in motion a self-perpetuating strategic 
justification for emphasizing conventional army programs. 
In the light of these economic and strategic rationales, a nuclear weap-
ons program would appear unattractive, even self-defeating. It would 
employ only a small scientific community in India (in 1981-82, the Depart-
ment of Atomic Energy employed 19,158 scientific and technical person-
nel and 12,498 administrative and auxiliary stam.37 It would trigger 
strategic nuclear responses in Pakistan and China, setting off a costly and 
dangerous arms race in South Asia. 
In short, there are both civilian and military purposes underlying 
India's nuclear energy program. Maintaining the weapons option serves to 
justifY outlays for nuclear power whatever the current commercial viability 
of this source of energy. At the same time, nuclear power is desirable in its 
own right, since it is expected to cover potential shortfalls between India's 
total demand and the conventional sources of energy, and nuclear energy 
appears all the more attractive in the face of OPEC's volatile pricing and 
supply policies of the recent past. The civilian pursuit of nuclear energy 
would give India a basis for embarking on nuclear weapons development if 
necessary, on the grounds that the cost would be only incrementally higher 
than for a nuclear energy program. While it might be difficult to justify 
either nuclear energy development or a nuclear weapons push on their 
own, taken together the two initiatives provide a mutually reinforcing 
strategic-economic justification. 
CoNCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 
The overall degree of development in India may be measured by the 
growth in electric power generation for the industrial, agricultural, and 
household sectors, which relies almost exclusively on coal-fired thermal, 
hydroelectric, and nuclear plants. While oil is critical in the transportation 
and petrochemical industrial sectors and, as kerosene, for cooking in the 
household sector, it is not used much for power generation except in the 
agricultural sector. The pace of growth in electricity generation has stead-
ily improved since the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66), with the annual rate 
of growth nearly doubling by the 1980s. (See table 2.1.) 
While the major role in electricity generation is played by coal-fired 
thermal plants, the importance of hydroelectric power is rapidly increas-
ing and the planned shift in this direction reflects the abundance of 
untapped energy that may be obtained from India's rivers. Indeed, much 
of northern and northeastern India may be serviced by hydroelectric 
power if the waters of the mighty Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers and their 
tributaries are properly harnessed. Nuclear power remains insignificant in 
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Table 2.1. Growth of power-generating capacity in India 
(Megawatts) 
Coal Hydroelectric Nuclear Total 
1961-68 
Total added 19,281 (62%) 11,386 (36%) 640 (2%) 31,307 
Avg. annual addition 1,134 670 38 1,842 
1980-85 
Total added 10,898 (77%) 2,873 (20%) 455 (3%) 14,226 
Avg. annual addition 2,180 575 91 2,845 
1985-90 
Planned additions 15,999 (72%) 5,541 (25%) 705 (3%) 22,245 
Planned avg. ann. add. 3,200 1,108 141 4,449 
Total installed 
capacity, 1986 29,856 (64%) 15,477 (33%) 1,270 (3%) 46,603 
Source: Figures derived and calculated from Ministry oflnformation and Broadcasting, India: 
1986, New Delhi, 1987, p. 396. 
*This period of years was chosen for comparative purposes only. 
terms of total power generated, partly because of serious teething prob-
lems in the nuclear industry that are expected to be overcome by 1990. In 
the next decade, nuclear power is expected to contribute about 10 percent 
of the total power generated in India. 
More than 15 years after the onset of the international oil crisis in 1973, 
the energy crisis in India now appears over or is subdued, as elsewhere in 
the world. The oversupply of oil on the international market from the 
mid-1980s onward, arising from the entry of Mexico into the export 
market, the production of North Sea oil, and the completion of the Alaskan 
oil pipeline in the United States, has sowed dissent among the OPEC 
nations regarding production quotas and controls on prices. These trends 
at times over the past 15 years have brought international oil prices down to 
about $10-14 per barrel, roughly the level that preceded the crisis in 
1974.38 Although the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war of attrition cut off much of the 
oil supplies available from these two countries, India managed to maintain 
modest imports from both these sources, meanwhile diversifying its sup-
pliers and increasing domestic production. 
Domestic oil exploration and production, in particular, has contributed 
substantially toward relieving the import burden. There has been only a 
marginal annual increase in Indian oil imports since 1973, with the bulk of 
Indian needs now being supplied domestically. Oil production in India 
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increased from 7 million MT in 1973 to 14 million in 1980 and to 29 million 
in the fiscal year 1984-85.39 The 1984-85 domestic production figure 
represents almost 75 percent of the total oil procurement for that period. 
The improvement in domestic production is likely to continue under the 
government's new policy of seeking greater participation from Western 
multinational oil corporations for oil exploration in India. 
Although there is the potential for supply dislocations in coal arising 
from strikes by coal miners and railway workers, there have been no major 
problems in this respect in recent years. India continues to depend on 
railway transportation to keep coal-fired thermal plants in operation 
throughout the country, as highlighted by recent increases. Coal supplies 
to power stations throughout India during the fiscal year 1981-82 totaled 40 
million MT, about 20 percent higher than in the previous year. There were 
4,365 railway wagons available in January 1982 for coal transportation, up 
12 percent the previous year. 40 
The incorporation of the public sector National Thermal Power Corpo-
ration (NTPC) and the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) 
in 1975 was intended to speed up the installation of new conventional 
power plants. The NTPC is currently in the process of setting up seven 
coal-fired super power stations with a total installed capacity of 10,900 
MW, at Singrauli and Rihand (Uttar Pradesh), Korba and Vindhyachal 
(Madhya Pradesh), Farraka (West Bengal), Kahalgaon (Bihar), and 
Ramagundam (Andhra Pradesh). Similarly, the NHPC is in the process of 
implementing the Salal and Dulhasti hydroelectric projects (in Jammu and 
Kashmir), as well as hydroelectric plants at Koel Karo (in Bihar), Chamera 
(in Himachal Pradesh), and Tanakpur (in Uttar Pradesh). However, in spite 
of fresh efforts to harness India's rivers, hydroelectric power remains 
inadequately exploited, and a clean and renewable source of energy is 
wasted. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a softening of international efforts 
to curb India's nuclear energy program, especially after the Reagan admin-
istration chose to play down antiproliferation in favor of wooing Pakistan to 
fight the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. On the other hand, there 
appears to be no overt effort by India at present to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Efforts by the U.S. Congress in the late 1970s to block the supply 
of enriched uranium for the Tarapur nuclear power plant in Bombay, 
because oflndia's refusal to sign the NPT, have been partly offset through 
an arrangement negotiated by the Carter administration with France to 
provide the enriched uranium to India. Meanwhile, various technical 
difficulties continue to delay India's development of nuclear energy. 
The main setback has been the denial of heavy water by Canada for the 
CANDU power reactors after India's efforts to obtain heavy water from its 
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plants proved to be a dismal failure. The heavy water plants built in India 
have functioned at less than 10 percent of capacity, and only three of the 
five plants were operative by the mid-1980s. Lack of heavy water has at 
times idled the Rajasthan and Madras nuclear reactors. To keep the 
Rajasthan reactor in operation, India turned to the Soviet Union for 
imports of heavy water, and this external dependence has persisted. In 
1988, press reports claimed that India had also obtained heavy water from 
Norway.41 
The more uncertain and disturbing aspects of the Indian energy prob-
lem for the future are the political and security-related byproducts. Even 
though the general energy supply situation has improved, certain political 
and security legacies of the 1970s remain. In the first place, the oil crisis 
reinforced the Indian commitment to nuclear energy despite increasing 
international and domestic constraints. Since nuclear energy objectives 
are not likely to be discarded-indeed they might have persisted even 
without the oil crisis-India will stay a short step away from a major 
nuclear weapons capability at an acceptable economic cost. This potential 
initially set Pakistan on the "dedicated path" toward acquiring nuclear 
weapons capability and subsequently toward an imitative policy of nuclear 
energy initiatives that may be diverted to weapon purposes at short notice. 
An overt or covert Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race will have implications 
for the Middle East as well, as both countries compete for economic favors 
from this region in exchange for nuclear technology and equipment. Such 
an eventuality would accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation and in-
crease the risks of nuclear war in the region. 42 
In the second place, the glut of petrodollars in the Middle East resulted 
in a large-scale buildup of sophisticated conventional arms in the region, 
especially in Saudi Arabia. While this trend is likely to slow as OPEC oil 
revenues decline, there were fears in India at one time of Pakistani military 
links with Saudi Arabia and Libya that might advance Pakistani conven-
tional and nuclear weapons capability. Following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States chose to arm Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia. U.S. arms sales to Pakistan were partly financed by 
Saudi Arabia, one of the military links between the Middle East and South 
Asia. India's earlier fears of a Pakistani-Libyan link lay in the possible 
financing of a Pakistani nuclear weapons program. India's military counter-
response to these trends was to acquire a substantial arms package from 
the Soviet Union that included MiG-23, MiG-25, and the advanced 
MiG-29 aircraft as well as T-72 tanks. India also procured the advanced 
Mirage-2000 combat aircraft. Meanwhile, any Pakistani development of nu-
clear weapons, whether overt or covert, with or without Saudi and Libyan 
assistance, is likely to trigger a major nuclear weapons initiative in India. 
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Indian economic and defense planners have translated the lessons of the 
international energy crisis into some pragmatic and successful policies in 
recent years. However, the persistence of old energy-related economic 
and security issues and the rise of new concerns in these areas will 
continue to test India's economic and security policies during the next 
decade. 
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3 
South Korea 
TONG WHAN PARK 
Despite the global trend of declining interest in nuclear energy, South 
Korea continues to invest heavily in building new reactors to generate 
electricity. Although the first reactor was built as recently as 1978, South 
Korea is already a major producer of nuclear energy; measured by the 
actual level of generation, its nine operating reactors currently meet more 
than half of the domestic demand for electricity. By 1999, five more nuclear 
power plants will go into operation. When all fourteen reactors become 
fully operational, they will make South Korea one of the top ten countries 
in the world in the generation of nuclear-powered electricity. 
South Korea's dependence on nuclear energy is the result of conscious 
planning by the government. It goes without saying that the onset of the oil 
crisis in 1973-74 served as a catalyst for Seoul's decision to go nuclear. For a 
country that had based its industrialization on imported petroleum, nu-
clear energy was probably the only viable alternative to hedge against 
future oil shocks. What is unique is that South Korea has followed through 
with its program for nuclear energy development, while most countries 
have not. In fact, South Korea is the only country in the world that is still 
expanding its nuclear power generation. Are Koreans not sensitive to the 
environmental and health hazards of nuclear energy? Or is Seoul's bu-
reaucratic inertia too strong to be affected by the real and potential dangers 
of nuclear accidents, as shown in the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl 
plants? The answers to these questions are neither simple nor straightfor-
ward. Making the matter even more complex, there still exists a lingering 
doubt about the possibility of South Korea's development of its own 
nuclear weapons. 
Regardless of the undesirable side effects of nuclear power, South 
Korea's topmost priority is the security of energy supply to sustain its 
economic growth. Without energy supplies, the survival of the nation itself 
is threatened. Like any country that depends on imported energy, South 
Korea faces two critical challenges in solving its energy problems. One is 
the restructuring of its energy sources to reduce the heavy reliance on 
foreign oil. The other is to secure an uninterrupted supply of petroleum 
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through diversification of suppliers and establishment of interdependent 
links with petroleum-exporting nations. Success in the first task hinges 
upon the development of alternative sources of energy, with special em-
phasis on nuclear-generated electricity. The second task would require a 
set of creative and carefully orchestrated policies toward oil exporters. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the political economy of energy 
in South Korea in the context of these policy goals. Specifically, this 
chapter examines: (1) the process of energy-driven industrialization in 
Korea; (2) the development of alternative sources of energy to replace and/ 
or complement petroleum; (3) the issues of external and internal security 
in light of various sources of energy; and (4) the prospects and problems of 
Korea's potential for nuclear weapons development. 
THE 'MIRACLE OF THE HAN RIVER' 
After his rise to power in 1961, the late President Park Chung-Hee began 
preaching the doctrine of "nation-building through industrialization and 
exportation." He saw in industrial exports the only path for South Korea's 
survival in the second half of the twentieth century. To him, economic 
development was not merely a legitimizing device for his regime. Instead, 
it reached the status of a religion. Without Park's charisma and genuine 
belief in the doctrine, South Korea might not have become a leader among 
the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in such a short time span. 
It is widely held that during the first three Five-Year Economic De-
velopment Plans (1962-76), South Korea made the transition to a modern 
industrial state. Often called the miracle of the Han River, the country's 
performance in export-led industrial expansion during this period was 
phenomenal indeed. A World Bank report on South Korea described its 
industrial growth in these words: 
Manufactured exports rose rapidly in the early 1960s, albeit from a small 
base, but the real "turning point" in both export and industrial growth came 
around 1965, during a period of trade liberalization and other major policy 
reforms. In the decade following 1965, manufactured export growth coupled 
with rising domestic demand fueled industrialization much faster than 
before. The compound annual rate of growth in the index of manufacturing 
output was 11% from 1955 to 1965; it increased to 24% from 1965 to 1975. 
Underlying the acceleration of manufacturing output growth, the share of 
exports in manufacturing (gross) output, which was nil in 1955, rose from 
roughly 6% in 1965 to nearly 25% in 1975. Within a decade, from 1965 to 
1975, the ratio of total exports to GNP more than trebled and the share of 
GNP originating in the manufacturing sector more than doubled. Manufac-
tured products constituted 42% of total exports in 1965 and 74% in 1975.1 
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Clearly, South Korea's economy owed its takeoff to the structural 
change in patterns of production. Mining and manufacturing sectors 
(construction industry excluded) increased their share from 11.7 percent of 
the GNP in 1962 to 33 percent in 1977, while the agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries sectors saw a sharp drop in their aggregate share, from 43.6 
percent in 1962 to 21.7 percent in 1977. In particular, the heavy and 
petrochemical industries led the modernization drive in South Korea's 
economy. The output ofiron and steel products increased 33-fold from 1961 
to 1973. The machinery industry also achieved vigorous growth by adopt-
ing the tactics of mass production, specialization, and vertical integration. 
The result was sharply increased output during the period 1961-72: growth 
of2.3 times in general machinery, 14.6 times in electrical machinery, and 
9. 8 times in the transport industry. Production capacity of the chemical 
fertilizer industry rose more than 17 times from 1961 to 1973. The petro-
chemical industry, established in 1968, paralleled the development of the 
oil industry. 
The economic growth and the rapid progress in industrialization created 
higher demand for electric power, and the Seoul government responded 
by encouraging public and private investment in electric power projects. 
During the fifteen-year period of the first three five-year plans (1962-76), 
twenty-nine electric power plants were added to the existing roster of 
thirteen-seven hydroelectric and six thermal. The additional generating 
capacity was mostly thermal: twenty-three new thermal plants, compared 
with only six hydroelectric plants. In 1977, power generation capacity 
totaled 5. 79 million kilowatts (kw), a 15. 8-fold increase from 1961. As shown 
in figure 1, hydroelectric capacity declined from 33.1 percent of the total in 
1961 to 12.3 percent in 1977, while the thermal power share rose from 66.9 
percent to 87.7 percent. (See figure 3.1.) 
During the early stage of building new thermal power plants, coal was 
to be the primary fuel. In the late 1960s, however, coal began to be 
replaced by petroleum. While in 1962 coal accounted for three-fourths of 
the total fuel for South Korean power plants, petroleum accounted for 
more than 91 percent of total energy supply in 1977. 
Paralleling the rising use of petroleum in electricity generation, the 
overall level of energy consumption increased exponentially and its pat-
tern changed drastically during the period 1962-76. Total energy consump-
tion in South Korea climbed from 10.3 million MT of oil equivalent to 30.3 
million MT, almost a threefold jump in fifteen years. The pattern of energy 
consumption changed mainly in the area of petroleum (figure 2). During 
the fifteen-year period from 1962 to 1976, oil consumption increased 
phenomenally, from 1 million MT to 17.8 million MT. On the other hand, 
consumption offirewood dropped from 5.3 million MT of oil equivalent in 
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Figure 3.1. Electric power generating capacity in South Korea 
1961 - 1977 
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1962 to 3.2 million MT in 1976, a 40 percent decrease. Coal and hydro-
electric power consumption rose 2.3 and 2.5 times, respectively, during 
the same period. Consequently, the shares of the four primary energy 
sources in South Korea changed radically from 1962 to 1976. Petroleum 
(including natural gas) increased its share of total energy consumption 
from 9.8 to 58.8 percent, while firewood fell from 51.7 to 10.5 percent, coal 
from36.8to29.3percent, and hydroelectric power from 1. 7 to 1.5percent. 
Essentially the same pattern held true from 1976 to 1983, with only minor 
fluctuations from year to year. The respective shares in 1983 were 56.2 
percent for petroleum, 33.1 percent for coal, 1.4 percent for hydro-
electricity, 4.8 percent for firewood and charcoal, and 4.5 percent for 
nuclear-generated electric power. During the same period, total energy 
consumption rose by 164 percent. After 1983, there was a marked shift 
away from dependence on oil in favor of nuclear energy. By 1986, pe-
troleum's share of total energy use fell to 46.7 percent, while that of nuclear 
energy rose to 11.6 percent. Hydroelectricity was little changed, at 1. 7 
percent, while coal and firewood accounted for 37.6 and 2.4 percent, 
respectively. South Korea started using liquified natural gas (LNG) in 
1986, and its share increased from 1. 0 percent to 3. 0 percent within a year. 2 
In an attempt to satisfY the increasing demand for petroleum products, 
South Korea built its first oil refinery in 1964, in equal partnership with the 
Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States. Known first as Yukong Limited 
and later as the Korea Oil Corporation, this joint venture started com mer-
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Figure 3.2. South Korean consumption of primary energy 
Source Mtnistry of Energy and Resources 
cial operation at the Ulsan refinery at a capacity of 35,000 barrels per day 
(bpd). Since the economic development plans required a stable supply of 
petroleum products, Korea proceeded to construct four more refineries: 
Kukdong Oil Co., Ltd. went on stream in 1966; Honam Oil Refinery Co., 
Ltd. in 1969; Kyungin Energy Co., Ltd. in 1972; and Ssangyong Oil 
Refining Co., Ltd. in 1980. As shown in table 1, Korea's petroleum refining 
capacity has grown in leaps and bounds to 790,000 bpd. 
With the rising demand for oil as the major source of energy for 
industrial and public use, the volume of imported crude oil increased 
steeply: from 5.8 million barrels in 1964 to over 69 million barrels in 1970, 
then to almost 183 million in 1981. Like most importing countries, South 
Korea reduced its crude oil imports after the oil crisis ofl979-80, to a level 
ofl78.4 million barrels in 1982. With the phenomenal economic growth in 
the 1980s, however, South Korea had to increase its oil imports 
thereafter-from 193 million barrels in 1983 to 230 million in 1986. The 
total dependence on foreign suppliers for crude oil has imposed a heavy 
burden on South Korea's foreign exchange reserve. 
Sudden upsurges in petroleum prices following the two international oil 
crises caused foreign exchange spent for crude oil imports to jump from 
$305 million in 1973 to $2 billion in 1977 and then to over $6 billion in 1982. 
(See table 2.) In 1982, crude oil imports amounted to 25.1 percent of the 
total import bill and equaled 27.8 percent of South Korea's export reve-
nues. During the period 1964-77, the most critical era in South Korea's 
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Table 3.1. Petroleum refining capacity in South Korea 
(Thousands of barrels per day) 
Total Yukong Honam Kyungin Ssangyong Kukdong 
1964 35 35 
1965 35 35 
1966 40 35 5 
1967 60 55 5 
1968 120 115 5 
1969 180 115 60 5 
1970 220 115 100 5 
1971 270 115 100 50 5 
1972 400 175 160 60 5 
1973 400 175 160 60 5 
1974 440 215 160 60 5 
1975 440 215 160 60 5 
1976 440 215 160 60 5 
1977 440 215 160 60 5 
1978 580 280 230 60 10 
1979 580 280 230 60 10 
1980 640 280 230 60 60 10 
1981 790 280 380 60 60 10 
1982 790 280 380 60 60 10 
1983 790 280 380 60 60 10 
1984 790 280 380 60 60 10 
1985 790 280 380 60 60 10 
1986 790 280 380 60 60 10 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Resources. 
economic development, annual imports of petroleum increased 26.5 
times, from 5.8 million to 154.5 million barrels. In the meantime, outlays 
for foreign crude increased 160 times, from $12.5 million to $2 billion. 
Uncertainties about international oil prices intensified during this 
period, when petroleum exporters wielded the "oil weapon" as an instru-
ment of foreign policy. It was fortunate for South Korea that the price of 
crude oil started to decrease in 1983 as part of the global phenomena 
known as the "three lows"-the other two areas of decline being interest 
rates and the value of the U.S. dollar. The cost of oil in 1986 for Seoul was 
less than $3.5 billion despite the import volume of over 230 million barrels. 
South Korea is handicapped in oil procurement by its limited number of 
sources. As shown in table 3, Kuwait supplied 100 percent of South Korea's 
petroleum needs in 1964, and until1968 its sole suppliers were the two 
Middle Eastern countries of Kuwait and Iran. Saudi Arabia began ship-
ping crude oil to South Korea in 1969 and was a dominant source from 1973 
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Table 3.2. South Korea's bill for crude oil imports 
Import bill 
Import FOB basis C & F basis 
volume 
(000 bbl) Total (000) $/bbl Total (000) $/bbl 
1964 5,835 $ 9,426 $ 1.62 $ 12,607 $ 2.14 
1965 11,170 18,092 1.62 23,677 2.12 
1966 14,202 22,810 1.61 29,803 2.10 
1967 18,638 28,852 1.55 37,909 2.03 
1968 36,409 52,637 1.45 70,683 1.94 
1969 55,889 77,621 1.39 97,681 1.75 
1970 69,150 95,918 1.39 118,916 1.72 
1971 85,425 147,944 1.73 178,761 2.09 
1972 92,581 176,320 1.90 221,077 2.39 
1973 103,210 253,020 2.45 305,158 2.96 
1974 112,703 1,013,522 8.99 1,104,833 2.80 
1975 117,795 1,241,214 10.54 1,328,152 11.28 
1976 132,407 1,492,011 11.27 1,580,003 11.93 
1977 154,549 1,890,104 12.23 2,000,075 12.94 
1978 166,532 2,042,764 12.27 2,173,680 13.05 
1979 185,153 3,153,352 17.00 3,330,608 17.95 
1980 182,861 5,431,438 29.70 5,641,434 30.85 
1981 180,316 6,237,384 34.12 6,504,165 35.58 
1982 178,369 5,854,300 32.82 6,075,324 34.06 
1983 192,888 5,550,319 28.77 5,767,996 29.90 
1984 199,681 5,587,105 27.98 5,807,394 29.08 
1985 198,313 5,289,381 26.67 5,499,593 27.73 
1986 230,063 3,259,118 14.17 3,474,588 15.10 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Resources. 
to 1984, when Iran became the largest supplier. After 1983, the Seoul 
government accelerated its efforts to diversify the sources of oil supply, 
reducing the dependence on the Middle Eastern oil from 7 4 percent in 
1983 to 60.5 percent in 1986. 
The strong association between South Korea's industrialization process 
and its rising dependence on crude oil is clear. Not only did the GNP grow 
along with petroleum consumption, but the rate of increase in manufactur-
ing output closely matched that of crude oil imports. During the period 
1965-75, for example, the annual rate of growth in the compound index of 
manufacturing output was 24 percent, while the average annual growth 
rate for oil imports was 28.9 percent. According to the forecasts of the 
Seoul government, South Korea's dependence on foreign oil will remain 
high through the 1990s, close to the 1986level of 47 percent.3 There are 
three basic reasons for this outlook. First of all, domestic coal production 
has reached a plateau, due to the combination of a poor resource base and 
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Table 3.3. Sources of South Korea's crude oil imports 
(Thousands of barrels) 
Middle East Middle 
Saudi & South 
Arabia Kuwait Iran Oman Other Asia Africa America Total 
1964 5,835 5,835 
1965 7,137 4,033 11,170 
1966 8,513 5,689 14,202 
1967 11,209 7,435 18,638 
1968 17,997 18,412 36,409 
1969 12,545 24,464 18,880 55,889 
1970 21,995 24,998 22,197 69,150 
1971 30,548 43,984 10,802 85,425 
1972 30,867 46,628 2,824 6,262 92,581 
1973 63,411 19,401 4,554 15,844 103,210 
1974 73,713 18,866 3,305 16,799 112,703 
1975 51,867 53,637 882 11,415 117,795 
1976 52,640 52,406 14,234 13,127 132,407 
1977 83,396 49,657 16,766 4,730 154,549 
1978 95,840 50,789 12,912 6,991 166,532 
1979 98,865 59,887 19,809 6,953 154 185,513 
1980 111,853 47,612 15,515 7,881 182,861 
1981 104,900 38,800 14,500 7,700 5,100 1,500 10,300 182,800 
1982 88,500 21,300 22,900 2,800 21,900 6,400 14,500 178,400 
1983 58,900 20,700 31,400 17,900 14,000 26,300 12,100 11,700 193,000 
1984 35,800 15,800 39,800 24,100 17,200 38,500 12,000 16,200 199,700 
1985 13,700 17,500 34,100 23,100 24,500 48,000 11,900 25,400 198,300 
1986 21,300 13,200 37,400 27,800 39,600 51,200 14,000 25,600 230,100 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Resources. 
unfavorable mining conditions. Rising income will also lead to heating of 
living quarters with oil rather than anthracite coal. Second, South Korea 
will experience an exponential growth in the transportation industry, 
especially for privately owned passenger cars. The third factor is South 
Korea's limited potential in alternative sources of energy. The develop-
ment potential for hydroelectric and tidal power is extremely small. 
Plagued with technical and economic problems, solar energy will not 
make a significant contribution to South Korea's energy supply in the 
foreseeable future. Except for nuclear energy, it appears that Seoul has 
little latitude in the development of alternative energy sources. 
NUCLEAR ENERGY AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE 
Korea's GNP is expected to grow at an annual average rate of 7 percent 
through the end of this century, according to a recent forecast made by the 
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Table 3.4. Long-term energy demand forecast for South Korea 
(Provisional; thousand tons of oil equivalent) 
1986 1991 2001 2010 
Petroleum 28,500 (46.7%) 38,100 (47%) 57,900 (47%) 70,800 (43%) 
Anthracite Coal 12,800 (21.0%) 12,800 (16%) 7,500 ( 6%) 5,100 ( 3%) 
Bituminous Coal 10,100 (16.5%) 13,300 (16%) 33,700 (27%) 51,500 (31%) 
Nuclear 7,100 (11.6%) 12,500 (15%) 18,400 (15%) 27,300 (16%) 
LNG 100 (0.2%) 2,600 ( 3%) 2,600 ( 2%) 6,500 ( 4%) 
Hydro and firewood 2,500 (4.0%) 2,700 ( 3%) 3,200 ( 3%) 4,800 ( 3%) 
Total 61,100 (100%) 82,000 (100%) 123,400 (100%) 166,000 (100%) 
Source: Ministry of Energy & Resources. 
government. Energy demand will rise by approximately 5 percent an-
nually until the year 2001, then by only 3.4 percent from 2002 to 2010. The 
reliance on imported energy will likewise increase, from 66.5 percent in 
1986 to 76.4 percent in 2001 and 77.6 percent by 2010.4 
Confronted with growing dependence on imported energy, South 
Korea has been seeking a structural transition in the composition of energy 
sources. The main thrust has been to reduce the shares of petroleum and 
anthracite coal while increasing those of nuclear energy, bituminous coal, 
and LNG. Nuclear energy accounted for only 2 percent of the country's 
energy demand in 1982 but rose to 11.6 percent in 1986. In September 1989 
the ninth nuclear reactor went into operation, bringing installed nuclear 
capacity to 7.62 million kilowatts (kw), representing 36.5 percent of 
Korea's total electricity generating capacity. By 2001, nuclear power will 
meet a projected 15 percent of total energy needs. Bituminous coal, which 
raised its share from 12.2 percent of total energy demand in 1982 to 16.5 
percent in 1986, will reach 27 percent in 2001, according to provisional 
energy forecasts (table 4). On the other hand, the Seoul government's 
energy policy calls for a declining share of the energy mix for petroleum. 
Whereas oil accounted for 57.8 percent of energy used in 1982, its contri-
bution was lowered to 46.7 percent in 1986 and will remain at that level 
throughout the 1990s. 
To achieve such an ambitious transition in energy configuration, Seoul's 
planners employed a number of strategies, including the diversification of 
oil supply sources, "development import" of oil and coal from overseas, 
and a concentrated investment in nuclear energy. The centerpiece of 
Seoul's plan is the controversial program to increase its dependence on 
nuclear-generated electricity. This approach seems to have been working 
so far, even though it has seen its share of problems. 
For a rapidly industrializing country like South Korea, the supply of 
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electricity for industrial use is the backbone of sustained economic growth. 
Confronted with the reality of an unstable oil market, Koreans have 
accepted nuclear power as the primary alternative for the supply of 
electricity up to the year 2000. In 1981, nuclear reactors accounted for only 
6 percent of the electricity generated, while oil-powered plants supplied 
74.2 percent of demand. By 2001, Seoul hopes to lower oil's share of power 
generation to a meager 11.3 percent, while raising nuclear power to 36.1 
percent of total supply and keeping it there. The relative proportion of 
hydroelectric plants will remain stable, while coal-fired power generation 
is expected to rise. 
Korea's decision-makers saw three opportunities in this approach. 
First, relief from the burden of heavy reliance on foreign petroleum is 
desirable from the political-economic standpoint. The plan is especially 
attractive because it complements nicely Korea's attempt to explore its 
own sources of crude oil. The second opportunity is the internalization of 
nuclear technology. No major breakthrough has yet been made in the 
search for alternative sources of oil that are both safe and inexpensive. 
Solar, geothermal, and other exotic energies will make only limited contri-
butions during the next decade. Given the premise that nuclear power is 
perhaps the only viable alternative to petroleum in the foreseeable future, 
it becomes imperative for the South Koreans to internalize the nuclear 
technology. The third opportunity in "going nuclear" takes advantage of 
the severely shrinking demand in the international nuclear industry. For 
example, the industry received orders for only two reactors in 1978-both 
from South Korea, while the global nuclear industry has the total capacity 
for building 15 to 20 generators per year. In such a buyer's market, South 
Korea can bargain for the best possible deal by playing one supplier against 
the others. 
There are some serious problems, however, in an energy development 
plan that puts an excessive weight on nuclear power. Nuclear reactor 
technology is controlled by a small number of suppliers, upon which South 
Korea will have to remain dependent for a considerable period of time. 
Only a handful of foreign companies are involved in the nuclear power 
plants under construction or in operation in South Korea (table 5). Since 
Koreans lack the know-how for nuclear power generation, there is no 
assurance that they will be treated fairly by these foreign firms. A highly 
publicized scandal over claims of overcharging by the Bechtel Corporation 
is eloquent testimony to Seoul's vulnerability. According to the heated 
debate in the National Assembly's Trade and Industry Committee, the 
Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) concluded "unfavorable contracts" 
with the Bechtel Group for the design and construction of four nuclear 
power plants in South Korea. Opposition lawmakers called for the revision 
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Table 3.5. Nuclear power plants in South Korea 
(February 1989) 
Capacity 
Plant (kw) Type 
KoRi 1 556,000 PWR 
KoRi2 605,000 PWR 
KoRi3 895,000 PWR 
KoRi 4 895,000 PWR 
Wolsong 629,000 PHWR 
Yongkwang 1 900,000 PWR 
Yongkwang 2 900,000 PWR 
Ulchin 1 920,000 PWR 
Ulchin 2 920,000 PWR 
Yongkwang 3 950,000 PWR 
Yongkwang 4 950,000 PWR 














of the bilateral contracts to avert future incidents of overcharging. In part 
due to this political pressure, KEPCO received in 1984 a refund of close to 
$5 million of the $16 million allegedly overpaid to Bechtel. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the complex case involving the Bechtel Corporation, the 
cause may be the practice by which "Bechtel submits bills and KEPCO pays." 
A second drawback for nuclear power in South Korea is that the fuel 
must be imported, at the cost oflarge amounts offoreign exchange, since 
Korea does not produce uranium at an economically profitable level. The 
Ministry of Energy and Resources has estimated that uranium imports in 
1987 totaled 298 tons at a cost of$192 million; in 1988, the total was 342 tons 
of uranium oxide costing $312 million. 5 Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that uranium-exporting countries will refrain from the pattern set by some 
oil-exporting nations in raising prices and threatening embargoes. As long 
as South Korea remains an ally of the United States, however, the danger of 
nuclear fuel shortage is not likely to materialize. 
The third obstacle is the environmental hazard posed by nuclear reac-
tors and wastes. South Korea has experienced no major reactor accidents 
to date, but that does not mean that the country's safety record has been 
above the international standard. In 1987, routine check-ups of the reac-
tors in operation revealed fifty-five violations and inadequate observations 
of safety rules. As a result, there were twenty-six unscheduled shutdowns 
in South Korea in one year. The frequency of unscheduled shutdowns was 
3.7 per reactor, comparable to that of the U.S.-3.9 per reactor in 1986. 
But the incidence in South Korea was seven times higher than Japan's 0.5 
shutdowns per reactor. 
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The primary reason for South Korea's nuclear safety problem is organi-
zational: the government body charged with safety inspection lacks in-
stitutional independence, as well as trained personnel. The highest 
responsibility for nuclear safety lies with the Atomic Energy Commission, 
which reports to the prime minister. Of the six members of the commis-
sion, four are ex officio: the minister of the Economic Planning Board, the 
minister of science and technology, the minister of energy and resources, 
and the president of KEPCO. The inclusion of the latter two casts doubt 
about the neutrality of the commission's work, for they are the key 
architects and managers of nuclear power plants. In a case in point, the 
commission made a fifty-two-point recommendation to upgrade reactor 
safety after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, but eight recom-
mended items have yet to be accepted by KEPCO on the grounds that the 
measures would cost over $12.5 million per reactor. 
It is no accident that many South Koreans are advocating a change of 
status for the commission. Instead of operating under the office of the 
prime minister, they argue, the commission should report directly to the 
president, as does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United 
States. The Achilles heel of South Korea's nuclear safety, however, is the 
control of the Atomic Energy Safety Center, charged with the task of 
inspecting nuclear power plants for environmental hazards. The center is 
affiliated with the Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute, which not 
only depends on KEPCO for funding but also has KEPCO's president as 
its chairman of the board. With such an institutional setup, it is difficult to 
conduct safety inspections impartially and independently. 
Balancing its advantages with its problems, Korea's nuclear develop-
ment plan appears to be a mixed blessing. From the viewpoint of energy 
supply, the plan seems quite adequate despite the weakness in safeguards. 
From the larger perspective of the global political economy, there is room 
for reconsideration. During the next two decades, OPEC's member na-
tions will undergo the process of industrial revolution. Along with the 
capital acquired in the form of petrodollars, they will need technology and 
skilled labor. It is the latter requirement on which South Korea may 
continue to capitalize. By tying purchases of crude oil to the supply of 
technology, South Korea could enjoy a competitive edge in a scramble for 
the OPEC market. But an enhanced linkage with oil exporters need not 
lead to a higher dependence on imported oil, for South Korea's petroleum 
dependence is already too high. 
ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
In an analysis of South Korea's energy outlook and strategy for the future, it 
is imperative to examine the problem of security as it relates to energy: 
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specifically, the question of safeguarding energy sources and energy-related 
installations. South Korea faces threats from both without and within, and any 
damage inflicted upon its energy system will have far-reaching repercussions 
beyond the losses themselves. At stake will be not only the survival of a 
regime but also the viability of the state itself An in-depth look at the sources 
of threat to South Korea's energy supply sheds light on the directions the 
government may take to maximize energy-related security. It also gives a 
glimpse of past attempts and the current posture of government planners 
toward development of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. 
Two major considerations govern Seoul's strategic thinking about the 
external security of energy. One is the safety of the sea lanes through which 
oil tankers pass, while the other is the constant threat of attack by North 
Korean infiltrators. As for the shipping routes, there is little South Korea 
can do but act prudently to minimize the risks. The country's dependence 
on Middle Eastern oil has been so great that even during times of crisis in 
the Persian Gulf, its imports from the region have continued at the normal 
rate. The government has emergency plans in the unlikely event that the 
Persian Gulf is closed, however. The Ministry of Energy and Resources 
predicts that its reserve oil stockpile would carry South Korea for 102 days 
and could be stretched to cover 150 days should the emergency plan go 
into effect. The stockpile contains 23.8 million barrels of crude oil and 12.4 
million barrels of petroleum products, equivalent to 65 days' use at normal 
rate of consumption. In addition, South Korea has a standing commitment 
from the United States to help secure oil in case of emergencies. 
Despite the sizable stockpile and the U.S. pledge of assistance, how-
ever, disruption of oil supply would have a highly negative impact on South 
Korea's economy. One report of the Korea Development Institute forecasts 
that a 20 percent drop in oil supply for six months would reduce national 
income by 11.9 percent, cause unemployment for l. 35 million people, and 
reduce exports and imports by 12.9 and 24.1 percent, respectively. Even 
more pessimistic, the government's think tank projects that if oil supply is 
reduced by 30 percent, the effects on national income and unemployment 
will be almost double those of a 20 percent reduction. 6 
Whereas the possible closure of the Persian Gulf poses a severe threat, 
its impact would not be limited to South Korea. In fact, such an eventuality 
would most likely bring about a global crisis over which Seoul could 
exercise little control. From Seoul's standpoint, no less menacing than a 
crisis in the Gulf is the threat from North Korea against energy supply and 
installations in the South. One of the major targets would be oil and LNG 
tankers en route to South Korea. Vessels owned or chartered by South 
Koreans are easy prey for surprise attacks by North Korean guerrillas, as 
witnessed in the November 1987 terrorist attack on Korean Air Flight 858. 
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It is widely known that Pyongyang is undergoing a critical transition of 
power from Kim Il-Sung to his son Kim Chong-II. In an attempt to divert 
domestic tensions about the succession, Pyongyang may ignite confronta-
tions with the South. It has a contingent of 100,000 specially trained 
commandos that can be deployed for any type of unconventional warfare. 
South Korea has uncovered four underground tunnels in the Demilita-
rized Zone that could have been used for the infiltration of troops, and it is 
estimated that North Korea is digging more than twenty such tunnels in 
the hope that some may evade detection. Moreover, Pyongyang has often 
sent guerrillas with underwater gear aboard speedboats, who could cause 
untold damage should they be successful in attacking the operating nu-
clear reactors in South Korea, which are located in or near the coastal 
areas, within easy reach of seaborne attackers. Beside nuclear reactors, oil 
refineries and conventional power plants could be crippled by North 
Korean commandos. Seoul has a strong military force and a well-trained 
militia, of course, and it places a high priority on the protection of its 
industrial sites. But the unfortunate reality is that South Korea has a 
relatively open society compared with that to the north. North Korea's 
"special troops," trained in the southern dialect and style of living, might 
be able to penetrate South Korea's defense and blow up energy stockpiles 
and processing plants. 
An attack by Pyongyang on South Korea's energy-related installations 
would most probably invoke physical sanctions from Seoul. The tricky 
point is that North Korea would camouflage its actions to make it difficult 
to identifY the culprits. Even after the 1983 massacre of Rangoon, in which 
seventeen top-ranking South Korean government officials were mur-
dered, Pyongyang vehemently denied its involvement, despite the fact 
that its commandos were captured and convicted of the crime by the 
Burmese court. The international politics of Northeast Asia will also 
constrain Seoul from launching a massive retaliatory attack against the 
North for fear of destroying the quadrilateral balance of power. After all, 
nobody can deny that a regional status quo has been pursued by the 
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. 
Put these considerations into the decision matrix of the Seoul govern-
ment and it is understandable why Seoul is sensitive to the role of U.S. 
troops stationed in the country. Without U.S. forces serving as a tripwire 
against a North Korean invasion, South Koreans face a justifiable "window 
of vulnerability" vis-a-vis the Northerners. It is an irony that Seoul's 
economic miracle hangs on a thin line of military security sustained in 
large part by some 43,000 U.S. troops. 
There is no denying that South Korea has had domestic problems 
ranging from the skewed distribution of wealth to the oppression of 
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political dissidents; mismanagement of energy and other critical resources 
may have contributed to domestic instability. Despite internal problems, 
however, South Korea has not seen a major threat to its energy-related 
installations. No known cases of sabotage have taken place in power plants, 
nuclear or other. The most serious case of unrest occurred in a labor 
dispute at the Sa-Buk coal mine in 1980, which was handled with dispatch 
by the government. Even when labor disputes swept the country in 1987, 
none of the energy-producing facilities were affected seriously. It is pru-
dent to say that South Koreans will not direct their discontent at energy-
related facilities because energy represents their lifeline. This does not 
imply, however, that the government's energy policy is immune to popular 
scrutiny. If anything, the Seoul government has opened itself to public 
opinion by wisely subjecting its energy policies to public debate. Not only 
does the government want to see a consensus emerge on energy issues, 
but also it seeks to share the responsibility of energy shocks with the larger 
segment of the society. Energy is such an issue of life and death, yet so 
difficult to control, that no government could shoulder the burden alone. 
A question that is very much a part of South Korea's energy and security 
outlook is whether it will develop its own nuclear weapons capability. 
Possession of nuclear arms might arguably enhance Seoul's security pos-
ture. It is one thing to rely on the American nuclear umbrella but South 
Korea would acquire an entirely different status if it became a member of 
the prestigious nuclear club. There has been speculation about Seoul's 
posture toward the development of nuclear weapons. During the late 
President Park Chung-Hee's reign, public debate on the issue was toler-
ated if not encouraged. The Fifth Republic under President Chun Doo-
Hwan saw no public comment on South Korea's becoming a nuclear 
power; the government's official posture was to support the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty ofl968, which was ratified by the Korean National Assembly in 
1975. Nevertheless, it is assumed by many observers of South Korean 
affairs that Seoul could build nuclear devices without much difficulty 
should it so desire. The actual implementation of weapons production, 
however, would require a major change in the international climate of 
Northeast Asia. 
It was the deteriorating security environment of Northeast Asia that 
prompted the Park regime to explore the nuclear option in the first place. 
Shocked by the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 and the decision to withdraw the 
Seventh U.S. Infantry Division from Korea, Park's government had little 
choice but to launch a program of greater self-sufficiency in national 
defense. In 1970, the government established two organs for this purpose: 
the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), charged with modernizing 
the weapons system, and the Weapons Exploitation Committee, to obtain 
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high-powered weapons including atomic devices. With the fall of Viet-
nam, the credibility of America's extended deterrence declined even 
further. 
At about the same time, North Korean President Kim 11-Sung visited 
Peking on April 15, 1975, amid speculation that he might be seeking 
China's approval for another invasion of the South. Confronted with such 
an unstable situation, President Park made his first statement on June 12, 
1975, about the possible development of nuclear weapons in the case of the 
withdrawal of America's nuclear umbrella. He reaffirmed his statement on 
nuclear weapons in an interview with the Washington Post Qune 25, 1975), 
while the Minister of Science and Technology, Choi Hyung-Sup, gave 
public support to President Park's remarks. 
There are two critical components that a "threshold" country like South 
Korea must acquire before it can become a nuclear power: the nuclear 
device itself and the delivery system. The latter posed no barrier to 
potential nuclear proliferation by the Park government, which had F -4D/E 
fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads. In 1978, the ADD 
successfully test-fired the first ground-to-ground guided missiles, with an 
estimated range of 100 miles. 7 Given the capability of delivery, it was in 
the nuclear fuel cycle that the Park government concentrated its efforts. 
Though South Korea is known to have deposits of natural uranium, the 
quantity is not significant. According to a 1981 report of the Korea Institute 
of Energy and Resources (KIER), U30 8 reserves were estimated at 10,000 
metric tons-barely enough to fuel three nuclear power plants for 30 
years. 8 It was only logical that South Korea seek to buy a reprocessing plant 
for spent nuclear fuel. In fact, Seoul's intention to obtain reprocessing 
capability dates back to 1968, when such a project was first set up as part of 
the Long-term Plan of Research, Development, and Use of Nuclear 
Energy (1968-83). In 1972, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute9 
drew up a detailed plan to construct a reprocessing plant by 1977. In May 
1972, negotiations began between the South Korean and French govern-
ments on nuclear fuel fabrication and a reprocessing plant, as well as 
cooperation in nuclear research. Talks continued at the working level and 
resulted in the bilateral Agreement for Technical Cooperation in Atomic 
Energy, which became effective on October 19, 1974. 
While the deal was being cut with the French government, Seoul 
ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on March 
20, 1975. The ratification was intended to convey to the United States and 
to other regional powers that South Korea would not develop its own 
nuclear weapons. In a sense, it was a political ploy that would help allay 
fears of the American government, which was deeply concerned with the 
ongoing talks between Seoul and Paris. Korea and France also signed, 
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under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Agreement 
for the Application of Safeguards, to be effective from September 22, 1975. 
Meanwhile, the French government notified Seoul of its readiness to 
provide $20 million for nuclear reprocessing facilities, and Korea was 
about to acquire its own reprocessing program. 
The U.S. government had decided, however, that the French-Korean 
deal was not to materialize. Starting in November 1975, the Americans 
initiated a series of discussions with Korean officials about the reprocessing 
plant project. Washington's pressure tactic worked and on January 29, 
1976, Myron B. Kratzer, U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for oceans 
and international environmental and scientific affairs, disclosed at a Senate 
Government Operations Committee meeting that South Korea had can-
celed its plans to purchase a French plutonium reprocessing plant. In an 
attempt to save face, French President Giscard d'Estaing said on NBC's 
"Meet the Press" on May 23 that he had decided against selling the 
reprocessing plant before South Korea canceled its purchase.IO 
It has been reported that Seoul has continued to show interest in 
obtaining reprocessing technology. In 1984, a proposal was allegedly made 
by the Canadian Atomic Energy Agency to recycle the spent fuel from a 
U.S.-made light water reactor (LWR) in South Korea into mixed oxide fuel 
(MOX), which would contain weapons-grade plutonium for the Canadian 
heavy water reactor (HWR) at Wolsung.u The proposal was reportedly 
blocked by the U.S. government. Due in part perhaps to this alleged 
incident, the Seoul government allowed installation of an added security 
device on the Wolsung CANDU nuclear power plant to account for the 
disposition of all plutonium, since it requires only about 8 kilograms of 
plutonium to make a nuclear bomb. Called the spent fuel sealing system, 
this device serves as a backup to surveillance systems previously installed 
in the spent fuel storage bays. The new system would provide the IAEA with 
an additional guarantee that no diversion of plutonium would take place. 
The Sixth Republic, launched on February 25, 1988, will continue to 
honor the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Deeply committed to rapprochement 
with China and the Soviet Union, President Roh Tae-Woo is not likely to 
become a second Park Chung-Hee. Roh has also made it clear that he will 
pursue the unification of Korea through peaceful means. Though he will 
try to negotiate with the North Koreans from a position of strength, he is 
not likely to authorize a nuclear weapons development program. At pres-
ent, Seoul is in an optimum position to improve relations with its northern 
neighbors, and the country is becoming an important trading partner for 
the Communist bloc. On the other side, the United States is not expected 
to withdraw its nuclear umbrella from Northeast Asia in the foreseeable 
future and definitely does not want to see a "Korean bomb." 
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The challenges of energy management are multidimensional, complex, 
and dynamic. They are multidimensional because their causes and con-
sequences affect virtually all aspects of a modern polity, whether econom-
ic, political, military, or sociocultural. They are complex, as the ingredi-
ents of energy policies interact with each other in a manner not amenable 
to simple linear analyses; energy-related issues are dynamic because they 
are in a state of constant change. For these reasons, programs of most 
countries are at best a compromise between long-term tactics and short-
term trial and error. South Korea cannot be an exception to this rule. 
Through the 1990s, Seoul's energy programs will be guided by four 
major goals. First, South Korea will continue to build a basis for secure 
supply of oil, meanwhile enlarging its stockpile for commercial and strate-
gic uses. Second, Seoul's policies will aim at reducing its relatively high 
dependence on oil. Failing that, it will try to maintain oil's share in total 
energy consumption at a level below 50 percent. Growth in South Korea's 
energy consumption, in both residential and industrial sectors, will be met 
by such non-oil sources as nuclear power, coal, and LNG. Though modest 
in scale, research and development will continue on solar, wind, and tidal 
energy sources. Third, South Korea will accelerate its efforts to become a 
producer of energy, with oil and gas development vigorous on its continen-
tal shelf, in addition to overseas oil exploration. Seoul will continue its 
overseas investment not only to secure oil, but also to mine coal and other 
mineral resources. Fourth, despite the quantum rise in the living standard 
of its people, the government will not slacken its drive for energy con-
servation through a combination of incentives and sanctions. 
The backbone of Korea's energy development through the end of this 
century will be nuclear-generated electricity. Such commitments have 
already been made and there will be no turning back in the foreseeable 
future, although there will surely be much controversy about safety and 
weapons development potential. The success of Seoul's nuclear-based 
energy policy will depend on the government's will to mix flexibility with 
firmness. It must maintain consistency in energy planning while remain-
ing strong and credible enough to make swift adjustments to the changing 
environment. As experienced in the energy crises of the past, South Korea 
is but a small player in the volatile field of international energy. Its survival 
will depend upon skillful maneuvering in the political economy of the 
global energy market. 
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Pakistan 
CHARLES K. EBINGER 
Since its founding in 1947, access to vital energy supplies has played a 
major role in Pakistan's economic and its foreign policy. At independence, 
Pakistan had almost no industries, and its only power stations were three 
hydroelectric plants, two in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
and one in the Punjab.I During 1947-58, Islamabad acquired only 46 
megawatts (Mw) of additional generating capacity, owing to the high costs 
of dam construction and its conflicts with India and Afghanistan over water 
resource rights. 
With the implementation of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, however, 
Pakistan obtained rights to the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, Kabul, and 
Chenab rivers. With international assistance, Pakistan embarked on the 
construction of two giant earthrock dams at Mangla and Tarbela and the 
development of extensive barrage and canal systems throughout the Indus 
Basin. Although Pakistan has a large hydroelectric potential, with esti-
mates varying between 10,000 and 12,000 Mw, the expansion of hydel 
power in Pakistan is plagued by: (1) the large seasonal fluctuations (60-70 
percent) in the flow of the rivers; (2) the impact that drought can have on 
hydroelectric generating capacity, intensified as irrigation receives pri-
ority over generation; (3) the high siltation rates of the Indus and its major 
tributaries, which limit the life oflarge-scale hydro plants; and (4) the high 
cost of dam construction and transmission and distribution facilities in the 
remote north, where hydel potential is greatest, far from the major load 
centers.2 
Given these problems, Pakistan has developed a substantial thermal 
electricity capacity to offset shortfalls in hydel generation; thermal genera-
tion also provides electricity to areas of the country not served by hydel 
capacity. Nonetheless, only about 22 percent of the country's population 
has access to the electricity grid. Although natural gas reserves are sub-
stantial, at 530 billion cubic meters (BCM), and gas has received priority 
since the 1960s as a fuel for thermal electricity generation, serious short-
ages of natural gas occurred in 1983-84,3 the result of a combination of 
subsidized prices to consumers, low producer prices at the wellhead, and 
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skyrocketing demand. Even though Pakistan has significant coal reserves, 
nearly all are poor-quality lignite or subbituminous coal with limited 
coking potential, a low calorific content, and a high sulfur component. 
Moreover, because the coal is subject to spontaneous combustion when 
stacked and deteriorates upon exposure to air, it has until very recently4 
not been much in demand, becoming progressively less important in the 
national energy balance since 1965. 
The problems plaguing the hydel, gas, and coal sectors and the rising 
prices for oil led to interest in nuclear power in Pakistan even before the 
1973-74 OPEC price rises, as evidenced by Pakistan's acquisition from 
Canada in 1971 of its first nuclear power plant-a 137-Mw heavy water 
reactor outside Karachi. (In February 1990, France agreed to sell Pakistan 
its second nuclear power plant.) 
ENERGY AND SECURITY: THE 1973-74 OPEC CRISIS 
Still reeling under the economic dislocations engendered by the 1971 
secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and a series of disastrous 
nationalizations in the first half ofl972, Pakistan was ill-equipped to handle 
the devastating economic impact ofl973-74 OPEC oil price rises. 
The increases in the price of oil had both direct and indirect effects on 
the Pakistani economy. With crude oil and petroleum products in 1972 
accounting for about 42 percent of the nation's commercial energy use, 
clearly Pakistan was vulnerable to oil price rises, as evidenced by the 
escalation in its oil import bill-from $50 million in 1973 to $540 million in 
1979, $1.1 billion in 1979-80 following the Iran crisis, and $1.3 billion in 
1982-83. Simultaneously, Pakistan's current account deficit rose from $131 
million in 1972-73 to a peak of$1,187,000,000 in 1974-75 before tapering off 
to $538 million in 1982-83. However, in 1986 it escalated to $2 billion.5 
Behind the drastic slide in Pakistan's current account position were: (1) 
the loss of income from East Pakistan's jute sales, (2) the escalation in the 
price of oil, (3) the enactment of ill-judged domestic economic policies, 
and (4) fundamental structural imbalances that continue to plague the 
Pakistani economy-a decrease in international prices for Pakistan's ex-
ports and stagnating domestic production, especially of cotton and textile 
goods. The Pakistani economy remains dependent on export earnings 
from rice, cotton and its products, and wheat. Because these crops are at 
the mercy of weather conditions, even relatively mild weather fluctuations 
can spell disaster. When the monsoon comes too early or too late, or floods 
the country, the national economy is in crisis. 
Even prior to 1974, Islamabad had recognized the need to enact a 
vigorous oil exploration program. With domestic oil production filling only 
13 percent of the nation's requirements, Pakistan since 1972-73 has pro-
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moted joint ventures in petroleum exploration with foreign oil companies, 
in close association with the state-owned Oil and Gas Development Cor-
poration. To encourage participation, Pakistan has drawn up a model 
concession agreement and has moved steadily toward indexing the price of 
crude oil and petroleum products to international prices. 6 Likewise since 
1973, Pakistan has moved to develop an oil products pipeline from the 
remote northern oil-producing and refining centers to Karachi and 
Hyderabad to replace imported petroleum. Despite these prodigious 
efforts, however, domestic oil production in 1982-83 accounted for only 11 
percent of total consumption. 7 
By the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-83), Pakistan was self-
sufficient to the extent of about 67 percent of its total energy supplies; the 
remaining needs were met exclusively by imports of crude oil and pe-
troleum products. This degree of self-sufficiency has occurred owing to the 
steadily growing share of natural gas and hydel in the total energy supply 
mix. 8 The contribution of hydel and natural gas to the energy picture 
increased from 12.8% and 35.6%, respectively, in 1971-72 to 16.1% and 
40.8% in 1981-82. In the same period, the respective shares of oil and coal 
fell from 42.9% and 8.3%, respectively, to 36.9% and 5.6%. Nuclear 
energy contributed less than 1%. 
While Pakistan made substantial progress in reducing oil's share in the 
total energy balance, rising demand offset much of the increase in hydel 
and gas supply. Moreover, although Pakistan's efforts to increase the 
domestic production of oil showed success in the commissioning of the 
Tando Alam and Dhurnal oil wells in the early 1980s, the value of fuel 
imports continued to rise until 1982,9 having first jumped from $78.2 
million in 1973 to $238.8 million in 1974 and to $681.9 million in 1979. The 
second spurt in international oil prices in 1980 caused the value of fuel 
imports to jump to $1,442,100,000 in 1980, then to a peak of$1,616,800,000 
in 1982. Thereafter, the value of fuel imports declined steadily, dipping to 
$1,433,200,000 in 1985 as oil prices continued to fall rapidly in the 
mid-1980s. 
The collapse of OPEC unity on oil pricing policies from 1985 onward 
and the oversupply of oil available on the international market at substan-
tially reduced prices have not relieved the structural imbalance in 
Pakistan's terms of trade. The deficit in Pakistan's current account balance, 
for instance, increased from $753 million in 1981 to $1,110,100,000 in 1982 
and reached a depth of$1,268,400,000 in 1985. Part ofthe reason was the 
decline in the remittances of Pakistani workers abroad, mainly in the 
Persian Gul( which fell from $2,888,200,000 in 1983 to $2,457,100,000 in 
1985, although they rose to $2,631,700,000 in 1986. However, as expatriate 
Pakistani workers continue to return in the late 1980s following retrench-
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ment in the Gulf sheikdoms in the face of falling oil revenues, Pakistan's 
economic problems are likely to be compounded. 
The natural gas sector remains plagued with problems despite the 
government's supportive production policy, under which the wellhead 
price per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of Sui gas rose from 0. 75 rupee in 1981, 
to 5.27 rupees in 1983, and to 30.38 rupees ($0.62) in July 1984. Despite 
dramatically improved incentives for natural gas producers, prices remain 
too low to encourage sizable new production. To induce conservation, the 
government raised consumer prices for gas by 30 percent in January 1982, 
23 percent in January 1983, and 25 percent on July 1, 1983. While Isla-
mabad agreed with the World Bank to raise the weighted average natural 
gas price to two-thirds of the world price equivalent by mid-1988, Pakistani 
consumer prices remained only about 45 percent of the international 
equivalent. 
In Pakistan, natural gas is used in power generation (21% ), in the 
manufacture of cement (7%) and fertilizer (34%), in general industry 
(25%), and in the commercial (3%) and household (10%) sectors.IO Natural 
gas is obviously vital for power, industrial, and fertilizer sectors of the 
economy. With demand for natural gas accelerating under subsidized 
consumer prices, with gas supplies stagnating, and with gas used to make 
up shortfalls in hydel power arising from drought conditions at Mangla and 
Tarbela, Pakistan has experienced gas shortages in several parts of the 
country. During 1983, for example, electricity supply was 12 percent short 
of demand and the natural gas supply fell short by 14 percent. The 
shortages, which have at times crippled industrial production in the 
country, were the major catalyst behind the Sixth Five Year Development 
Plan, launched in July 1983, giving top priority to energy development, 
especially natural gas.n 
While there were many reasons for Pakistan's energy crisis, clearly 
Islamabad deserves some blame for its management of the energy sector. 
The state-run Oil and Gas Development Corporation, despite sizable 
budgetary allotments, has consistently failed to expand oil and gas produc-
tion to meet the nation's growing energy needs. Similarly, both the Water 
and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and the Karachi Electricity 
Supply Corporation (KESC) have terrible records of shutdowns and break-
downs. During the winter, Karachi-Pakistan's most important commer-
cial, financial, and industrial center-typically experiences power shut-
downs of several hours per day. Parts of the Pun jab and the North-West 
Frontier Province have had similar power outages. 
While some observers have expressed concern that the recurrent shut-
downs of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) may be a smoke-
screen for clandestine diversion of plutonium for a weapons program, the 
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U.S. government has stated that there was no evidence that Pakistan had 
reprocessed spent fuel from KANUPP.I2 
In addition to economic losses in the industrial and commercial sectors, 
power outages have also dealt substantial setbacks to agricultural produc-
tion for both the domestic and export markets, by disrupting tube well 
irrigation. Even though the Power Development Authority deserves cred-
it for operational improvements that reversed the upward trend in power 
and energy losses, annual power losses as a percent of total generation 
were still29-30 percent in the mid-1980s, down from about 38 percent in 
the mid-1970s.l3 While electric generating capacity under the Fifth De-
velopment Plan rose from 3,265 Mw to 3, 954 Mw by March 1983, it did so 
only at the cost of 13,000 million rupees. Although Islamabad has made 
great strides in electrifying the countryside, there are still fewer than 5 
million electricity consumers out of a total population of about 100 mil-
lion.l4 
To cope with the growing shortage of electric generating capacity, 
variously estimated in the range of 700-900 Mw, the Sixth Five Year 
Development Plan (1983-88) targeted $7.5 billion out of$36.83 billion for 
investment in energy. Is One key priority is to develop 1500 Mw of addi-
tional capacity as rapidly as possible to narrow the growing power gap.l6 
In addition to developments in the hydro, gas, oil, and nuclear sectors, 
Pakistan is developing renewable sources of energy, such as biogas and 
solar or windpower, to aid those regions where it is prohibitively expensive 
to extend the national electricity grid.I7 
ENERGYANDTHEECONOMY 
While the Pakistan economy has been making great economic progress, 
the problems are acute-a widening gap between energy supply and 
demand, low productivity, poor management of government undertak-
ings, and growing alleged irregularities of the earlier Zia regime. In the 
wake of the devastation created by the Bhutto government's socialization of 
the economy in the 1970s, the oil price rise, and the loss of East Pakistan, 
the nation's economic problems have grown in magnitude and complexity. 
While Pakistan made great strides during the five year plans of 1978-83 
and 1983-88, even the government's assessments have been somber: "It 
appears, by and large, [that] personal consumption has been sustained at a 
reasonable level. ... Poverty was not eliminated, but its frontiers were 
pushed back from a pervasive phenomenon to identifiable areas to be 
attacked. But, the situation was much less satisfactory in relation to 
avenues of social consumption." 18 
While the economic record of the Fifth Plan (July 1, 1978-June 30, 1983) 
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was mixed,I9 clearly the energy sector was the paramount obstacle to 
sustained ecnomic progress. However, despite setbacks in energy, by the 
last year of the plan (July 1, 1982, to June 30, 1983) substantial progress had 
been made, particularly in view of continued world recession. In the 
1980s, GNP growth rates have remained above 6 percent. 2o There also was 
considerable price stability, with inflation decreasing from the average of 
10.3% in the period 1965-1980 to an estimated 7.5% in the period 1980-86. 
Despite some of the structural deficiences in the Pakistani economy, the 
high rate of economic growth has accelerated demand for energy. 
Even though the Sixth Plan gives the highest priority to developing the 
nation's energy resources to meet the needs of economic growth, Pakis-
tan's problems in the energy sector will not be easy to overcome. The plan 
called for total installed generating capacity to be increased from 4,809 Mw 
in fiscal1983 to 8, 604 M win fiscal1988, with most of the new plants to be 
thermal. However, it appears likely that power shortages will retard 
Pakistan's economic growth throughout the rest of the decade. With 
demand for petroleum products growing at a skyrocketing 11.3 percent per 
year, during the Sixth Plan oil demand was seen rising from 112,000 barrels 
per day to 192,000 bpd.2I The major increases occurred in demand for fuel 
oil (to back out natural gas in thermal generation), diesel oil, and gasoline. 
While it appeared that Pakistan would surpass its planned target for 
domestic oil production, nonetheless oil imports during 1983-88 grew as a 
percentage of total oil consumption. 
The dire trends in oil demand are matched in the natural gas sector. 
Sixth Plan projections showed total gas demand escalating from 702 mil-
lion cubic feet per day to 839 mmcfd on average, with demand peaking 
between 979 and 1,121 mmcfd. With domestic supplies forecast to increase 
only from 622 mmcfd to 825 mmcfd on average and from 692 mmcfd to 916 
mmcfd during the peak period, 22 Pakistan was to experience sizable 
shortages of gas throughout the plan. 
The impact of energy shortages on Pakistan's economic, social, and 
political systems has led to a major policy debate in the country over two 
alternatives for Pakistan: pouring money into nuclear power to help allevi-
ate growing electricity shortages or moving to develop its vast coal reserves 
(640 million metric tons). While, as noted, Pakistan's coal reserves are of 
very poor quality, many energy experts believe that Islamabad should 
develop the coal sector in stages, with power stations at the production 
facility, rather than choose the "quick fix" nuclear option. 
The country's attempts to acquire nuclear generating capacity have 
been hampered by its refusal to place all its nuclear facilities under full-
scope safeguards. There are growing indications that Pakistan may have 
embarked on a clandestine nuclear weapons program. 
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NUCLEAR ENERGY AND EXTERNAL SECURITY 
Perhaps no issue in U.S.-Pakistani relations has been more clouded with 
ambiguity and rancor than the development of Pakistan's nuclear energy 
sector. From the Pakistani perspective, nuclear energy has, since at least 
the mid-1960s, been viewed as a valuable energy source that would have to 
be pursued to ensure that the nation met its energy requirements. Both 
before and after the oil price shocks of 1973-7 4, this view was supported by 
teams of specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency.24 
Critics attacked the IAEA assessments as biased in favor of expanding 
power generating capacity rather than adequately assessing how much 
demand might be met by reducing power theft and transmission losses. 
Similarly, the IAEA's post-embargo analysis ofl975 was viewed skeptically 
for assuming a continuation of Pakistan's historically high levels of growth 
in power demand, without adequately evaluating the possible impact of 
worldwide recession and high oil prices. 
Pakistan's severe lack of fossil fuel resources and the shortage of hydro-
electric resources near the major electrical load centers could be used to 
justify a sizable nuclear power program. However, Islamabad did not 
promote a major commercial nuclear power program until after the May 
1974 Indian nuclear detonation. 
As early as the mid-1960s, U.S. officials became concerned about the 
sharp synergisms behind the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. At 
this time, Pakistani officials voiced their concerns to the United States that 
under the rubric of its nuclear energy program India might be moving 
toward a nuclear weapons capability. The other side of the coin is that the 
Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology had decided as early as 1961 
to establish a laboratory-scale "hot-cell" reprocessing plant. While this 
facility was not built for over a decade, owing to disagreement in the 
Pakistani government about its location, Islamabad's interest in it gener-
ated concern in New Delhi. 
Indian concern was shared by nonproliferation advocates in the United 
States, especially when in 1965 rumors circulated that Ali Bhutto had tried 
to get President Ayub Khan to allocate $30 million to build a plutonium 
reprocessing plant. While the evidence to support this contention remains 
sketchy, Islamabad certainly was aware that in early 1965 India had com-
missioned a plutonium reprocessing plant. Indian protestations that the 
facility was for its civilian nuclear program and not for weapons develop-
ment were viewed skeptically by Pakistan, especially as strategic analysts 
in India were campaigning for acquisition of the bomb in response to 
China's 1964 detonation. 
Pakistan's refusal to sign the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, despite 
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India's signing and ratification, inflamed Indian public opinion. Bhutto's 
1965 statement that "if India builds the bomb we will eat grass or leaves, or 
go hungry, but we will get one of our own" did little to assuage extremist 
Indian opinion. In The Myth of Independence (Oxford University Press, 
1969), Bhutto made clear that Pakistan had at least given thought to a 
nuclear deterrent. 
The motivations behind India's and Pakistan's nuclear ambitions have 
been thoroughly delineated.25 What is important for the purpose of this 
analysis is Pakistan's rethinking of its defense policy. The complex geo-
graphic contours of Pakistan's eastern border with India and the dispropor-
tionate size of India's military forces and its territory had led Pakistani 
strategists to adopt an "offensive defense" doctrine, which prevailed in the 
1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars. Under this Pakistani policy, an early 
advance could secure strategic gains to be held until intervention by the 
international community effected a ceasefire. In an ensuing settlement, 
Pakistan, having headed off a lightning strike by India, might gain some 
small additional strategic advantage. 
While this policy may have made some theoretical sense as a broad 
strategic doctrine, the disastrous 1965 and 1971 wars, combined with 
India's de facto acquisition of nuclear arms in 1974, led to a reassessment of 
Pakistan's policy. After 1974, as Stephen Cohen notes, Pakistan's growing 
conventional military inferiority, its worsening internal problems, and the 
limitations on its historical allies led to a fundamental reassessment of the 
country's strategy.26 
Pakistani fears of Indian designs on its territory can only be understood 
if viewed against Indian support for Bangladesh's secession in the 1971 war 
and continued provocations by New Delhi against the Moslem majority 
population in Kashmir. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the creation of 
Bangladesh marked a watershed in relations between the two nations by 
substantially altering the balance of power between them. Given the 
devastating dislocations in Pakistan's economy caused by the loss of Bang-
ladesh, the intensified Indian expansionism after 1971, and the staggering 
impact of the 1973-7 4 oil price rises and subsequent energy shortages, 
Pakistani government planners had more than enough justification to 
believe that their national security was endangered on all fronts. Some 
elements of the Bhutto government believed that only a small nuclear 
program would serve to deter an Indian attack. 27 
In the early 1970s, Iran's emergence as the major military power in 
the Persian Gulf region aggravated its longstanding rivalry with India 
and drew Pakistan into closer association, as a result of Pakistan's con-
viction that India wanted to dominate the region from the Persian 
Gulf to the South China Sea.28 India's interventions in Sri Lanka in 1971 
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and 1987-89, its annexation ofSikkim in 1973 and intervention in Maldives 
in 1988, as well as the signing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty and the 1978 Afghan coup, served to accentuate Pakistan's percep-
tion of India as an expansionist power and of its own diplomatic isola-
tion. 
Pakistan's first nuclear reactor at Karachi went critical in 1971. While 
both the KANUPP power reactor from Canada (1965) and the PIN STECH 
research reactor from the United States (1961-62) were acquired on a 
turnkey basis, it had been clear all along that in time, the Pakistanis would 
take over the reactors themselves.29 Despite the lack of a formal an-
nouncement concerning expansion of its nuclear power program, circum-
stantial evidence indicates that by late 1971 Pakistan was considering the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition to Pakistan's continued warn-
ings to Washington about the real intent oflndia's nuclear program, and 
Pakistan's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the absence of an 
Indian signature, there is some indication that Pakistan commenced dis-
cussions with a French firm, Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) 
for the design of a pilot-scale reprocessing facility to be used at 
PINSTECH for experimental research. 3D 
Although there is limited nonclassified evidence to corroborate either 
that such discussions in fact took place or that in 1973 a tentative contract 
for the design work was concluded, pending the completion of financial 
arrangements, this author was told by high-level sources in Pakistan and 
the United States that such did occur.31 However, when a team of nuclear 
personnel from Oak Ridge National Laboratory visited Pakistan in April 
1972, key officials of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 
indicated no interest in accelerating Pakistan's nuclear power program, 
although by that time Pakistan had 550 qualified nuclear engineers and 
scientists. 32 
In their report, the U.S. team observed that Pakistan's nuclear power 
program was moving ahead slowly, with the next reactor (350 Mw) not 
scheduled to come onstream until1979. The report noted that the PAEC 
had not yet chosen the reactor site or design type and had only tenuous 
plans for nuclear power development after 1979. It specifically stated that 
no member of the PAEC organization had expressed any interest in 
obtaining fuel reprocessing technology or other "full fuel cycle" -meaning 
uranium enrichment-facilities. 33 Despite such official statements, Dr. I. 
H. Usmani said in March 1972 that he had been forced out as chairman of 
the PAEC because he had refused to build a bomb.34 
In June 1973, Islamabad announced approval of a plan for nuclear 
desalination of sea water and expansion of its nuclear power program. 
While details were scarce, in July 1973 the government announced that a 
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500-M w reactor would be built in the northern part of the country within 
two and one-half years.35 This goal proved to be extremely optimistic; 
budgetary allocations for the reactor, which in the end was slated for 900 
Mw, were not made until after the Indian nuclear detonation, and to date 
the planned reactor has not been constructed. 
Although it is difficult to determine the exact date in 1973 Pakistan 
began discussions with France for purchase of a commercial-scale re-
processing facility, there is little doubt that the negotiations were launched 
prior to the October 1973 OPEC oil price increases.36 The timing contra-
dicts Islamabad's claim that the reprocessing negotiations arose out of 
concern, generated by the energy crisis, about secure access to nuclear 
fuel supplies. This claim is also inconsistent with the PAEC's December 
1973 announcement that "abundant quantities of uranium" had been found 
in south Punjab and at three other locations in Pakistan. If proven domestic 
uranium reserves were adequate to support a major expansion in the 
number of commercial nuclear power reactors, there would be little 
incentive to acquire a reprocessing facility. As it turned out, however, 
Pakistan had not, contrary to official reports, found "abundant" quantities 
of uranium. 
Of equal importance is the question of whether the French-Pakistani 
negotiations over a commercial reprocessing facility preceded alleged 
negotiations for a pilot-scale facility or occurred in tandem-or whether 
both moves were subterfuges designed to draw attention away from 
Pakistan's clandestine development of a uranium enrichment facility. 
From recent reports, it is clear that the pilot-scale reprocessing deal was 
consummated and Pakistan acquired the plant sometime during 
1975-76.37 
Recent attention in the West has been riveted on the implications of 
Pakistan's acquisition of a uranium enrichment plant capable of making 
nuclear weapons; from the evidence available, however, it appears that 
even prior to late 1976 or early 1977, Pakistan intended to keep open the 
weapons option by acquiring the pilot-scale reprocessing facility. Since 
Pakistan's one nuclear reactor was of CANDU design, the acquisition of 
even a pilot-scale reprocessing facility would have allowed Pakistan to 
extract enough plutonium to make a small number of bombs over a period 
of three to four years. Moreover, if Pakistan acquired a commercial-scale 
reprocessing facility, it could secure much valuable technical expertise 
directly applicable to a clandestine weapons program. 
While it is impossible to prove without access to classified information, 
it appears, on the basis of extensive interviews in France, the United 
States, and Pakistan, that throughout most of 1975-76 the Bhutto govern-
ment did not have the intention of directly manufacturing a nuclear 
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weapon. Pakistan moved to purchase the equipment for a uranium enrich-
ment plant only after it became apparent that the country's scientists 
lacked the technological know-how for making nuclear weapons via the 
reprocessing route and that the commercial reprocessing facility would be 
delayed indefinitely. By that time, profound changes had occurred in 
Pakistan's geopolitical situation. 
In addition to seeking reprocessing capability, the PAEC in 1973-7 4 
moved to acquire a fuel fabrication facility from Canada to supply the 
KANUPP reactor in Karachi. It appears that Pakistan also tried to pur-
chase a heavy water production plant, without initial success.38 Despite 
the various initiatives, on the eve of the Indian nuclear explosion in May 
1974, Pakistan's nuclear facilities nonetheless remained primitive in com-
parison with New Delhi's advances. 
PAKISTANI NucLEAR PoLICY AND THE INDIAN NucLEAR ExPLOSION 
While Pakistan's severe lack of fossil fuels and the geographical disadvan-
tage of its hydroelectric resources could easily have justified a sizable 
nuclear power program, as late as September 1974 Pakistan officially had 
firm plans for only one additional600-Mw reactor; studies were underway 
for a third reactor to be completed sometime in the 1980s. It was not until 
December 1974-seven months after the Indian nuclear explosion and 
fourteen months after the onset of OPEC's oil price increases-that 
Pakistan announced a major expansion in its nuclear reactor program. 
Under the new program, Islamabad would build four or five new power 
plants in the 1980s and one plant every year during the 1990s. This plan was 
subsequently modified to call for construction of twenty-four nuclear 
power plants by 2000.39 
The events that transpired in Pakistan's nuclear policy between 1974 
and the overthrow of the Bhutto government in July 1977 have been well-
delineated. 40 By 1978, intense diplomatic pressure by Washington and 
Ottawa had not only led to the termination of all nuclear cooperation 
between Canada and Pakistan, but had also, under U.S. direction, forced a 
cancellation in the French-Pakistani reprocessing agreement. 
It is extremely difficult to analyze Pakistani nuclear energy policy 
during the 197 4-77 period because fears for national security arising from 
the Indian explosion have been so pervasive in Pakistani political debate. 
The role of nuclear energy, however-in both its peaceful and destructive 
applications-is viewed much differently in Islamabad than in Wash-
ington. In Pakistan, development of commercial nuclear technology is 
perceived as a symbol of a nation's "modernity." While it would be dan-
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gerous to emphasize this perception, it would be equally dangerous to 
dismiss this psychological component of the nuclear debate. 
While Pakistan's slow implementation of a major nuclear program in the 
wake of the oil embargo raised disturbing questions as to the program's 
motivations, the IAEA in fact supported a major expansion in the Pakistani 
nuclear program on the eve of the embargo and reiterated this support in 
1975. Furthermore, in spite of waning enthusiasm in the industrialized 
world for commercial nuclear power as an alternative to oil, the Pakistanis 
found sufficient justification for nuclear expansion in their unique energy 
situation in 1976: the sizable fluctuations in electric generating capacity, 
the concentration of hydroelectric capacity in the north while demand is 
greatest in the south, and the staggering costs of long-distance transmis-
sion lines. 
Because the nuclear question was part of national security considera-
tions, the Bhutto regime created a major commercial nuclear power 
program to justify Pakistan's long-term needs for a reprocessing facility. 
Although the IAEA's assessment of Pakistan's need for nuclear reactors 
was more modest than the PAEC's projections, the IAEA's projections in 
both 1973 and 1975 did, within the dictates of the plutonium recycling 
debate at the time, justifY Pakistan's future need for a reprocessing facility. 
It was for this reason that the IAEA board of governors approved the 
French-Pakistani reprocessing transfer and concluded the trilateral safe-
guards agreement. 
While reasonable analysts may differ over whether Pakistan needs more 
electric power generation plants (nuclear or otherwise), or whether the 
country would be better advised to use scarce resources to improve the 
transmission and distribution system, there are legitimate reasons for 
advocating nuclear power expansion. However, Pakistan's preoccupation 
with national security and the defensive role of nuclear weapons raises 
vexing problems. In responding to Washington's opposition to the re-
processing facility, Islamabad relied largely on the argument that it is not 
the mere possession of sensitive nuclear technology that threatens interna-
tional security, but rather a nation's perception of being so overwhelmingly 
threatened that it has no recourse but to acquire nuclear weapons. While 
sophisticated Western-educated analysts might not understand this view, 
failure awaits any U.S. government policy that fails to take into account 
Pakistan's perception of Indian intentions. 
Pakistan has traditionally sought security through membership in re-
gional alliances, such as CENTO and SEATO, that are backed by the 
United States, and through close relations with Iran and China. While the 
specifics of its foreign policy have changed over time, Pakistan has tried to 
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ensure sound relations with at least one of the major powers. In the two 
major crises of Pakistan's short history-the 1965 and 1971 wars-the 
United States failed to prevent catastrophic defeat. Surprisingly, very few 
Pakistanis are bitter over this fact. However, as a long-standing ally of the 
United States, Pakistan believes that Washington should reexamine the 
"entire context of Pakistan's security options and recognize the threat 
Pakistan feels from its neighbors."41 In Islamabad's view, the United States 
should either make diplomatic initiatives to protect Pakistan from India 
and Afghanistan (meaning the Soviet Union) or, at the very minimum, not 
stand in the way of a firm Pakistani response to these threats. 42 
In Islamabad's view, the Carter administration not only turned a deaf 
ear on Pakistani security concerns but also made a conscious decision to 
"tilt" U.S. policy toward India. A series of events-President Carter's 
rejection of Pakistan's request for 110 Vought A-7 attack planes, the re-
sumption of shipments of enriched uranium to India, the inclusion oflndia 
(and the exclusion of Pakistan) on President Carter's December 1977-Janu-
ary 1978 world tour, the failure of the United States to step up military 
assistance to Pakistan in the wake of the May 1978 Afghanistan coup, and 
Pakistan's deteriorating security situation in the wake of the Iranian cri-
sis-all combined to convince Islamabad that it could not count on the 
U.S. commitment to Pakistan's security. 
THE ZIA GovERNMENT: EscALATION IN NucLEAR TENSIONS 
While Bhutto charged that the United States had assisted in his overthrow 
for a quid pro quo that the Zia government would cancel its reprocessing 
contract with France, in reality the situation was far more complex. While 
initially there was hope that the new Zia regime might cancel the SNG-
PAEC reprocessing agreement, it did not. On numerous occasions, the 
chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the federal 
minister of science and technology reaffirmed that the deal would be 
consummated. 43 
The reprocessing controversy continued after 1977, with rumors 
abounding that China or Libya was financing or otherwise aiding a nuclear 
weapons program for Pakistan. Following the Communist-backed April 
1978 coup in Afghanistan, however, new strategic concerns in the Middle 
East and South Asia began to cloud the direction of U.S. nonproliferation 
policy. Although the strategic motives and the role of the Soviet Union in 
the series of Afghan coups that occurred between April 1978 and De-
cember 1979 remain subject to intense debate, 44 the April1978 coup in 
Kabul added a new dimension to the geopolitics of the region and made 
U.S.-Pakistani relations far more complex. 
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In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Islamabad attempted to warn 
the United States that not only was the Soviet Union behind the events in 
Afghanistan but also that it represented the first component of a Soviet 
thrust against the Persian Gul£ The United States chose to dismiss Isla-
mabad's concerns as merely a subterfuge designed to reduce U.S. diplo-
matic pressure against Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program. 
Ironically, the United States apparently discounted Pakistan's warnings 
largely because Washington believed the Shah oflran could deal with any 
Afghan-supported efforts to subvert the Gulf states. 
To be fair to U.S. government leaders, in April1978 there appeared to 
be little prospect that Moscow was preparing to intervene in the Gul£ 
From Washington's perspective, alleged Soviet involvement in the over-
throw of the Daoud regime was largely designed to restore Soviet influ-
ence in nonaligned Afghanistan and to reverse the country's growing drift 
into the Iranian political orbit. While Washington was clearly concerned 
about the direction of events, the overthrow of Daoud was not perceived as 
a fundamental shift in the geopolitics of the region. This perception of 
events was not shared by Islamabad or by many other observers of the 
Afghan scene. 45 
Although unknown at the time, the French decision to cancel the 
reprocessing contract with Pakistan did not disturb Islamabad, for two 
reasons. First, despite the cancellation, France, apparently for motives 
still unknown, transferred 95 percent of the blueprint for the facility. 
Second, Pakistan in 1977 apparently established a number of dummy 
corporations around the world to purchase the component parts of a 
centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. 46 Abdul Qadir Khan, a Pakistani 
scientist, is believed to have stolen the designs for the enrichment plant 
while working at the Almelo plant in the Netherlands. 
These events, which alarmed Washington far more than the political 
situation in Afghanistan, came to light in September 1978 when Frank 
Allaun, a British Labour M.P., received information regarding Islama-
bad's purchase of centrifuge equipment in the United Kingdom. Allaun 
notified Energy Minister Anthony W. Benn, who in turn alerted the 
German and U.S. governments. In March 1979, the CIA informed Presi-
dent Carter that Pakistan was indeed building a centrifuge plant capable of 
producing weapons-grade uranium. In April, the United States, invoking 
the Symington amendment, announced that, as a result of Pakistan's 
construction of a uranium enrichment facility, it was canceling all military 
assistance and would reduce its economic aid. In June, Washington an-
nounced that Pakistan would receive only $40 million of its $120 million 
request. 
In retrospect, it is curious that at the same time the U.S. was curtailing 
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military assistance to Pakistan out of concern that Islamabad's nuclear 
weapons program would destabilize the subcontinent, Pakistan was mov-
ing to improve relations with its arch adversary-India. In May 1979, 
Pakistan's foreign secretary visited New Delhi to discuss bilateral con-
sultations on problems of regional and international concern. Puzzled by 
the growing U.S. restrictions on foreign assistance, Islamabad withdrew 
from CENTO and embarked on a crash program of Islamization. Chief 
among Pakistan's reasons for withdrawing into nonalignment was a desire 
to attract greater economic assistance from oil-rich Islamic nations. 
At the same time that Pakistan was moving to improve its relations with 
India and strengthen ties to the Islamic world, it attempted to keep good 
relations with the Kabul regime after the April1978 coup. Pakistan was the 
first state to recognize the Afghan regime of President Taraki, and Presi-
dent Zia made an early state visit to Kabul to exchange views with the new 
regime. As a further demonstration of good faith, Islamabad moved to 
facilitate the transit of Afghan goods through Pakistan. While all this was 
going on, Pakistan maintained its historically close relations with Peking 
and Teheran. Yet, despite Pakistan's astute regional diplomacy from 
mid-1978 to mid-1979, events in the region conspired against Islamabad's 
vital interests. In January 1979, the Shah oflran, the chief military bulwark 
against the fissiparous tendencies of Baluchistan and the North-West 
Frontier Province, was overthrown and replaced by the militarily weak-
ened Khomeini regime. Recurrent coups and coup attempts in Afghanis-
tan led to civil war and the migration of thousands of Afghan refugees into 
Pakistan. 
The influx of refugees posed serious economic problems for Pakistan, 
and Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province became bases for 
arming and training Afghan insurgents. Islamabad's tenuous military con-
trol of these two regions gave rise to worries that aid to the refugees might 
bring retaliation from the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. Alternatively, 
Islamabad feared that the weapons pouring into the region might be 
turned against it once the regime in Afghanistan was toppled. 
In November 1979, relations with the United States deteriorated badly 
when a coalition of right-wing Muslim students, leftist Iranians, and 
Palestinians burned the American embassy in Islamabad, incited by alle-
gations of American participation in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca. 
In December 1979, Pakistani security was further jeopardized when the 
Soviet Union, concerned about the deterioration in its political position in 
Kabul, invaded Afghanistan with massive land and air forces. The Soviet 
intervention sparked a new flight of refugees to Pakistan, and Pakistan's 
relations with Kabul and Moscow spiraled downward. Given the Soviet 
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claim, supported by India, that its intervention was a consequence of 
outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, Islamabad was con-
cerned that Moscow and New Delhi might use the pretext of Pakistan's 
support for the Afghan rebels as justification to dismember Pakistan. In 
reaction, Pakistan intensified its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons to 
defend its territorial integrity. 
The fall of the Shah in January 1979, combined with the Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan in December, led to a dramatic short-term improve-
ment in U.S.-Pakistani relations. Relations again cooled, however, when 
President Zia rejected President Carter's offer of a $400 million aid package 
as "peanuts." While Pakistan wanted to bolster relations with Washington 
out of concern that Moscow might use force against it, President Zia could 
not risk a closer association with the United States unless Pakistan received 
enough assistance to dramatically improve its defense capabilities vis-a-vis 
India and Afghanistan. 47 
Given the political perceptions of the Reagan administration about the 
Soviet Union's grand strategic design, Washington agreed in 1981 to give 
Islamabad $3.2 billion over five years in military and economic assistance, 
making Pakistan the largest recipient of direct U.S. aid outside Israel and 
Egypt. While Islamabad pledged that it would not pursue a nuclear 
weapons program, it has nonetheless apparently violated that promise. 48 
In any case, the Reagan administration continued to view close U.S.-
Pakistani ties as a vital link in countering Soviet military moves in South-
west Asia. Pakistan is not only well positioned as a base for protecting the 
Persian Gulf but also has highly trained armed forces, among the best in 
the region. As an entrepot for a rapid deployment force to protect allied 
access to the Persian Gulf oil fields, Pakistani bases would be a vital 
strategic asset. In light of these considerations, the U.S. Congress on April 
27, 1981, granted an unprecedented country-specific nonproliferation 
waiver for aid to Pakistan, despite repeated allegations by both European 
and American sources that Pakistan had embarked on a nuclear weapons 
program.49 
Despite numerous disclaimers by both the Pakistani and U.S. govern-
ments that Islamabad has no intention of manufacturing nuclear warheads 
or acquiring nuclear weapons, critics of U.S. policy toward Pakistan are 
alarmed by a series of actions that they believe contradict such asser-
tions:50 
• In December 1980, Canadian officials in Montreal seized U.S.-made 
electronic equipment being shipped illegally to Pakistan. The equip-
ment included components for an inverter that could be used to enrich 
uranium to weapons grade. Canadian officials at the time said there 
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was evidence of at least five other shipments of similar electronic 
parts. 
• In October 1981, customs agents at John F. Kennedy International 
Airport in New York seized 5, 000 pounds of zirconium illegally bound 
for Pakistan. Export of this metal is regulated because of its potential 
use in nuclear operations. 
• In 1981, Pakistan obtained a fuel fabrication plant with the help ofWest 
German companies. 
• For at least eight years, there have been allegations that Pakistan has 
received Libyan help in obtaining "yellowcake," or uranium concen-
trate, from Niger, that it has received financial assistance from Libya 
and/or Saudi Arabia, and that it has been given technological guidance 
by China. In 1984, rumors of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation delayed 
the signing of a U.S.-Chinese agreement for nuclear cooperation. 
• In July 1984, two Pakistanis were convicted in Canada of illegally 
exporting U.S. -made equipment that could be used in a nuclear plant. 
The company the men worked for, Serabit Electronics, was also 
convicted. 
• On July 21, 1984, the Washington Post reported the indictment in 
Houston, Texas, of three Pakistanis for attempting to export illegally 
high-speed switches called krytons that can be used in building a 
trigger for a nuclear bomb. 
• On July 11, 1987, U.S. customs officials in Philadelphia arrested a 
Pakistani-born Canadian who was attempting to export to Pakistan 25 
tons of a special steel used in uranium enrichment centrifuges and an 
undisclosed quantity of beryllium, for which one application is in-
creasing the yield of nuclear weapons. 
Without access to classified information, it is impossible to assess 
whether Pakistan has a dedicated nuclear weapons program, but, there 
can be little question that Pakistan could if it so desired commence a 
weapons program on a limited scale, perhaps five to seven bombs per 
year. 51 These weapons would be of a more advanced level than the early 
bombs produced in the United States. 
Unanswered questions are cause for concern about the direction of 
Pakistan's civilian nuclear program. First, why does Pakistan need com-
mercial reprocessing when it is clearly uneconomical in the absence of a 
massive civilian program, which Islamabad does not even have on the 
drawing boards? Second, how can the outside world cavalierly dismiss 
concern about Pakistan's nuclear intentions in the light of statements by 
former Prime Minister Bhutto, A. Q. Khan, and others about the need for a 
nuclear weapons program? Third, why did the IAEA, an impartial agency 
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that has consistently supported Pakistan's need for nuclear power, express 
concern in 1981 that diversions of plutonium-bearing fuel from the 
KANUPP reactor may have occurred? Fourth, what did U.S. intelligence 
satellites detect in the Baluchistan mountains in early 1981? If it was not a 
nuclear test site, as alleged, what was it? Fifth, why are IAEA monitoring 
cameras and other safeguard devices subject to chronic operational 
failures? Sixth, why does Pakistan need an uranium enrichment facility 
when its only reactor works on natural uranium? Why does Pakistan need a 
reprocessing plant when it has no breeder reactor program? 
ENERGY AND SECURITY: THE PROSPECTS 
The fierce debate about nuclear weapons has beclouded the question of 
whether Pakistan in fact needs a civilian nuclear power program. The 
answer depends upon a host of policy considerations, the most important 
being the structure of the gross domestic product-t<r-energy coefficient, 
especially in the electricity sector; the relative costs/benefits of construct-
ing electric generating facilities versus upgrading the power transmission 
and distribution infrastructure and/or reducing power theft; the impact of 
subsidized consumer and producer prices in skewing the pattern of energy 
demand and supply; and the difficulty of obtaining financing for energy 
projects that are not "show pieces" even though more effective on a cost/ 
benefit basis. 
Analysts who argue that under no circumstances does Pakistan need 
civilian nuclear power must find alternative methods to meet the unique 
problems plaguing the electric power sector. Critics must also take into 
consideration both the IAEA's assessment of Pakistan's need for nuclear 
power and the interest of countries such as France, West Germany, 
Belgium, and Switzerland in making nuclear sales to Pakistan if adequate 
safeguards arrangements can be effected. 
Until the problems and opportunities of Pakistan's entire energy sector 
are evaluated authoritatively and a coherent resource policy is imple-
mented, a detailed analysis of the role of nuclear energy in the nation's 
future is impossible.52 While the author believes that more attention 
should be focused on alternatives to new large-scale electric power genera-
tion-including conservation, improvements in power transmission and 
distribution, more effective management and accountability practices in 
the national economic and energy bureaucracy, better energy planning 
mechanisms between Islamabad and the provinces, and the end of price 
controls on all fuels-he is critical of those analysts who make facile 
judgements that under no circumstances is there a role for nuclear power 
in Pakistan's energy future. Likewise, he queries whether large-scale 
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high-cost alternative programs such as the Lakhra coal project have not 
been offered as much for political, nonproliferation purposes than because 
they make sound economic or technical sense. 53 
The critical link between Pakistan's energy and security policies is not 
the possible use of its civilian nuclear energy program as a cover for 
developing weapons. Rather, by weakening Pakistan's already fragile econ-
omy, the energy crisis exacerbated Pakistan's internal and external se-
curity problems. The fall in oil prices to about $13 per barrel in 1988 has not 
eased security problems but has added new economic problems with the 
return from the Persian Gulf oflarge numbers of Pakistani workers whose 
petro-dollar remittances to Pakistan will be lost. 
While the magnitude of political and economic crises confronting 
Pakistan makes concern over energy issues seem somewhat parochial, in 
reality many of the energy issues are but another manifestation of the 
country's political problems: the regional imbalance in economic develop-
ment, the disparity in the quality oflife between rural and urban areas, the 
tensions engendered in the transition from a traditional to a modem 
economy, and the overemphasis on the industrial at the expense of the 
agricultural sector. Rising dissidence effected at least in part by economic 
dislocations created a perception among some segments of the Zia govern-
ment that the country was under siege. 
While relations between India and Pakistan have waxed and waned over 
the last 10 years, Islamabad's diplomacy has enjoyed some notable suc-
cesses. Relations with Iran have improved, as evidenced by rising volumes 
of trade. Pakistani-Chinese relations remain excellent. The 170 J-6 fighters 
supplied by China earlier are now being replaced by the Chinese J-7 
fighters, with sixty having been purchased in 1986 and an additional150 on 
order in 1989. In addition, 100 upgraded versions of the Chinese Q-5 
ground attack fighters have been sold to Pakistan. Pakistan's relations with 
the Arab world have brought increased diplomatic support against India by 
the Islamic Conference, substantial foreign assistance, and sizable remit-
tances-although declining in 1989-from Pakistani workers in the Gul£ 
In 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan secured Pakis-
tan's western front and brought the prospect that a friendly Islamic govern-
ment would eventually replace the Marxist government of Najibullah in 
Kabul. 
Despite major diplomatic problems with the United States over both its 
nuclear program and its rising illicit drug trade, the Zia government in 
1988 reached a $4.02 billion military-economic six-year agreement with 
the United States that included the prospect of sixty F -16 fighters. Pakistan 
had received forty-nine F-16s under a similar agreement with the United 
States in 1981. Relations between the two countries are likely to improve 
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even further following the death of Zia in a plane crash in 1988 and the 
election of Benazir Bhutto through the democratic process. 
The nature and magnitude of the U.S.-Pakistani assistance agreements 
have been criticized by many analysts, who fear dire consequences, 
particularly as the United States has agreed to equip the transferred F-16s 
with the ALR69, a top-secret electronic device for detecting radar signals. 
While the F-16s are not fitted with the sophisticated avionics for launching 
nuclear missiles, critics of the deal believe that Pakistan can retrofit the 
planes for this purpose. 
The acquisition of the sophisticated F -16s, together with reports of the 
deployment of French Crotale antiaircraft missiles to guard the alleged 
enrichment plant at Kahuta, has generated concern that India and/or 
Israel might launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facili-
ties. To a certain extent, this fear was alleviated in December 1988 when 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the newly elected Benazir Bhutto signed 
an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear reactors. It is also feared 
that the combination of the F-16s and Pakistan's nuclear program will be 
seen by India as sufficient reason to develop a dedicated nuclear weapons 
program, including thermonuclear devices. 
From the vantage point of Washington, Pakistan is a valuable ally not 
only in countering Soviet aggression in Afghanistan but also in "guarding 
the back door to the Gul£" Moreover, the United States has intense 
interest in regaining access to the sensitive intelligence facilities in 
Peshawar, and in receiving basing rights to new ports on the western edge 
of the Baluchistan coast. While the question of whether the acquisition of 
sophisticated conventional forces will enhance or reduce Pakistan's inter-
est in nuclear weapons has been debated since the Nixon Administra-
tion,54 clearly the Reagan administration believed that broad U.S. 
strategic interests outweighed immediate nonproliferation concerns. 
What has been lacking in the debate over U.S.-Pakistani relations in 
general and U.S. nonproliferation policy in particular is any serious discus-
sion of how the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bolster Pakistan's 
security. In contrast to most South Asian security analysts in the United 
States, Pakistani defense planners believe that India now possesses a 
stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. They hold that if Pakistan is to 
guarantee its territorial integrity against India's superior military forces, it 
too must have nuclear weapons. India's attempts on numerous occasions to 
abet regional separatist movements in Pakistan and its active supported for 
Bangladesh's independence are 1971 is cited to support this view. 55 
However, despite the apparent strategic rationale behind this doctrine, 
it has little or no applicability outside a life-and-death struggle with India. 
This view is supported by Zalmay Khalilzad, who notes: 
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Pakistan will force several dilemmas. Its nuclear deterrent will not necessar-
ily be credible against limited Indian conventional military attacks, or 
military moves in Kashmir. . . . Pakistan would be unable to target signifi-
cant Indian urban centers without putting very large Mus lim minorities . . . 
in direct jeopardy. . . . Pakistan would have few incentives to develop 
battlefield nuclear weapons to contest a major conventional invasion. The 
population density and narrow frontier in the main invasion corridors of 
Punjab would put its own population at risk from tactical nuclear warfare.56 
Nonetheless, despite these real limitations on Pakistan's use of nuclear 
force, there is little reason to be sanguine about the course and direction of 
Indo-Pakistani relations. As long as India believes that there is a real 
prospect of nuclear blackmail by China in support of Pakistan, and as long 
as Pakistan believes that India already has strategic nuclear weapons, there 
will be no reduction in tensions, with or without conventional weapons. 
The acquisition of sophisticated conventional weapons by either nation 
will only accelerate the arms race. If a major destabilization in these 
conventional forces occurs and is exacerbated by a dramatic event such as a 
nuclear detonation by Pakistan, a major crisis will ensue. 
On balance, the critical question confronting the global community is 
not whether Pakistan is clandestinely developing nuclear weapons under 
the rubric of its civilian nuclear power program, but how the United States 
and the Soviet Union can ensure that their respective allied states do not 
rush to Armageddon, out of a legacy of suspicion, fear, miscalculation, and 
historical precedent. 
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Taiwan 
DENIS FRED SIMON 
Historically, economic growth has been closely associated with expanded 
energy consumption. One of the primary consequences of the global 
energy crisis of the 1970s was the recognition that the management and 
development of energy policy must be closely integrated with and suppor-
tive of overall economic objectives. While the OPEC price increases and 
the uncertainty of supply affected all nations, developing countries paid a 
particularly heavy price. Because of the expanded emphasis on manufac-
turing and the development of capital-intensive industries such as petro-
chemicals during this period, the Third World proved to be quite 
vulnerable to the instabilities generated by the crisis. 
The global energy crisis caused an appreciable slowdown in overall 
economic growth in Taiwan. OPEC actions also served to crystallize the 
price of Taiwan's dependence on external suppliers for its fuels. Even 
though, admittedly, Taiwan fared much better than some other nations in 
accommodating rising oil prices, it was increasingly difficult for the coun-
try's economy to sustain the OPEC shocks, since, like most nations, 
Taiwan was caught relatively unprepared for the energy crisis of the 1970s. 
At the same time, however, the OPEC crisis served as the impetus to a 
fundamental restructuring of the island's economy-a rethinking of the 
overall approach to the management of its economy as well as its energy 
future. 
This paper analyzes the sources of energy security and insecurity in 
Taiwan. It examines Taiwan's current strategy for managing its energy 
affairs, specifying the tradeoffs between the alternative options available. 
It also highlights the key threats to Taiwan's overall security, with an eye 
toward the island's primary areas of vulnerability. Given the possible 
reunification of Taiwan with the China mainland, the paper concludes by 
projecting how the island's energy future could be affected by progress or 
lack of progress in the reunification process. 
Between 1961 and 1986, Taiwan's.real gross national product grew from 
U.S.$4.5 billion to almost U.S.$7.2 billion, representing an average an-
nual growth rate of almost 9.0%.1 Per capita income rose to U.S.$3, 784 in 
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Table 5.1. Power generation and consumption in Taiwan 
(Millions of kilowatt-hours) 
Consumption 
Total Residential & 
Generation Industrial Commercial Other 
1961 4,084 2,866 662 556 
1971 15,171 10,668 3,148 1,291 
1981 40,150 28,138 9,310 2,620 
1986 59,031 39,840 13,973 2,937 






1986 from U.S.$142 in 1961, reflecting an average increase in real terms of 
6. 8% per year. These figures are a manifestation of the major changes that 
have taken place in the island's economy over the last three decades. The 
two most visible influences have been the growing role of exports and the 
increasing importance of manufacturing in the overall mix of economic 
activity. 
The demands of economic growth, as well as the consequences of that 
growth, have stimulated substantial expansion in the use of energy, es-
pecially as Taiwan moved into heavy industries such as steel, petrochemi-
cals, and shipbuilding in the early 1970s. In addition, as table 1 indicates, 
household power use has grown steadily, reflecting improvements in the 
standard ofliving and the greater availability of consumer appliances to the 
island's more than 19 million inhabitants. Power generation in Taiwan 
increased from 4, 084,000,000 kilowatt-hours (kwh) in 1961 to 
59,031,000,000 kwh in 1986, an average growth ofl1.3% per annum.2 By 
1990, one source projects probable electricity demand to be 
86,897,000,000 kwh, climbing to 174,513,000,000 kwh in the year 2000.3 
The ratio of the growth rate of the G D P to that of electricity during 1954-86 
was about 1.35. 4 The faster growth in power output might lead some to 
suggest that energy demand is being met without a problem. However, 
given current projections of future energy demand and economic growth, 
supply considerations will continue to have weight for the authorities on 
Taiwan for the foreseeable future, especially since electricity growth since 
the OPEC crisis has fallen below the average growth rate of roughly the last 
three decades. Moreover, since a large component of Taiwan's energy 
supply is met through reliance on imports, its future energy position 
becomes an even more serious concern because of the island's increasingly 
uncertain political situation. 
Prior to 1961, Taiwan's power generation system was based mainly on 
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hydroelectric sources, complemented by a small thermal generating ca-
pability. During the period of Japanese colonial occupation of Taiwan 
(1895-1945), a modest energy capability was created as part of Japan's 
efforts to modernize the island's overall economic infrastructure.5 The 
bulk of Taiwan's early power development, however, was accomplished 
with assistance from the United States, which during the 1950s and early 
1960s helped provide the funds and technical know-how to build up the 
power system and related infrastructure to meet the local economy's 
immediate needs. 6 Yet, as demand for electricity began to grow and 
suitable sites for additional hydropower plants were lacking, the share of 
thermal plants in the total installed capacity began to increase quite 
rapidly. Many U.S. firms, at the encouragement of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, came to Taiwan to help develop thermal ca-
pabilities. 7 Growth in thermal generating capacity was supported by the 
availability of inexpensive imported petroleum. 
In general, Taiwan had been highly dependent on external sources for 
meeting its growing energy needs. This remains true despite efforts 
underway to cultivate high-technology industries that are non-energy 
intensive. 8 The China Petroleum Corporation, which oversees Taiwan's oil 
development and imports, is mainly engaged in refining imported pe-
troleum, though it does conduct limited oil exploration on and around 
Taiwan. It operates two petroleum refineries with a capacity of slightly 
more than 600,000 barrels a day. Its fleet of eleven oil tankers has a total 
capacity of more than 1 million deadweight tons. 9 
Dependence on external energy sources became especially problemat-
ic in the early 1970s, when the OPEC crisis shook the island's economy, 
injuring such key industries as plastics and petrochemicals.lO Many ques-
tions arose about steady access to fuel supplies irrespective of the cost. The 
basically unstable mode of world oil supplies and prices after the energy 
crises of 1973 and 1979 hurt Taiwan's attempts to plan for the future. The 
impact that a cutoff or serious decline in the availability offoreign oil would 
have on Taiwan's economy is seen in table 2. In 1986, almost 90% of total 
energy supplies were imports, with petroleum imports accounting for 
55%. 
Owing to the sharp escalation of oil prices, Taiwan's expenditures for oil 
imports have grown rapidly since the early 1970s. This has placed a heavy 
burden on both the private sector, which has depended on low energy 
costs for maintaining overall competitiveness, and on the government, 
which periodically has had to subsidize energy prices to offset the econom-
ic impact of rising prices.ll In 1986, over U. S.$2.2 billion was expended for 
imported petroleum-equivalent to about 9% of total imports-not an 
insignificant amount. (See table 3.) The addition of coal imports brings 
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Table 5.2. Sources of energy supply in Taiwan 
(Percentages of total oil equivalent) 
1961 1981 1986 
Domestic 73.3 14.3 10.4 
Coal 56.7 5.1 2.8 
Crude oil NA 0.6 .3 
Natural gas 0.7 5.0 2.9 
Hydropower 15.8 3.6 4.4 
Imported 26.7 85.7 89.6 
Coal NA 10.8 18.6 
Crude oil 26.7 66.9 54.9 
Nuclear NA 8.0 16.1 
Source: Energy Committee, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1987. 
energy imports to almost 11% of total imports. In Taiwan's case, however, it 
is not only cost considerations that are of concern; there is also great 
apprehension about the security of supplies.l2 These supply concerns 
stem from Taiwan's precarious international political status, the steady 
decline in the number of countries that recognize Taipei's claim to be the 
official government of China, and the island's almost total dependence on 
Middle East suppliers. 
Political leaders on Taiwan have taken three major steps over the last 
several years to alleviate its high dependence on imported sources of 
energy and on a limited number of suppliers. First, beginning with the 
announcement of the "energy policy for the Taiwan area" in 1973,13 there 
has been a concerted effort to develop indigenous sources of energy, 
mainly nuclear energy.I4 Efforts have been stepped up to develop offshore 
sites for petroleum exploitation, though work has been limited by geo-
logical uncertainties as well as by the location of some key sites in areas 
contested by the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines.l5 In 1985, the China Petroleum Corporation authorized 
McDermott Corporation of the United States to build a drilling platform 
and pipeline near Hsinchu to tap offshore oil and gas reserves. Total 
production of the well is estimated at 1 million cubic meters of natural 
gas.l6 The second initiative has been an effort to acquire more energy from 
alternative suppliers, thereby reducing the island's vulnerability in the 
case of political disruptions, such as Arab-Israeli wars and the Iran-Iraq 
war.l7 Third, programs have been introduced to improve the efficiency of 
energy use. As in most other countries prior to the OPEC crisis, con-
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servation measures were not seriously considered in Taiwan, but con-
servation efforts at the both national and enterprise level have been 
stepped up.l8 
However, there is only so far that Taiwan can go in diversifying its energy 
sources from abroad or reducing dependence on imports. Leaders on 
Taiwan realize that energy conservation also has its limits, achieving 
savings at the margins, but not really confronting the core of the supply 
problem. Conversion of power generation to alternative fuels is the major 
measure by which the island can reduce its dependence on imported oil. 
In view of the ever-increasing demand for electricity and the continued 
uncertainty of petroleum supply, the long-range power development pro-
gram for Taiwan has moved toward emphasis on nuclear power.l9 In fact, 
Taiwan has established one of the most successful nuclear programs within 
the Third World. Unlike the case in several other nations, where national 
security imperatives have given greater impetus to nuclear energy pro-
grams, Taiwan's movement toward nuclear has been driven equally by 
economic motives. 
TAIWAN'S POWER INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Since the OPEC crises, Taiwan officials have stressed that development of 
nuclear power is the key to dealing with the energy problem in the 
future.2o According to figures released by Taipower, the state-owned 
energy company that is responsible for overseeing the island's nuclear 
power program, it is estimated that the cost of power generation by nuclear 
units is about one-third less than that for oil-fired units. As of early 1985, 
nuclear-generated electricity costs were the equivalent of 4.5 cents a 
kilowatt-hour, compared with 5.2 cents for coal and 6.4 cents for oil,21 and 
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Table 5.4. Sources of Taiwan's imports of petroleum 
(Percentages of total) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1985 1986 
Saudi Arabia 40% 41% 48% 37% 35% 
Kuwait 38 41 32 18 19 
Nigeria 3 3 NA NA NA 
Oman 2 2 3 NA NA 
Indonesia 3 3 2 8 5 
Malaysia 1 1 2 NA NA 
Others* 13 9 13 37 41 
Source: Energy Committee, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1987. 
*Includes countries such as the U.S., Ecuador, and Venezuela, as well as spot market pur-
chases. 
nuclear costs are forecast to decline even further. Under such circum-
stances, it has become not only politically necessary to explore expansion 
of the nuclear power program, but economically wise as well. 
In some respects, Taiwan's energy situation is not unlike that of several 
of the other so-called newly industrialized nations. Starting in the early 
1950s, when the economy was basically agrarian-oriented, with a low 
standard ofliving and a limited number of skilled workers, Taiwan has built 
an economy where manufacturing in both heavy and, more recently, skill-
intensive industries has grown. Economic progress, however, was accom-
plished despite a poor raw materials base. While many of developing 
nations have sought to exploit their indigenous natural resources as a 
means to earn needed foreign exchange for buying foreign technology and 
equipment to support industrial development, Taiwan and the other Asian 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) have had no such alternative.22 
In addition to its lack of natural resources, Taiwan has had to contend 
with the problem of its uncertain international status, which has become 
more critical since 1979, when the U.S. decided to normalize relations 
with the People's Republic of China.23 The PRC still claims the island of 
Taiwan as one of its provinces. In fact, if there is only one opinion shared 
between Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist lead-
ership on the China mainland, it is that Taiwan is an integral part of China 
and should not become an independent entity. Except for a few of the 
smaller, nonstrategic nation-states in Latin America and the Pacific few 
countries have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The most notable 
exceptions are Saudi Arabia and South Korea, both of which are being 
formally and informally courted by the PRC to strengthen relations.24 
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While most of the industrialized and Third World nations maintain strong 
trade relations with Taipei, the absence of formal diplomatic relations is 
often a major constraint as well as an inconvenience. The constraints are 
mainly the difficulties involved in gaining access to international funds and 
financing through many of the major international organizations, diffi-
culties in negotiating terms of trade with other nations, and the lack of 
formal representation in key organizations such as the United Nations. 
Neither the United Nations nor the World Bank includes Taiwan in official 
statistics-an omission that is ironic in view of the successful model of 
development represented by the Taiwan. 
Unfortunately for Taiwan, these obstacles have intensified as the PRC 
has become more active in world politics and economic affairs. 25 Beijing, 
for the most part, has sought to further isolate Taipei through various forms 
of political pressure on third countries regarding trade or international! 
regional organizations such as the Asian Development Bank.26 The at-
tempts at isolation occurred at the same time Beijing was making overtures 
to Taipei about peaceful reunification and the applicability of the concept 
of "one country, two systems,"27 the formula that was used as the basis for 
the 1984 settlement of the Hong Kong problem between the PRC and the 
United Kingdom.28 Prior to the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 
summer 1988, Taipei's strict policy against negotiating with the Commu-
nist government in Beijing also limited the growth of trade with the 
mainland in areas that could be directly beneficial to Taiwan, especially 
energy and raw materials.29 
Nonetheless, over the last several years, trade between Taiwan and the 
PRC has started to grow. Estimates are that trade reached U.S.$550 
million in 1984 and U.S.$1 billion in 1985, and surpassed to U.S.$2.5 
billion to U.S.$3.0 billion in 1988.30 Much of this trade is carried out 
through Hong Kong, though some direct trade takes place between fishing 
ships from both sides. 31 For the most part, Taiwan receives herbal medi-
cines and agricultural and mining products in return for consumer prod-
ucts and appliances desired by the PRC. The political authorities on 
Taiwan have periodically cracked down on this growing trade for fear that 
the local economy might become too dependent on the mainland market, 
thereby giving Beijing a source ofleverage over Taiwan's economic future. 
Still, Taiwan businessmen feel that the China market is lucrative and 
cannot be totally ignored, especially as the West and Japan begin to pursue 
economic dealings with the PRC. 
TAIWAN's NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY 
When the first oil shock hit in 1973, Taiwan's economy reacted in ways 
typical of the reactions in other nations. To mitigate the worsening hal-
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ance-of-payments position of its economy, Taiwan adopted contradictory 
economic policies, which severely cut into its export earnings at a time 
when energy bills were soaring.32 As a consequence, Taiwan's trade deficit 
ballooned. The trade balance tumbled from a surplus ofU.S.$690 million 
in 1973 to a deficit of U.S.$13 million in the following year. Wholesale 
prices increased 40.6% in 197 4, while the island's rate of growth dragged at 
1.1 percent-a mere fraction of the 10.2 percent annual rate of growth 
dragged at 1.1 percent-a mere fraction of the 10.2 percent annual rate of 
growth that had been experienced over the previous ten years. 
While the major thrust toward nuclear power occurred during this 
period, the development of nuclear power had been given extensive 
consideration since the 1950s and 1960s. 33 Two departments were created 
within Taipower-the Nuclear Power Committee and the Power Develop-
ment Department-in June 1955 and May 1963, respectively, to plan the 
introduction of nuclear power in Taiwan. In fact, site selection for Taiwan's 
first nuclear energy project, which went on stream in 1978, actually began 
as far back as 1964. Similarly, various writings on the Taiwan economy 
during the immediate pre-OPEC period give clear evidence that nuclear 
power was considered an important component of the island's future 
energy sources-even though at the time the major transition noted in the 
Ten-Year Long Range Energy Development Plan (1970-80) was the shift 
from indigenous coal to imported oil. 34 Along the way, Taiwan met the 
guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, as well 
as working with experts from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and 
several U.S. engineering firms to implement nuclear power generation on 
the island. 
Construction ofTaiwan's first nuclear reactor began in 1970. Since that 
time, nuclear power development has proceeded quite rapidly. Taipower 
now operates three nuclear power stations, each equipped with a similar 
set oflight water reactors (LWRs) The third plant began operating in 1984 
and came fully on stream in mid-1985. Total installed capacity reached 
5,144 Mw at that time. A fourth plant was approved in early 1985, to 
become operational in the early 1990s. Initial projections, contained with-
in the island's Ten Year Economic Development Plan (1980-89), were that 
by the year 2001, there would be fourteen nuclear plants in operation, 
generating 51 percent of the island's energy supply-as opposed to the 
current estimate of 33 percent.35 However, because of recent concerns 
about environmental pollution and nuclear safety issues, exacerbated by a 
breakdown and fire at the third nuclear plant in July 1985,36 this plan for 
rapid growth has apparently been reconsidered.37 
The equipment in each of the Taiwan nuclear plants is American, made 
by either Westinghouse or General Electric, underlining the island's great 
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Table 5.5. Taiwan's nuclear power stations 
Reactor Turbine MWe 
supplier (type) supplier rating Startup Architect 
Chinsan 1 GE (BWR) Westinghouse 604 Dec. 1978 Ebasco 
Chinsan 2 GE (BWR) Westinghouse 604 July 1979 Ebasco 
Kuosheng 1 GE (BWR) Westinghouse 951 Dec. 1981 Bechtel 
Kuosheng 2 GE (BWR) Westinghouse 951 March 1983 Bechtel 
Maanshan 1 Westinghouse (PWR) GE 907 July 1984 Bechtel 
Maanshan 2 Westinghouse (PWR) GE 907 Mid-1985 Bechtel 
Yenliao 1 ? ? 1,000 June 1993 ? 
Yenliao 2 ? ? 1,000 June 1994 ? 
Source: Engery Committee, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
dependence on the United States for technical and political support for its 
nuclear energy program. The United States has also been the principal 
source of financial support for projects, providing, for example, about 25% 
of the loans for the Kuosheng and Maanshan nuclear installations.38 U.S. 
engineering firms have been the primary architects and construction 
consultants. Taiwan has been happy to integrate its local firms into the 
procurement and construction process but, unlike Japan or South Korea, 
has no desire to fully domesticize its nuclear power industry. 39 The United 
States, along with South Mrica, is also a major supplier of uranium to 
operate the island's nuclear plants. 40 
At the present time, Taiwan apparently does not reprocess any of its 
irradiated fuels. The United States conducts all of Taiwan's spent fuel 
reprocessing, although in 1982 Taiwan held discussions with the French 
firm Cogema on this score. 41 Fuel reprocessing on the island itselfhas long 
been opposed by the United States as well as other countries in the Asia-
Pacific region, for fear that weapons-grade materials might be diverted 
from such a reprocessing facility. There were reports in the early 1970s that 
Taiwan had clandestinely built its own reprocessing station at the Institute 
of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), the island's top research facility for 
nuclear-related science and technology. The INER had at one time been 
associated with the Taiwan military, giving cause for concern in many 
foreign capitals. According to one analyst, the plant was dismantled as a 
result of significant pressure from the United States. 42 Indications are that 
Taiwan officials would welcome participation in some sort of regional, 
multilateral organization for fuel reprocessing in the Asia-Pacific region, 
but given Taiwan's prevailing political status, involvement in such a formal 
consortium might prove impossible. 43 To prevent the storage of spent fuel 
from becoming a problem for nuclear plant operations, a radioactive waste 
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facility was constructed on Orchid Island, off the Southeast coast of 
Taiwan, to store irradiated materials from the nuclear reactors. 44 
Given the priorities stated in the current Ten Year Economic Develop-
ment Plan (1980-89), energy concerns clearly remain a dominant issue for 
economic and political leaders. In early 1981, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs announced its intention to invest almost U.S. $30 billion in energy 
development to reduce dependence on oil imports. 45 Similarly, a U.S. $25 
billion budget was approved for energy development for the 1992-2001 
period. 46 The goals for the energy sector fall into three broad categories: 
1) reduce the energy elasticity, that is, the percentage increase in energy 
inputs needed to raise GNP by 1 percent; 2) diversify energy sources, in 
terms of both energy suppliers and types of energy supplied; and 3) pro-
mote energy technology research. 47 While nuclear power development 
may have peaked, a principal aim is to expand the role of coal as an 
alternative source to imported petroleum for electricity generation. There 
remain many unanswered questions about the shift toward coal, mainly 
concerning the inefficiency of domestic coal production and the price 
instability in the world coal market. 48 
As a result, despite the setbacks of the last few years, nuclear energy 
seems to meet Taiwan's needs in terms of reliability, economic factors, 
investment resources, and security considerations. Foreign technology 
acquisition is viewed as a principal means to strengthen domestic ca-
pabilities and attain greater self-reliance. In 1981, Taiwan's top officials laid 
out four goals for nuclear power development, reflecting, in many ways, 
the critical role of foreign technology: 1) formation of a joint venture 
nuclear energy company with government backing to import know-how in 
the areas of design, analysis, and quality control methods for nuclear 
plants; 2) establishment of a nuclear fuel manufacturing plant using im-
ported technology; 3) expanded participation in international nuclear 
power development projects; and 4) diversification of nuclear suppliers in 
the areas of fuel, equipment, and technology. 49 In each of these areas, 
Taipower has made a concerted effort to achieve the stated objectives. 
Prior to the postponement of the fourth nuclear energy plant, the clearest 
example of its intentions was reflected in its decision to open up bidding on 
this nuclear project to non-U.S. vendors such as Framatome of France and 
Kraftwerk Union of West Germany. By the beginning of 1987, Taiwan 
ranked among the top ten countries with nuclear generating capability, 
having produced 25.8 billion kw of power during 1986.50 It also had one of 
the most efficient nuclear plant construction records among the indus-
trialized nations.51 
For over three decades, the specter of an invasion by the Chinese 
Communist regime has loomed large in the minds of Taiwan's leaders. 
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Even after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, 
the United States, along with Taiwan, has continued to view various 
developments in the once-contested Taiwan Straits area with a great deal of 
caution. Since the late 1970s and the announcement of the four moderniza-
tion program in China, Chinese de factor leader Deng Xiaoping and his 
cohorts have focused their attention principally on economic moderniza-
tion and technological advance, deciding to forgo much of the ideologically 
informed rhetoric that had characterized the PRC government during the 
heyday of Mao Zedong. Nonetheless, while domestic issues have occupied 
their attention, the issues of Taiwan and Hong Kong have not receded in 
importance for the present leadership. Resolution of both issues is viewed 
by Beijing as the last step needed to consolidate and finalize the Chinese 
revolution. 52 
The historical signing of the agreement on Hong Kong between the 
United Kingdom and the PRC in 1984, under the principle of "one 
country, two systems," gave the Chinese leadership a significant dose of 
self-confidence about its ability to use "diplomatic" means to resolve what 
heretofore had seemed like an intractable problem. 53 With this air of self-
confidence, however, has come a new sense of urgency regarding resolu-
tion of the Taiwan problem. While the present leadership apparently 
would prefer to settle the Taiwan reunification question on peaceful terms 
(and probably hoped to do so while Chiang Ching-kuo was still alive), it 
will not relinquish its self-declared right to use force to bring an end to the 
current situation. Reluctance to commit to a nonmilitary solution repre-
sents a major stumbling block to any formal negotiations between the two 
sides. Even though contacts between the island and the China mainland 
have continued to grow as Taiwan residents, journalists, and businessmen 
travel to the mainland for short-term visits, the reality is that the two sides 
appear no closer to achieving reunification. Moreover, the events in 
China's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, combined with the political 
crackdown in the aftermath of this event, have further damaged the 
potential for reunification. 
Several major initiatives have been taken directly by Beijing since 1978 
to bring Taiwan "back to the motherland." The most prominent was the so-
called Nine Principles enunciated by the late Ye Jianying in 1980. The Nine 
Principles provided a recipe for uniting the country, while claiming to 
allow Taiwan to retain most of its freedom of action. 54 Not unexpectedly, 
Taipei rejected this attempt at rapprochement as well as several other 
overtures from Beijing, pointing, at various times, to the following reasons 
for its continued unwillingness to negotiate: 1) the legacy of previous 
negotiations with the Chinese Communists, when it is believed by the 
KMT that the CCP on two occasions (1937 and 1949) took advantage of the 
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so-called United Front to undermine the position of the Nationalist re-
gime; 2) the experience of Tibet in 1951, when, despite an apparent 
agreement granting independence of action, Tibet lost all of its real 
autonomy to Beijing's control; 3) the general attempts by the PRC since 
1979 to isolate Taiwan internationally despite making peaceful overtures; 
4) the lack of credible guarantees from Beijing or any third party should an 
agreement be reached and then reversed; 5) the uncertain staying power of 
prevailing policies in the PRC after the death ofDeng Xiaoping; and 6) the 
economic and political situation on Taiwan.55 
Of all the issues, the last is perhaps the most relevant and the one over 
which both the Communist and the Nationalist regimes have the least 
control. Economically, the standard ofliving in Taiwan is well above that on 
the China mainland. 56 The key to the success of the KMT on Taiwan has 
been its ability to maintain an atmosphere conducive to economic pros-
perity-even in the times of international difficulties. 57 Politically, the 
reins of power in Taiwan still belong to the mainlander-dominated political 
elite, yet persons born on the China mainland who came to Taiwan in 1949 
currently comprise only 15 percent of the island's total population. Having 
been generally locked out of national-level politics until recent changes in 
the political hierarchy, most of the Taiwanese majority have established 
powerful institutional bases in business and the economy. 58 This separa-
tion between the mainlander-dominated government and the Taiwanese-
dominated economy lasted over three decades because of the mutually 
beneficial "interdependence" that had developed between the two 
groups. More recently, however, the gradual political liberalization begun 
by Chiang Ching-kuo has taken on a momentum of its own, leading to the 
emergence of a formal second political party on the island, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). This has given impetus to a remarkable change in 
the discourse within the political arena, bringing such once-taboo subjects 
as "Taiwan independence" and "reunification with the mainland" into 
center stage both in the press and within the once-sacred confines of 
government institutions such as the National Assembly. 
Under such circumstances, if the mainlander-led KMT were to respond 
precipitously to Beijing's overtures, it would face a difficult time. For one 
thing, most Taiwanese have few links with the China mainland, and 
therefore have no strong emotional attachment to the idea of reunification. 
Second, most native Taiwanese would probably view any deal between 
Beijing and the current government in Taipei as a sell-out of sorts, since 
there is a feeling among many local Taiwanese that neither the Commu-
nists nor the Nationalists are really concerned about their welfare. Third, 
the status quo at a minimum is acceptable to most Taiwanese, who would 
prefer not to become involved in the intrigues between the two sides and 
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would be happy if commercial transactions could be carried out without 
any political interference or political consequences. At one extreme end of 
this group are a relatively small minority who publicly favor a politically 
independent Taiwan, free of the control of both the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party. 59 Were the KMT to make a sudden move, the ranks of 
the proindependence group might quickly grow, and the results could be 
highly destabilizing. 
At the same time, Beijing has been growing increasingly impatient with 
Taipei's recalcitrant behavior. There is a sense that, as growing numbers of 
the KMT leadership leave the scene because of old age or death, it will be 
more difficult to maintain the integrity of the historical ties between the 
mainland and Taiwan, especially since during 1895-1945 the island was a 
Japanese colony, and at no time has it been under the control of a regime in 
like the current one in Beijing. Additionally, as one PRC scholar has noted, 
the PRC government sees the KMT not necessarily as a direct threat to its 
authority, but as a political competitor, thereby serving as an alternative 
locus of authority for overseas Chinese as well as several groups on the 
mainland.oo A case in point would be a number of prominent PRC 
scientists and athletes who have defected to Taiwan in recent years. 
More important, however, in the eyes of Beijing is that Taiwan repre-
sents a symbol of foreign intervention in China, the most serious violator 
being the United States, which interceded in China's civil war to protect 
the Nationalist government that had withdrawn to Taiwan in 1949. Had it 
not been for U.S. involvement these last thirty-plus years, Beijing claims, 
the Taiwan problem might have been resolved. A measure of extent of the 
PRC's adamancy on this score is its constant admonishment of the U.S., 
stressing on almost every high-level exchange of visits between Wash-
ington and Beijing that the status of Taiwan is a major obstacle to the 
improvement of Sino-U.S. relations. In November 1988, for example, 
China accused the U.S. of hindering efforts at reunification by continuing 
to expand relations with the island and by cautioning Taipei to be careful 
about forging too many ties too quickly with the mainland. 61 
The U.S. decision to de-recognize Taipei as the seat of the Chinese 
government and to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing on 
January 1, 1979, created a major security dilemma in Taiwan. One con-
sequence of the decision was the U.S. abrogation of its long-term defense 
treaty with Taiwan. 62 Moreover, implicit to many PRC leaders in the terms 
of the normalization agreement was a commitment by the United States to 
a gradual, albeit steady, reduction in its direct sales of military equipment 
to Taiwan. 63 While such a formal commitment was never publicly accepted 
by U.S. officials, PRC leaders have intimated on several occasions that 
such a commitment was indeed conveyed by Washington. The passage of 
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the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979 obligated the United States to 
maintain its previous level of economic and military exchanges with the 
island without an explicit defense commitment. It thus guaranteed Taiwan 
a continued flow of military equipment from the United States-although 
the U.S. decision to recognize Beijing clearly damaged American cred-
ibility in the eyes of the 19 million residents of Taiwan. 64 
TAIWAN's DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES 
Upon considering various options in the aftermath of the U.S. de-recogni-
tion, Taiwan officials felt they had four basic foreign policy alternatives: 
1) do nothing and simply try to ride out the storm; 2) approach the Soviet 
Union; 3) declare independence; and/or 4) pursue development of a 
nuclear weapon to deter a possible PRC attack. For obvious reasons, 
options No. 2 and No.3 were unacceptable to the leadership, who in spite 
of the difficulties at the time, remained steadfast in their commitment both 
to oppose Communism and to ensure that Taiwan remained a part of 
China. The nuclear option remains a viable alternative, especially since 
Taiwan has the technical know-how and qualified personnel to construct a 
nuclear weapon. 
Several compelling reasons, however, apparently made this option, at 
least in terms of a formal declaration, relatively unattractive to President 
Chiang Ching-kuo and the other KMT leaders. First, Taiwan is a signatory 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and even though it no longer belongs to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, it has agreed to abide by all of the 
principles of these two major institutions. Politically, even though in some 
circles Taiwan is referred to as an "international pariah," it would not risk 
further international isolation by developing a nuclear weapon overtly. It is 
also constrained by various bilateral conventions with the United States 
that went into effect as part of the Taiwan Relations Act. Should a violation 
occur, the U.S. could cut off fuel supplies and refuse to reprocess Taiwan's 
fuel. It is clear that most other nations would follow suit. Second, President 
Chiang Ching-kuo noted on several occasions that his government would 
not employ nuclear weapons against Chinese fellow-countrymen, in effect 
going on the record that Taiwan would not pursue a weapons capability. 65 
Third, the military balance in the Taiwan Straits has tended, though not in 
absolute terms, to be in Taipei's favor in terms of the level of technology 
and the possession of modem aircraft, thereby making the costs of an 
attack-even if successful-generally unacceptable to the PRC. 66 
The type of military threat that Taiwan would likely encounter would 
not be a nuclear attack, but rather a sea blockade or full-scale invasion, by 
PRC forces, of Taiwan and/or those islands surrounding Taiwan that are 
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currently under Nationalist control-for example, Quemoy. In light of 
comments made by former Communist party Secretary Hu Yaobang in 
summer 1985, a sea blockade would appear to be the most likely form of 
intervention, although in the short term the PRC does not appear to 
possess the military capabilities to ensure the success of this tactic. 67 
Similar remarks were made by Deng Xiaoping a year earlier in discussions 
with Japanese officials concerning the reunification question. 68 Such a 
blockade would sever the lifeline ofTaiwan: its international trade links, 
including the flow of imported fuels to the island. 
While the PRC does have nuclear weapons, it seems clear to most 
defense experts that they are primarily directed against the U.S.SR as a 
deterrent. 69 Of course, Beijing might threaten Taiwan with nuclear attack 
if it did not acquiesce to current overtures or if the post-Chiang Ching-kuo 
regime were to declare independence. Taiwan's new leader, Lee Teng-hui, 
seems unlikely to pursue the latter action, though he is also unlikely to go 
far beyond the present levels of exchange that have developed through 
commercial intercourse. Moreover, under the prevailing political climate 
in China, the leadership has tended to prefer less extremist actions. 
Beijing continues to offer various benefits designed to woo those living on 
Taiwan to make contact with the mainland, such as preferential treatment 
for investors from the island. 70 This is not to say that Beijing would not 
issue an ultimatum to Taipei, rather to emphasize that one aim of U.S. 
policy toward the PRC since recognition has been to provide Beijing with a 
vested interest in behaving in a more moderate fashion in foreign affairs-
including pursuit of the solution of the Taiwan problem through peaceful 
means. 
Of course, there are no guarantees on either side of the straits. Both 
political systems are in the process of major change. For example, even 
with the legacy of Ferdinand Marcos's downfall in the Philippines and the 
creeping crisis of political legitimacy in South Korea looming large in the 
minds of the KMT leadership, it was hard for anyone to predict that the 
pace of political liberalization on Taiwan would have occurred so rapidly 
and so intensively. There are also forces that in effect are working against 
immediate resolution of the problem, such as Taiwan's continued ability to 
attract foreign investment and advanced technology from abroad. For 
Taiwan, these factors assure a level of security that was absent in the past. 
The events in Tiananmen Square aside, the emergence of a pragmatic 
leadership in Beijing does much to allay fears of adventurist behavior on 
the part of the PRC. Under such circumstances, Taipei has lacked incen-
tives for pursuing a nuclear option as part of its defense strategy, especially 
since a nuclear response to any of Beijing's actions would almost certainly 
bring destruction in the form of nuclear retaliation. 
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Nonetheless, whether or not it in fact produced such a weapon Taipei 
might see a great political advantage in the perception that it could do so, if 
only to deter any extremist action on the part of Beijing. The value of such a 
"near-nuclear" option, however, would be conditional on the PRC's will-
ingness to believe that the Taiwan authorities would use such a device if 
severely threatened. While it is hard to envision a scenario in which Taipei 
would be pushed to take such an action, the reality is that the political 
value of a "near-nuclear" approach might outweigh the short-term gains in 
deterrence if Taipei really had a weapon. This seems to be the thrust of the 
message delivered when a former high-level scientist from Taiwan's mili-
tary-operated Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology defected to 
the United States in 1988. The scientist claimed to have been working on a 
nuclear weapons project at the time of his defection. 72 
Given that a nuclear exchange with the PRC is an unlikely form of 
confrontation, Taiwan has attempted to strengthen its conventional forces 
and modernize existing weapons capabilities. One of its immediate re-
sponses to the U.S. de-recognition decision was the creation of a "national 
defense fund" to expand defense research and development, 73 ensure 
greater technological self-reliance in the military area, and purchase 
needed weapons from abroad. 74 The Chungshan Institute for Science and 
Technology has been given additional resources to development improve-
ments in radar, avionics, aircraft, and various types of nonnuclear 
missiles. 75 Response to a possible blockade has been high on the defense 
agenda. Moreover, there is an explicit attempt underway to more closely 
link civilian technological advances with those in the military, to strength-
en the industrial and R&D base for defense. 76 
Advanced defense capabilities have become more imperative as a result 
of additional pressures by Beijing on the United States to halt arms sales to 
Taiwan. In 1982, Sino-U.S. relations built to a crisis when Beijing refused 
to accept continued American arms sales to Taiwan. The signing of the so-
called Shanghai Communique II seemingly ended the crisis. In reality, 
however, it merely served to reinforce the differences between Wash-
ington and Beijing about what commitments had been made and toward 
what end. Moreover, the "agreement to disagree" regarding Taiwan, which 
had formed the backbone of the normalization process that began with the 
Nixon-Kissinger initiatives, seemed no longer viable fn~m Beijing's per-
spective. While U.S. resolve to honor the TRA has remained strong, the 
momentum of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship has left the authorities 
on Taiwan with grave doubts about U.S. behavior in the coming years. At 
the same time, U.S. leverage over the PRC may have decreased as China 
has pursued what is described as a "independent" foreign policy, refusing 
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to lean to the American side in the strategic triangle of Beijing, Moscow, 
and Washington. 77 
Apprehensions have grown as discussions between Beijing and Wash-
ington focus on the transfer of advanced civilian and "dual-use" tech-
nologies from the United States and other Western countries to China. 78 
At times, negotiations between the United States and the PRC have also 
included the sale of military equipment. While the United States sees 
such sales primarily in terms of helping China deal more effectively with 
the fifty-plus Soviet divisions on its northern border and while the United 
States is on record as restricting the sale of items or know-how that could 
assist any PRC effort to attack Taiwan, the fact remains that it is extremely 
difficult to sort out the multiple applications of specific technologies. 79 
Taiwan officials also have grown uneasy about projected sales of nuclear 
power technologies to the PRC. Taiwan claims that such transfers of 
equipment and related technology could be diverted to military use given 
the PRC's current technical capabilities, adding to the nuclear weapons 
that the PRC already has. 
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Taiwan's ability to preserve the status quo, which at this time seems to be 
the Nationalist regime's primary goal, depends to a great extent on its 
success in maintaining economic prosperity and allowing a greater degree 
of pluralism in the domestic political realm. Energy security is an impor-
tant part of the economic question. Should the island begin to experience 
economic difficulties because of the uncertainty of energy supplies or high 
energy prices that affect export competitiveness, the political authorities 
might face an internal crisis. In some respects, the likelihood of such an 
energy-induced crisis has actually increased somewhat as Beijing has been 
successful in making political inroads in countries such as Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. In the case of the former, China has been the recipient of 
several large development loans. In the case of the latter, while formal 
diplomatic recognition has not been forthcoming, China's attempts to play 
a constructive role in the Third World have not gone unnoticed in Saudi 
Arabia. 80 Even more critical, and perhaps more ironic, the PRC has 
apparently sold its CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to 
help the Saudis defend themselves against an Iranian attack; apparently, 
there are also dozens of Chinese technicians on-site in Saudi Arabia, 
assisting with the deployment of these missiles. 81 
Taiwan continues to look to the United States for assistance in meeting 
energy needs. Even in the case of the Mingtan Hydroelectric Plant, a 
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multimillion-dollar project to build a pumped storage hydropower facility 
for the 1990s, Taiwan initially neglected potential suppliers from France, 
the UK, and the Federal Republic of Germany in favor of working with the 
United States. 82 For further nuclear construction, should it take place, the 
U.S. is also viewed as the primary supplier. More recently, as Taiwan's 
trade balance with the United States has grown substantially in its favor, 
Nationalist officials have even raised the possibility of purchasing crude oil 
from Alaska. 83 Such purchases, if allowed, would go a long way toward 
reducing the U.S. trade deficit. More important, access to Alaskan crude 
oil would help assure Taiwan of uninterrupted supplies of imported pe-
troleum. U.S. officials, however, have been unwilling to lift the ban on 
export of Alaskan oil, given their own concerns about future energy 
shortages. 
Generally speaking, the issue of energy security in Taiwan's case cannot 
be divorced from general concerns about overall national security and 
nuclear weapons development. Should Taiwan begin to feel increasingly 
isolated in international affairs, believing that its "friends" such as the 
United States and Japan were succumbing to pressures from Beijing to 
curtail their extensive levels of commercial interaction with the island, 
Taipei might respond with a knee-jerk reaction. It could be argued that it is 
not the mainlander-dominated regime that is the primary source of con-
cern, but rather a post-Chiang, Taiwanese-dominated leadership that sees 
the nuclear option as a leverage point somewhere between an explicit 
refusal to accept Beijing's overtures and an outright attempt to declare 
independence. The political utility of nuclear weapons in this context 
could outweigh the costs, even if the immediate reaction of the United 
States, Japan, and others might be condemnation. 
The challenge for the United States, Japan, and the PRC is to ensure 
that Taiwan's leaders see no need-political or military-to pursue a 
nuclear option. Washington and Tokyo must continue, publicly and pri-
vately, to insist on a peaceful approach on the part of Beijing in return for 
American participation in China's modernization through such means as 
expanded technology transfers. Bringing China into closer contact with 
the West through increased economic exchanges gives Beijing a vested 
interest in avoiding extreme actions that might cause the West to cut off 
access to its technology and training. Continued adherence by the United 
States to the principles of the Taiwan Relations Act is also essential, since 
Taiwan is more of a proliferation worry if it is overly apprehensive about its 
national security than if it feels it is operating from a position of relative 
strength. 
Whether Washington or Beijing wants to accept it or not, the United 
States is intimately involved in what happens in Taiwan. A precipitous 
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withdrawal of explicit support by the United States, whether by the 
government or the private sector, could be extremely destabilizing to the 
status quo in Taiwan, possibly sending the wrong signals as far as the 
island's security is concerned. It is the United States, as much as Taiwan's 
own resolve, that has maintained stability across the Taiwan Straits. Ignor-
ing that critical role risks an extreme reaction on the part of Taiwan and 
possibly by the PRC as well-which could prove detrimental to the 
interests of Washington, Beijing, and Taipei all three. Fortunately, in 
contrast to its past position, the PRC seems to recognize this reality and 
has in fact encouraged the U.S. to play a more active role in its attempts to 
reunifY the country. 
Of course, events on the China mainland could also prove threatening to 
Taiwan, in both the short and long term. Current dissatisfaction with 
Taipei's policy of nonnegotiation at a time when self-confidence is declin-
ing in China could lead Beijing to exert even greater pressure on Taiwan's 
trading partners and other international organizations to minimize rela-
tions with the island. At the very least, it is not inconceivable to envision a 
situation in which firms doing business or wanting to do business in the 
PRC will face criticism by Chinese officials for their investments on 
Taiwan. The decision to go this route could be made as a result of frustra-
tion or Beijing's perception that it was losing whatever leverage it might 
have regarding the future of Taiwan. 
Similarly, while it continues to be in the interest of Beijing to pursue a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem, a confluence of events could 
lead to the use of force. A series of pronounced economic downturns or 
internal political problems, combined with a serious foreign policy flap 
with the United States, for example, could lead the PRC away from its 
generally moderate behavior over the last several years. A succession crisis 
on Taiwan might also elicit a military reaction by Beijing. In spite of recent 
changes in the PRC military hierarchy, it apparently continues to be the 
bastion of conservatism regarding Taiwan. It would not be going too far to 
suggest that segments of the People's Liberation Army, along with compo-
nents of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been the main sources 
behind much of the pressure on the United States regarding Taiwan. 
In the final analysis, resolution of the Taiwan problem depends on a 
combination of political and economic factors. While the current at-
mosphere appears to be one of relative calm, especially considering the 
often-sharp rhetoric that has been exchanged by Beijing and Taipei at 
times since 1949, the future is anything but certain. Beijing seems to be 
counting on the sudden downturn in the Western economies and the rise 
in protectionism since the early 1980s to be the very catalyst needed to 
drive a wedge between Taiwan and its Western supporters. Under circum-
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stances of dwindling access to Western markets, Chinese leaders contend 
that Taiwan's business community will increasingly be driven to seek out 
economic opportunities with the China mainland. Such an expansion of 
trade-with energy sources and other raw materials being supplied by 
China in return for basic manufactured and industrial products from 
Taiwan-could form the basis for growing interdependence between the 
two sides. Just as it is hoped that the border between Hong Kong and 
southern China will gradually disappear, so, it is hoped, will the obstacles 
that currently separate Taiwan from the China mainland. 
While this attractive scenario provides what Greenwood and others 
have called "proliferation disincentives," it has two majorfallacies. First, it 
is probably impossible for Taiwan to obtain any greater measure of energy 
security from linking up with the China mainland precisely because the 
PRC itself faces massive energy deficits and will likely do so for the rest of 
the century. It is clear, for example, that inadequate energy supplies are a 
major constraint on Chinese economic growth. Second-perhaps even 
more important-this scenario ignores the role of politics. Above all, the 
Taiwan problem is a question of politics, involving succession matters in 
both capitals as well as complex power relationships in each society. It is 
not merely a difference of opinion between the Nationalists and the 
Communists that has divided China for thirty-plus years; at stake are a 
plurality of interests, the most important involving the people of Taiwan. 
Unless both Beijing and the current government in Taiwan can satisfy the 
political concerns of the Taiwanese inhabitants, economic interdepen-
dence will not lead to political interdependence-unless coercive means 
are applied. 
Time, of course, is essential for the post-Deng Xiaoping and Chiang 
Ching-kuo successions to work themselves out and determine whether the 
PRC will stay on its current pragmatic course. There is no doubt that the 
expertise accumulated by Taiwan over the last three decades could be put 
to good use on the China mainland in support of the so-called four 
modernizations, especially if Taiwan's attempt to develop high-technology 
industry is successful. On the other hand, continued economic success on 
Taiwan may be the biggest obstacle to a settlement with Beijing. Whether 
or not that willingness to cooperate will be forthcoming remains a political 
question that may not be answered for a long time. The main worry is that 
the longer it takes to answer this question, the more unlikely it is that the 
answer will be to Beijing's satisfaction. This is a sobering thought in view of 
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Argentina 
CYNTHIA A. WATSON 
Argentina has baffied both internal and external observers for nine dec-
ades of the twentieth century with behavior that has not seemed reason-
able when compared with the opportunities available to the people. 
Nationalism, the desire to control Argentina's growth and destiny, is a 
strong force in the republic. While a highly controversial figure, Juan 
Domingo Peron described the feelings of many Argentines when he said: 
"This is in a few words the Argentine international doctrine: we want to 
respect all peoples but we want to be respected in turn by them; we are 
always on the side of the subjugated because we understand that in the 
community of peoples of the world there cannot be powerful people who 
possess everything while there are weak people who suffer everything." 1 
Regardless of the reasons for the difficulty in explaining or predicting 
Argentina's political and international behavior, the nation at the southern 
tip of Latin America is a threshold nuclear weapons state. The nuclear 
program has been cultivated carefully and is a source of significant national 
pride. It gives the republic some options in addressing both its energy 
needs and its military strategies. This chapter will consider these options 
within the context of the overall energy picture. 
International concern about Argentina's nuclear program heightened 
after the south Atlantic conflict with Britain in 1982. The world press 
highlighted Argentine capabilities in astonishment that this somewhat 
peripheral state would take on the power and prestige of the Royal Navy. 
The majority of the world was not aware of the conflict that had simmered 
between Washington and Buenos Aires during the years immediately 
following World War II, nor of the national power envisioned by Peron 
during his decade as leader. Argentina was too far away to be of concern to 
many nonspecialists, often mentioned only because of the seemingly 
constant transitions of governments, more reminiscent of a banana repub-
lic than an aspiring world player. The horrors of the National Security 
State, which began in 1976 with the ouster oflsabel Peron, received some 
attention on the international scene through the efforts of human rights 
groups and the Carter administration in the United States. The end of the 
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Carter period appeared to indicate the end of international awareness in 
1981, as the United States and other industrialized democracies elected 
more conservative governments. The newly elected governments seemed 
more interested in promoting business links than human rights in Argen-
tina. 
The stark realization that Argentina was not merely a peripheral state 
hit both policymakers and the public hard. The nuclear capability should 
not, however, have come as any surprise. Argentina's aspirations to create a 
world-class nuclear program date back to a rather humiliating episode in 
the early 1950s. After Peron announced to the world that he had created 
the first-ever controlled thermonuclear explosion, only to find that his 
"scientist," former Nazi Ronald Richter, was a charlatan,2 Peron set out to 
create a strong, legitimate nuclear energy program. While Argentina has 
remained adamant since the 1950s that its goals are entirely peaceful, the 
global community has been somewhat suspicious. 
This chapter will explore the nexus of energy and security in the context 
of contradictions between nationalism and the need to reach outside its 
borders that have plagued Argentina. It will discuss the political realities 
behind these phenomena. In the process, it will focus particular attention 
on Buenos Aires's relatively sophisticated nuclear program. 
ENERGY IN ARGENTINA: THE EARLY YEARS THROUGH THE 1960s 
Argentine petroleum deposits were discovered in the area around Com-
odoro Rivadavia in December 1907. The initial years of oil development 
saw Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch Shell, and an Argentine 
company, Astra, working in relatively advantageous conditions, since the 
Argentine regime feared that its fuel supplies might be cut off by impend-
ing conflict in Europe.3 The problems of World War I mandated a national 
program for petroleum development. The national petroleum agency, 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), was created in 1922 for the pur-
pose of producing petroleum and related activities. Although YPF had 
government support, it was unable to make Argentina self-sufficient 
through the 1940s. 4 Demand for petroleum rose at a higher rate than did 
production, particularly at the end of World War II, because of the 
dramatic rate of industrialization. From 1947 until1955, petroleum im-
ports climbed 100 percent to meet consumption, as YPF fell short of goals 
in increasing its domestic operations. The foreign corporations operating 
under contract with the YPF were prohibited from increasing their pro-
duction levels, hence closing another method of holding down imports. 
YPF had not generated enough profits to invest in newer technologies and 
was allowing Argentina to fall behind its government-controlled pe-
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troleum production until 1940 while YPF increased refining of foreign 
companies' oil. 5 
Peron and his rhetorical concerns about national sovereignty had cre-
ated domestic expectations that Argentina would be able to produce 
enough petroleum to meet its needs. By 1953, Peron had given way to 
economic realities and allowed foreign investment in the petroleum indus-
try, but the damage had already been done. With Peron's ouster in 1955, 
the national sentiment for sovereignty over domestic resources collided 
with the need for oil. Arturo Frondizi, a successor to Peron who charged 
that the Argentine people should retain control over their assests, had 
given YPF a legal monopoly over the production of petroleum by 1958.6 
However, Argentina then had to buy 7 million barrels of crude oil from the 
Soviet Union while Frondizi attempted to entice private petroleum firms, 
some of them foreign, into production in Argentina. Buenos Aires signed 
drilling and development contracts with many private firms, including 
Esso, Royal Dutch Shell, Kerr-McGee, Astra Cia. Argentina de Petroleo, 
and Cia. Argentina para El Desarrollo de Ia Industria Petroleo y Miner-
ales, SA. 7 The need for increased energy production conflicted with the 
Argentine desire for national control over the means of production as well 
as profits. When Frondizi saw that YPF was unequal to the task of raising 
production, he turned to the private sector in a change of policy that was 
unpopular but that increased domestic production while drastically de-
creasing imports. 
Beyond oil, the state became involved in other aspects of energy 
production. The government body Agua y Energia took control over 
foreign holdings in electricity, while Gas del Estado, established in 1957, 
oversaw natural gas production.8 Even with growing state control, it was 
not until the latter 1960s that Argentines believed themselves on the way to 
self-sufficiency in various types of energy supplies. As late as 1957, the 
Frondizi government was accused by the opposition of bringing the re-
public to the point of importing two-thirds of its petroleum needs. 9 Energy 
sufficiency was a domestic political football as opposition figures charged 
that contracts with foreign companies were actually concessions which 
were costing Argentine money and its natural resources. While the gov-
ernment was working through foreign companies in developing domestic 
energy, it was creating a parallel Argentine nuclear program aimed in-
creasingly at autonomy. The Frondizi government's attempts to obtain 
foreign financial, managerial, and technical assistance were exemplified 
by the so-called Yadarola plan, whereby the Argentine ambassador to 
Washington tried to raise $1 billion in outside capital for petroleum explo-
ration and production.lO The Frondizi plans were successful between 1957 
and 1959, when Standard Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, and other corporations 
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contracted to aid Argentine energy development. Outside investment was 
also obtained for petroleum and natural gas pipelines, as well as hydro-
power expansion.n 
The Frondizi regime's willingness to engage foreign private participa-
tion in the late 1950s, less than a decade after Peron and his rhetoric of 
nationalism, was to set a pattern of contradictions throughout the next 
three decades. Argentina's energy policy has alternated between high 
dependence on the government's role and reliance on private-often 
foreign-participation. These shifts in reliance on state versus private 
sources of expertise and funding resulted from political necessities and 
economic realities during the turbulent years of the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s. These dramatic shifts between nationalism and foreign assistance 
have characterized Argentine energy development in the 20th century. 
During the Alianza Para el Progreso ofl961-69, Argentina continued to 
receive energy-related loans from the U.S. government as well as the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and the 
World Bank.I2 Such funding came under the control of the state corpora-
tions YPF and Agua y Energia, which then worked to create joint par-
ticipation where possible. This pattern of joint participation became 
entrenched as the main option when state operation of industries was 
jettisoned with changes in government. State enterprises have contracted 
operations out to foreign companies for lack of technical and financial 
resources. In the case of petroleum and natural gas, foreign companies 
often sold specified amounts of production to the state at prices under the 
world market levels.l3 
The main sources of capital and technology for energy development 
during the three decades have been Western, whether private or govern-
mental; the Soviet Union had limited participation in Argentina's energy 
development until1970, but the two states increased nuclear power ties in 
the 1980s.l4 The United States, through the Atoms for Peace program, 
worked to strengthen the Argentine nuclear energy program in the 1950s. 
The first experimental nuclear plant in Latin America arrived in Argentina 
in 1957 from Westinghouse-the RA-1 reactor, located 50 kilometers 
outside of Buenos Aires at the Ezeiza Atomic Center. It resulted from a 
1955 agreement under which the United States pledged to supply the 
reactor while training 200 Argentine scientists and providing $460,000 in 
grants from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The RA-1 was a light 
water reactor for which enriched uranium was imported from the United 
States. The reactor was to become a source of resentment in Argentina 
when the Carter Administration curtailed sales of enriched uranium in the 
late 1970s in retaliation for Argentine human rights abuses.l5 
In one of the periods when foreign enterprises' development of Argen-
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tine resources clashed with nationalist sentiments at home, Arturo Illia, 
Radical party president, in 1963 canceled contracts held by foreign corpo-
rations without paying compensation.l6 The United States responded by 
terminating foreign assistance, forcing Illia to pay the foreign oil com-
panies compensation of more than $800 million.l7 By 1965, government 
policy had reverted to greater Argentine, rather than outside, control over 
national assets.lS When the military took power the following year, foreign 
corporations were invited back to resume development of energy re-
sources, as would happen again in the 1970s.l9 During General Juan 
Ongania's tenure (1966-70), foreign corporations explored for petroleum 
and natural gas even without supervision of the Argentine state enter-
prises. 2o This policy came under severe attack under the rule of a Peronist, 
Alejandro Lanusse (1971-1973), whose government was quickly over-
turned. During the briefPeronist interlude of the 1970s, full-scale nation-
alization was threatened but never conducted,21 although Peron did move 
all petroleum marketing back under control of YPF. 22 YPF became a state-
owned company in 1977, with somewhat greater autonomy, although it 
remained under the Energy Secretary. YPF, now the largest enterprise in 
the republic, owns service stations; it is divided into a public section and a 
military/industrial section. 23 
Petroleum production in Argentina rose to the point of near-indepen-
dence in liquid fuels by 1982 (Table 6.1). During the same period, natural 
gas production rose at a fairly consistent pace, from 1,058,000,000 cubic 
meters in 1955 to 15,523,000,000 cubic meters in 1982.24 
DEvELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES: 1950 THROUGH 1984 
Argentina's nuclear energy agency, the Comision Nacional de Energia 
Atomica (CNEA), was set up in the 1950s as a result of international 
embarrassment over the charlatan Richter. Peron's goal was then to create 
a solid nuclear organization that would be above reproach (including 
membership by anti-Peronists who otherwise might not have been consid-
ered acceptable).25 To avoid dependence on states that might use political 
leverage to subjugate Argentina,26 the CNEA was created with a highly 
organized, well-defined mission to help create self-sufficiency in energy. 
Some thirty years after its establishment by Pedro Iraolagoitia, the Jorge 
A. Balseiro Institute of Physics at San Carlos de Bariloche remains a 
respected nuclear training facility. The institute has evolved into a public 
policy think tank as well as a CNEA education facility. Regardless of the 
other problems the nation faces, it has retained a substantial pool of 
technical expertise. 
The first nuclear reactor in Argentina was a heavy water-natural ura-
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Table 6.1. Argentina's imports of petroleum and its byproducts, 
1955-1982 (Thousands of cubic meters except as noted) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 
Petroleum 4,621 3,685 4,203 1,684 2,540 1,736 
Aircraft 66 64 85 
Kerosene 211 596 16 62 
Gasoil 465 589 758 627 239 
Diesel oil 195 316 55 9 6 
Fuel oil 2,713 309 26 168 148 57 
Propane* 103 154 91 
Butane* 273 337 266 
LNG* 26 183 376 491 357 
Lubricants 80 63 107 142 172 54 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Petroleum 3,395 3,430 2,486 3,524 3,413 2,476 
Aircraft 12 14 5 5 
Kerosene 42 60 34 
Gasoil 107 114 550 500 590 179 
Diesel oil 20 
Fuel oil 436 80 99 
Propane* 69 141 115 126 62 114 
Butane* 237 271 305 249 171 260 
LNG* 306 412 420 375 233 374 
Lubricants 1 3 39 43 23 29 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
Petroleum 2,009 2,529 1,447 823 
Aircraft 
Kerosene 249 100 117 
Gasoil 969 15 19 
Diesel oil 
Fuel oil 
Propane* 194 77 78 
Butane* 231 232 154 
LNG* 425 309 232 
Lubricants 13 23 28 19 
Source: Anuario Estadistico della Publica Argentina: 1981-1982, lnstituto Nacional 
de Estadistica y Censos, Buenos Aires, 1982, p. 531. 
*Thousands of tons. 
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nium type sold by the West German conglomerate Siemens, which went 
on stream in 1974. As early as 1964, President Illia had requested that the 
CNEA conduct a feasibility study for nuclear power generation in the 
Buenos Aires metropolitan area, which resulted in a decision to seek bids 
on a 500-megawatt reactor to supply electricity by 1971. The study also set 
two benchmark goals: to utilize as much as possible of the abundant 
indigenous uranium supply as possible, and to accomplish roughly 40-50 
percent of the construction and operation of the power station through 
domestic participation. 27 This study was one of the earliest accomplished 
by a state independently, rather than through Atoms for Peace or the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.2s 
Among the 17 bids from the United States, West Germany, France, 
Canada, and Britain, both the Canadians and West Germans offered 
reactors based on the heavy water-natural uranium model, which fulfilled 
the CNEA feasibility study's goal of high utilization of domestic uranium 
supplies without exporting fuel for enrichment. CNEA accepted the 
Siemens bid for a 320-Mw reactor although it was not the lowest-priced, 
nor had Siemens even tested a reactor of 320 Mw.29 However, Siemens 
offered Argentina 35 percent local participation and 100 percent financing. 
Members of the Buenos Aires government also had personal links with 
Walter Schnurr, a West German who lobbied for Siemens. Since the 
CNEA was convinced that the West German proposal would ultimately 
increase Argentine autonomy, the $70 million contract was signed by 
supporting local participation, which could translate into nuclear indepen-
dence. Construction on Atucha I began at a site 150 kilometers north of 
Buenos Aires on the Parana River. While scheduled for completion in 1971, 
Atucha I did not go critical until March 1974, because of a variety of 
problems. Siemens absorbed the expense of redesigning the problematic 
fuel rods, as well as cost overruns, which may have been 100 percent. 30 The 
government in Buenos Aires was impressed with the West German will-
ingness to satisfy the customer, which influenced later power plant deci-
sions and solidified existing nuclear links. This connection generated some 
international concern when stories surfaced that the West Germany, 
which is prohibited from developing nuclear weapons, may have secretly 
provided illegal nuclear materials ("hot cells") to Argentina. These stories 
circulated widely during the 1982 conflict between Britain and Argentina 
but have not been pursued since.31 
Atucha I proved successful. In industry efficiency reports, it was rated 
first of 154 reactors in the world between 1977 and 1978.32 
In 1967, CNEA had developed ten-year plan for nuclear development, 
setting goals of three power plants, domestic fuel manufacturing and 
disposal, and up-to-date breeder and plutonium technology. Partially as a 
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result of this report, Argentina had five research reactors by 1971 and a 
small domestically designed, produced, and operated reprocessing facility 
(the first in Latin America for plutonium). 33 When the 1967 nuclear plan 
was completed, Rio Tercero Lake in Cordoba province in the interior was 
chosen as the site of the next reactor, the Embalse plant. The contract for 
the 600-Mw heavy water-natural uranium facility went to the Atomic 
Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) of Canada, after considerably greater 
public debate than in the late 1960s, when Atucha I was awarded. The 
Canadians did not offer 100 percent financing for Embalse, but their 
proposal was appealing in calling for transfer of additional nuclear tech-
nology. 34 Skeptics of the Argentine program pointed out that the Atomic 
Energy of Canada CANDU type of heavy water reactors produced greater 
amounts of plutonium than other reactors, a characteristic that might have 
been the deciding factor if the republic were seeking to acquire nuclear 
weapons.35 The CNEA got the AECL to agree to 50 percent Argentine 
participation36 for the $250 million project. The Embalse reactor contract 
was signed in 1971, but construction was delayed for two years-only the 
beginning of the reactor's problems. 
The Embalse reactor became a classic example of the bureaucratic/ 
economic/international problems facing Argentina as a society and a 
threshold state. The year before construction began, Juan Domingo Peron 
returned from a seventeen-year exile and a period of political collapse 
began, culminating in the National Security State and the guerra sucia. 
While Peron had carefully avoided politicizing the CNEA after the Richter 
fiasco in the 1950s, during the Peronist Interlude of the 1970s it became a 
highly politicized organization. Decision-making disintegrated because of 
political purges and the lack of direct communication between the CNEA 
and the Casa Rosada (the head of state works out of this site). 37 
More significant, the Canadians felt betrayed by the Indian nuclear 
detonation of May 18, 197 4, which proved that a state could develop a 
nuclear explosive from a civilian power plant. The Canadians felt at least 
partially responsible for the Indian action, as they had supplied much of 
the technology for the Indian program, which began in the 1950s. After the 
detonation, Canada attempted to increase the safeguards on the Embalse 
facility, which was then under construction. The Argentines resisted such 
attempts, and considerable wrangling slowed construction. If this were 
not enough, the peso devaluations and inflation spiral of the Peronist 
Interlude forced the AECL to take $200 million in losses, as the ultimate 
price tag reached four times what had been contracted in 1971.38 Embalse 
went critical in March 1983, leaving serious questions about the nuclear 
industry's external ties, as well as international concerns about Argentina's 
goals. 
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After the collapse of Isabel Peron's government in March 1976, Ret. 
Rear Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, trained at Westinghouse in the 
United States and holding a Ph.D. in physics, assumed charge of the 
CNEA early in the Videla government. He managed to survive all the 
upheavals that plagued Argentine society and government over the next 
seven and a half years, remaining in control of the CNEA until January 
1984. Under his direction, the Argentine nuclear capability came of age. 
Madero left the CNEA a viable agency for nuclear development, poten-
tially a technology exporter of the Third World. 
The CNEA moved to put its 1967 growth plan more thoroughly into 
effect with Argentina's third nuclear generating plant. During the Peron 
period, the CNEA under Iraolagoitia had discussed a third nuclear reactor 
of the same size as the 600-Mw Embalse, but the tensions with AECL left 
doubt regarding any Canadian bids. The Siemens delays of the 1960s, 
extensive though they were, were rapidly fading from memory, and the 
West German willingness to buck the Ford Administration on supplying a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil39 made the West German option 
increasingly appealing again. Building the third reactor at the same loca-
tion as Atucha I was expected to cut costs, and local energy demands were 
bound to grow, since one of every three Argentines live in the Buenos Aires 
metropolitan area. Twin reactors at Atcha made economic and logistical 
sense. In November 1978, the junta in Buenos Aires appointed an inter-
ministerial commission to continue developing a national plan for nuclear 
growth and to start taking bids for the new reactor. 
The CNEA's 1979 plan was to chart nuclear development through the 
turn of the century. Argentina's plan "is aimed at stepping up the scientific, 
technical, and industrial effort in the nuclear field for peaceful uses and 
utilization of the country's human and natural resources in this field to help 
consolidate national growth".4o The plan, approved through decree 
302179, charged the nation to develop reactors to go on line in 1987 (Atucha 
II), 1991, 1994, and 1997. The plan called for a total of 15 reactors (for 
research as well as power generation) by the year 2000, with generating 
capacity of 9000 Mw, at a projected construction cost of $10 billion. 41 
Decree 302/79 cemented the commitment to heavy water reactors as the 
sole means of Argentine nuclear power generation. For future facilities, 
Argentina would be self-sufficient in the heavy water part of the fuel cycle. 
By the year 2100, the nuclear industry was projected to fill Argentine 
energy requirements beyond the 93 percent petroleum self-sufficiency to 
be achieved by then. In 1979, petroleum provided 63 percent of the 
nation's energy, gas 23 percent, hydropower 6 percent, and nuclear-
generated power merely 2 percent. By the turn of the century, Argentina 
hopes to increase the nuclear contribution to 15 percent, and hydropower 
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to 73 percent while lowering fossil fuels to 12 percent. 42 The full con-
tingent of reactors by 2000 were to be using 600 tons of uranium per year of 
the known reserves of 30,000 tons in Argentina. 
One of the main goals of the plan, as has been true throughout nuclear 
development in Argentina, was to keep increasing domestic participation 
in the management and ownership of the nuclear industry. As a result, 
CNEA moved to create four enterprises as mixtures of public-government 
participation, as well as domestic-foreign, to get the financing to best 
develop Argentina's nuclear capabilities. These enterprises included one 
to help develop nuclear potential in Rio Negro and Patagonia provinces 
and, a second enterprise, in Mendoza, as a mixed mining group in the 
"province of uranium." The third company, with the majority privately 
owned and the minority held by CNEA, is responsible for technical 
production and development of the combustible aspects of irradiation 
process. Fourth is a mixed engineering enterprise held 75 percent by 
CNEA, in charge of deciding the reactor sites for the projected three 
additional reactors. 
The Atucha II reactor resurrected international worries about Argen-
tina's elevation to the status of threshold nuclear state. Global nuclear 
weapons proliferation concerns greatly increased after the 197 4 Indian 
detonation and the Bonn-Brasilia fuel cycle pact of the following year. Not 
only the Canadians were worried about the possibility that Argentina 
might derive weapons from the civilian power generating plants; the 
United States and several European countries were equally apprehensive. 
The West Germans, however, were significantly less concerned, since 
Argentina was already developing many of the nuclear fuel cycle compo-
nents itself The West Germans won the contract for the Atucha II reactor, 
and a Swiss company simultaneously got the contract to build a heavy 
water production facility. The West Germans clearly wanted the reactor 
contract enough that they did not care about not getting the heavy water 
facility as part of the package. While the Carter and Trudeau administra-
tions encouraged the Germans not to go through with the contract, the 
Atucha II process "pointed out three long-standing problems on this 
issue ... 1) the bankrupt state of the Carter policies on nuclear com-
merce, 2) the sizable number of orders for West German nuclear products, 
and 3) the military-commercial balance of power in Latin America". 43 
Coupled with the emerging information about the brutality of the National 
Security State in control of Argentina the prospect of Atucha II was 
unsettling for those concerned about Argentina's status as a threshold 
state. 
Atucha II, a 750-Mw heavy water-natural uranium reactor, was con-
tracted to West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU), while the 250-ton-
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per-year heavy water production plant at Arroyitos was awarded to the 
Sulzer Brothers of Switzerland. The heavy water plant, the third in 
Argentina, consolidated its move toward self-sufficiency. The awards had 
vocal critics at home and abroad, particularly since other bids were as 
much as $500 million lower than the winning KWU contract. 44 Critics felt 
that Argentina, in selecting the reactor, had been more concerned about 
the few nonproliferation strings attached than about the economics of the 
system. The CANDU reactors sold by Canadian corporations were more 
highly tested than the prototype that KWU had offered. 45 The Canadians 
were reluctant to push their case too strongly, however, since the superb 
Atucha I reactor also had been a prototype. Nor was the Sulzer Brothers 
heavy water facility exempt from criticism, since that firm's largest plant to 
date had been only one-tenth the size of the one for Argentina, as well as 
being prone to problems.46 Much of the criticism about the two 1979 
contracts centered on whether the CNEA had subdivided the business to 
circumvent stiff Canadian nonproliferation safeguards.47 The United 
States pressured the West Germans and Swiss on grounds that Argentina 
had not agreed to the mandated blanket safeguards that these suppliers 
had accepted as members of the London Supplier Club. 4H However, 
neither the West Germans nor the Swiss abandoned the $1.6 billion 
combination German-Swiss deal, although in 1980 Bonn got pledges on 
stiffer safeguards. Castro Madero's stated position on the safeguards: 
Argentina maintains that the international exchange of nuclear technology 
must be covered by suitable safeguards, as a means of promoting the 
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On this basis, it has 
put under safeguards all the nuclear facilities that it has received from 
abroad, but it refuses to subject to safeguards those facilities which have 
been developed and built with its own technology, and wherein it has not 
received any assistance from abroad. This is the only way of actually giving an 
incentive to external assistance in areas that have been unilaterally defined 
as sensitive by the London Club. It refuses to give a blank check, such as the 
signing of total safeguards, which would leave the country without the 
capacity to negotiate for the procurement of major nuclear technology. In 
short, safeguards are accepted in exchange for technology. 49 
The progress on both Atucha II and Arroyitos has been plagued by 
economic and technical slowdowns, but nuclear energy is helping to meet 
Argentina's needs. 
ALFONSIN AND THE DEBT CRUNCH: STALL ON ENERGY 
After the ousting of the leaders of the guerra sucia, .so when Raul Alfons in 
assumed office on December 10, 1983, a somewhat different path was 
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Table 6.2. Energy production in Argentina, 1977-1987 
1977 1980 1984 1986 1987 
Petroleum, 000 bbllday 431 491 478 434 428 
Natural gas, 000 bbllday 11 13 8 31 31 
Dry natural gas, trillion cubic ft. 0.28 0.28 0.49 0.55 0.54 
Hydroelectric power, billion kwh 5.7 15.0 19.7 20.8 21.0 
Nuclear electric power, billion kwh 1.6 2.2 4.3 5.4 6.1 
Source: Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. Department of Energy, International 
Energy Outlook, 1989, Washington, D.C., 1989. 
chosen for the nexus between the state and the development of energy in 
Argentina. Alfonsin did not choose to throw open the country to foreigners 
nor did he unceremoniously oust them, although public opinion during 
the 1980s has been high in opposing repayment of the massive external 
debt accumulated during the 1976-83 period. Alfonsin was forced by the 
reality of Argentina's debts to make overtures to foreign energy com-
panies, limiting the operations of primarily state-owned energy com-
panies. Alfonsin needed to satisfy the criteria set forth by the International 
Monetary Fund as conditions for renegotiating its debt servicing sched-
ules. Under its economically orthodox policies, the IMF set conditions for 
short-term-loans and debt servicing that would limit state control over the 
economy, including energy enterprises. This led the Alfonsin government 
to solicit cooperative agreements in energy matters with Italy, Japan, West 
Germany, and Brazil. The Italian state oil company, Ente Nazionale de 
ldrocarburi (ENI), agreed on a $350 million joint venture with YPF and 
Gas del Estado for the annual production of 285,000 tons of LPG. ENI 
agreed to provide one-third of the financing at 1. 75 percent interest for the 
duration of the 20-year loan. 51 Through the World Bank and the Japanese 
Export-Import Bank, YPF would receive extra financing for petroleum 
refining and natural gas development.52 A Franco-German-Argentine 
consortium, Total-Deminiex-Bridas, discovered natural gas under San 
Sebastian in Tierra del Fuego in early 1988. This discovery was expected to 
raise natural gas reserves to roughly 900,000 cubic meters at total drilling 
costs of $511 million. 53 
Part of the changes that Alfonsin sought concerned control over the 
energy agencies, particularly the CNEA. From its inception in the early 
1950s through January 1984, the CNEA was under the control of retired 
navy men. Some of them were engineers chosen for their technical knowl-
edge (such as Madero, the U.S.-trained physicist in control between 1976 
and 1984) or for their political affiliations (including lraolagoitia, a staunch 
Per6nist in charge several times when Per6nists took control of the nation 
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between the 1950s and 1970s). Alfonsin realized that much international 
concern focused on military control of the CNEA and the implied threat 
that the avowedly civilian nuclear energy program could be used for 
military purposes, particularly after the southern Atlantic conflict ofl982. 
He removed Madero on January 24, 1984, replacing him with the civilian 
engineer Alberto Constantini. Alfonsin also set about to cut the CNEA 
budget drastically, partially because of the reality of Argentine economic 
problems and partially the fears aroused by the 1982 conflict, when 
Madero had threatened to embark on a program to build nuclear-powered 
submarines for "self-defenses."54 While terminating military leadership, 
Alfonsin did not eliminate the long-term navy influence on the program. 
The government tried to reorganize the CNEA itself by putting the two 
operational nuclear power plants under the control of a new corporation, 
but the nationalist opposition feared that this would diminish the nuclear 
program. 55 Alfonsin's moves to contain the state's role in energy extended 
to the military ownership of chemical factories in 1987; Petroquimica Bahia 
Blanca and Petroquimica General Mosconi reverted from indirect military 
control to that of the civilian-based Department of Defense.56 Many 
political opponents in Argentina feared that under Alfonsin the natural 
resource muscles of Argentina would atrophy in order to satisfy the foreign 
creditors, their concerns heightened by the president's desire to expand 
the energy sector during the last years of the century. As long as Alfonsin's 
austerity programs retained fairly broadly based political support, he 
could continue his programs, but the periodic devaluations of the austral 
and the increasingly severe economic belt-tightening reduced his flex-
ibility in terms of Argentine energy and political will. 
Expansion plans for the energy sector appeared in 1985 when the vice-
minister for energy planning unveiled a program that reserved 55 percent 
of all public investment for energy development, particularly petroleum 
and hydroelectric ventures. Two additional nuclear power plants were 
anticipated, as under the 1979 nuclear plan.57 
The target for investment during 1985 was $3 billion over a fifteen-year 
period, but the feasibility of such high levels of investment was question-
able, particularly when coupled with the perennial renegotiations of the 
debt repayment schedule with multilateral lending organizations. By the 
end ofl985, the economy minister reported that the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development 
Bank had credited Argentina with $300 million for energy-related proj-
ects, 58 for which Alfonsin's government had appealed across the interna-
tional community. However, the participation by international corpora-
tions has fueled concern about Argentina's losing its sovereignty to out-
siders in selling its vast natural resources. The "Olivos plan" for selling 
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petroleum illustrates the paradox. The plan was an acknowledged im-
provement over the military's outright sale of subsoil rights to foreigners, 
but the government's agreement to pay no less than 80 percent of the world 
petroleum price, in hard currency, to independent suppliers nevertheless 
aroused some concerns, since it meant diminishing foreign currency 
reserves. 59 
Alfons in did not alter the development of nuclear energy as dramatically 
as other energy sectors, for several reasons. For one, the CNEA has been 
successful at operating the nuclear energy program without outside inter-
ference, as noted, due to its own structure and the nature of the industry 
itsel£ Once Argentina began developing reactors, deliberate steps were 
taken to decrease external influence on the program. A second differentia-
tion has been the strong national sentiment evoked by the nuclear energy 
program's success. Many Argentines who supported the president in his 
attempts to put the nation back on a more stable path were angered at the 
idea that Alfonsin might destroy the perceived success of this autonomous 
program. While acknowledging that Argentina had bought the Embalse 
and Atucha I and II reactors from other nations, Argentines cling to the 
goal of domestic production of nuclear reactors and to the ambiguous 
status of being a nuclear force. Upon taking office, Alfonsin and Foreign 
Secretary Dante Caputo indicated that they were considering making 
Argentina a full party to the 1967 Treaty ofTlatelolco. The Per6nist party 
was joined by people across the political spectrum in claiming that Argen-
tina's sovereignty was more imporant than placating the international 
community on nuclear safeguards. Since it procured its initial reactor in 
1968, Argentina has steadfastly declared that it has only peaceful goals for 
nuclear power but that it cannot allow the industrialized nations to dictate 
Argentine domestic policy. Argentina was sovereign not only in its devel-
opment of nuclear power but also in its evolving role as nuclear supplier; 
Tlatelolco would have restricted that activity. Scientists also feared that 
one of the Third World's most vibrant research programs would be hurt. 
Alfonsin's reconsideration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, coinciding with real-
ization of the $50 billion external debt, appeared to show Argentina as 
giving in to foreigners at every turn. After strong lobbying by many 
interested parties, the major political parties issued a joint statement on 
nuclear development and research, saying that it "is a fundamental pillar of 
out national liberation and growth. "6o Overall energy production in Ar-
gentina was not consistent, however, as shown by massive power shortages 
in late 1988 and 1989.61 
Although Alfonsin's moves created a domestic uproar, he was only 
reacting to international apprehension about the country's nuclear pro-
gram. With Castro Madero's announcement-coming between Alfonsin's 
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election and his accession to power-that the CNEA had built a clan-
destine uranium enrichment facility, questions regarding Argentine in-
tentions multiplied. During the 1982 conflict, Castro Madero's comments 
about a nuclear-powered submarine, coupled with Buenos Aires's stub-
bornness on signing international nonproliferation agreements and the 
revelations about uranium enrichment, made nuclear proliferation spe-
cialists skeptical that Argentina was being honest about its goals. Frantic 
Argentine declarations that its sovereignty should not be violated coin-
cided with requests by Buenos Aires that the economic community make 
concessions in debt repayment. Alfonsin's position was complicated by the 
October 1986 statement by the chief naval officer that Argentina's first 
nuclear submarine (with three more planned) would sail in two years "if 
budgetary restrictions did not slow us down". 62 
This statement was a further indication of domestic pressures to pursue 
the nuclear program in spite of budgetary problems and international 
pressures to curtail the program, putting Alfons in in a no-win situation. He 
had reduced the budgets of the CNEA and all armed services by signifi-
cant amounts in the early months of his administration, yet indications 
were that the public desired continuation of these projects. At issue in such 
pressures was the same question that Alfonsin and his successors will face 
for the foreseeable future: How will Argentina juggle debt repayment with 
domestic spending projects believed essential to the national security, be 
they nuclear energy or more conventional forms? The issue is not merely 
whether the government or the public has control over the energy sector; 
rather, it is a priority struggle between the domestic goals and interna-
tional demands, both of which have tremendous clout with the person in 
the Casa Rosada. 
While Brazil is increasingly considered an international economic 
giant, with the world's ninth largest economy, and its economic and 
political power creates new challenges for Argentina. The concept of 
subregional integration of Brazil and Argentina took off in 1985 after the 
elected governments of the two came into office. Given their history of 
geopolitical suspicion, critics were somewhat skeptical of the ideas of 
economic integration put forth by Alfonsin and Brazil's Jose Sarney. Al-
fonsin was under particular pressure not to enmesh Argentina in any 
scheme that would further deprive the nation of its economic autonomy; 
critics feared that the massive Brazilian economy would overwhelm Argen-
tina's. While the two presidents met every six months to discuss mutual 
concerns and the progress made in integration, the process moved slow-
ly. 63 A major part of the integration was the sharing of nuclear technology 
and a lessening of the threat that the two states would allow their civilian 
nuclear power programs to become the bases for competition in nuclear 
116 CYNTHIA A. WATSON 
weapons. Argentina's nuclear program, significantly ahead of Brazil's, 
evoked concern in Brazil when the CNEA Chairman Madero, tri-
umphantly announced that Argentina ~ad developed its own nuclear 
enrichment program. Observers both inside and outside Argentina and 
Brazil believe that agreements resulting from the biannual meetings be-
tween Alfonsin and Sarney will not only make it more difficult for either 
state to feel threatened by the other but will also enhance the sharing of 
appropriate nuclear technology between the two. 64 
GROWING APPREHENSION ABOUT THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
Conventional wisdom on nuclear arms has held for thirty years that 
nonindustrialized states of the Third World would not have significant 
delivery capabilities for the foreseeable future. That the newer nuclear 
states would have the delivery capabilities to hit the United States or the 
European mainland seemed inconceivable, since intercontinental ballistic 
missiles were the purview of the established nuclear powers, outside the 
control of those newly emerging. These beliefs appear to have created and 
fed a false sense of security that the Third World nuclear states would be 
controllable. While attacks on the United States and other highly indus-
trialized states are yet to become a reality, significantly improved delivery 
capabilities are spreading to the lesser developed states. While these delivery 
systems will not directly confront the industrialized states in the near future, 
they may destabilize the balance of power in other sections of the world. 
Argentina is developing the medium-range Alacron (Condor II) ballistic 
missiles, with a range of500 miles. While the Alacron, as such, will not be 
an intercontinental missile, yet it is a product of the Third World that will 
be exportable. Argentina has been linked with unconfirmed Alacron 
exports to Iran and Egypt, part of the network of Third World arms sales 
already threatening the control held by traditional arms control suppliers. 
Brazil is also developing two medium-range ballistic missiles, possibly for 
export to Argentina but more likely to other Third World states. 65 The 
Brazilian-Argentine attempts at subregional integration, illustrated by 
President Sarney's visit to the enrichment facility at Picaniyeu in 1987, 
show the level of growing trust between the states. 
For Argentine use, the intercontinental ballistic missile under develop-
ment by India might offer interesting possibilities. While the Indian 
ICBM has had several failures and is far from ready for deployment or sale, 
its existence serves notice of the intentions to arm themselves on the part 
of states outside of the traditional ranks of military superpowers. The new 
arms producers will likely contemplate the role that China and Brazil have 
had in changing the balances of Third World conflicts, and it is ludicrous to 
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believe that emerging arms producers would not emulate the sales be-
havior of the more established sellers. Argentina could well become a 
recipient as well as a producer of the new weapons-a infinite danger even 
with nuclear weapons unsophisticated by U.S.-USSR standards. 
The most pressing issue for Argentina is not the question of nuclear 
weapons production. Regimes back to the 1950s have consistently argued 
that the sole intent of the CNEA, and the government in general, is the 
self-sufficiency of the Argentine nation. As a result of the 1982 conflict in 
the southern cone, regardless of who started it, calls for Argentina to 
defend itself against Britain have grown to include some discussion of 
nuclear weapons. As long as Argentina remains outside the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco (1967) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), it appears possi-
ble, if not likely, that Argentina will exercise the nuclear option. A more 
credible scenario, however, has Argentina sticking to a position of ambigu-
ity-not choosing to pursue weapons openly, yet retaining the national 
option for some point in the future. It will certainly maintain the option of 
developing nuclear weapons to defend the nation if necessary, even though 
no enemy clearly exists. 
Argentina is more likely to begin selling international technology to the 
Third World, with perhaps deeper involvement, given its development of 
certain technologies not necessary for the current nuclear reactors. The 
1983 acknowledgement of the Picaniyeu enrichment facility, developed in 
a clandestine manner, is one example. With the current heavy water 
reactors, there is no need for enriched uranium, and any plans to reorient 
its nuclear generating grid toward lightly enriched uranium/natural water 
systems seem highly unlikely in view of Argentina's commitment to a 
heavy water system. Since Argentina has not signed the major instruments 
of nuclear nonproliferation, it is not committed to refrain from selling 
indigenously built technology to other nations. If traditional suppliers 
begin adhering to the London Suppliers' Club (or some other) standard 
intended to curb sales of nuclear technology to states not part of the 
nonproliferation regime, Argentina might fill in the gaps. Its declared 
policy is that Argentina imposes its own bilateral nonproliferation stan-
dards on any nuclear sales. The nation's position has been one of sharing 
technology with others from which it can benefit, such as Brazil or the 
People's Republic of China. Argentina might reach to broader markets, 
however, where it would realistically have little influence on the use of nuclear 
technology. The Iran-Iraq war, with its arms supplies from a vast number of 
heretofore unlikely sources, exemplifies this possibility. As long as a civilian 
regime retains control over the Argentine state, the imposition of Argentine 
safeguards will continue to promote the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy. 
Argentina has made the first major sales of nuclear technology to other 
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Latin American states. Through the Organization for Latin American 
Energy Development, as well as under bilateral agreements, Argentina 
has assumed a leadership role in the region. The Peruvian agreements of 
the 1970s to buy small research reactors were important for their sym-
bolism as well as the reality that Argentina was able to provide indige-
nously produced technology-not nuclear materials bought from industri-
alized states and reexported. Discussions about selling small research 
nuclear reactors have taken place between Argentina and virtually every 
other Latin American state. These examples of regional cooperation, 
however, in nuclear as well as conventional energy ventures, only fore-
shadow the possibilities in the years to come. Regional ties appear to be 
strengthening in response to outside influences, such as those of the 
international banking community. 
Argentina has achieved relative self-sufficiency in energy through pe-
troleum, hydropower, and nuclear power. The question is whether it will 
have to sacrifice long-term self-sufficiency to meet short-term economic 
demands. The problems in getting the state-owned petroleum industry 
onto a sound economic footing show the difficulty facing all sectors of the 
energy field. Perhaps more than any other threshold nuclear weapons 
state, Argentina has the resources to make its own choices. Many of the 
problems that it faces pit domestic control over energy resources against 
the desire to exploit those resources more economically. Unlike several 
other threshold states, Argentina has sizable natural resources, which it is 
exploiting at a quickening pace in a diversified manner. It has no genuine 
security threat like those facing other states in this book, yet Argentina has 
chosen to pursue policies that perpetuate doubts regarding its status in the 
international system, specifically in nuclear development. 
Of the threshold states, Argentina has the least reason to develop 
nuclear power, aside from maintaining its role as a potential weapons state. 
The problem with such a position is that the internal political turmoil of the 
past quarter of a century has prevented Argentina from creating a solid, 
sustained energy program. The history of the upheavals in its energy 
program, as well as those across society, has created doubts that a 
sophisticated civilian nuclear power program could escape being dragged 
into domestic conflicts in the future. Plutonium generated by the nuclear 
reactors might be used for nuclear weapons production whether Argentina 
remains a democratic state or reverts to some sort of authoritarian regime. 
In any severe domestic upheaval, even a stockpile of crude nuclear weap-
ons could have a major impact on the internal and external affairs of the 
nation. While no absolute figures on plutonium production are available, 
indications are that Argentina has-or can have almost immediately-
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sufficient fissile material to create weapons if the political will to do so is 
there. 
It is more credible, however, that any regime in Buenos Aires will 
continue working to establish Argentina as a major supplier in the second 
tier of nuclear supplier states. This state of affairs makes the nation more 
visible as a player while at the same time offering some slight remedy for 
economic needs. Of real value in the short term of the ability to supply 
nuclear technology will be that it carries political weight through the 
perception of economic and technical sophistication. 
Given the overriding concern about debt service, Argentina's national 
resources are being diverted from what the Menem government and its 
predecessors declared as their intent over the past thirty-five years. It is 
possible, however, for a Buenos Aires government-particularly if it re-
turned to either the more traditional Per6nist position or that of an 
insecure National Security State-to determine that national priorities are 
more important than those of the international banking community. In 
that case, Argentina might pursue its energy programs more directly, 
without considering the economic budgetary ramifications, and a decision 
to take a more concerted approach to developing nuclear weapons-or at 
least maintaining the nuclear ambiguity-would be in order. The ques-
tions for Argentina unlike those for other threshold states, lie largely 
within the country itself and are thus not easily resolved. 
Regardless of whether it sells technology, develops its own weapons, or 
abandons nuclear energy altogether, the Argentine position will put na-
tional interest above anything else. While it will work to create self-
sufficiency, creative methods may be invoked, depending on who is in 
control of the regime. 
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Brazil's involvement in the international economic system has increased 
remarkably since 1964.1 The extent to which growing interdependence has 
diminished or strengthened the country's ability to adjust to a broad range 
of external challenges may be gauged by various yardsticks. Among these, 
its experience in the energy sector provides a critical measure of state 
capacity to adapt to changes in the international political and economic 
environments. Why were certain instruments of domestic and foreign 
policy selected and not others? 
The first task is to define the nature of the threat to political coalitions 
and state structures posed by the 1973-74 and 1979 oil shocks. Brazil's 
response to these challenges reflected the country's political and institu-
tional configurations. Adjustment strategies were inextricably linked to 
the macropolitical objectives of the military-technocratic regime installed 
in 1964. The goals included rapid economic growth through the acceler-
ated integration of Brazil into the international economic system. The 
expansion of state entrepreneurship, high levels of external indebtedness, 
and import substitution were core instruments in this strategy, which at 
times undermined the attempt to strengthen a national private industrial 
base. Thus, the strategy was not exempt from contradictions that helped to 
erode the political basis of the ruling coalition. In particular, domestic 
private entrepreneurs denounced the expansion of the state sector. The 
regime's domestic weakness influenced the nature of immediate foreign 
policy responses. These took the form of an accommodating web of eco-
nomic and political ties with oil suppliers and an emphasis on diversifying 
and deepening Brazil's relations with the industrialized world. Structural 
changes in the international system-including Brazil's emergence as a 
rapidly industrializing country-reinforced a policy of moderation. The 
characteristics of Brazil's nuclear program further reflected the major 
parameters in domestic and foreign adjustment strategies. Some of the 
ambiguities in Brazil's strategies were shared by other newly industrializ-
ing countries that placed energy resource scarcities at the core of their 
regional and global policy. 
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Table 7.1. Energy and the economy in Brazil (1970-1982) 
Price increases General Trade Foreign 
Real for petroleum price balance debt 
GNP growth and derivatives index (billions) (billions) 
1970 8.8% 17.7% 19.8 U.S.$ 0.2 U.S.$ 5.3 
1971 13.3 26.5 18.7 -0.3 6.6 
1972 11.7 23.8 16.8 -0.2 10.2 
1973 14.0 14.7 16.2 0.007 12.6 
1974 9.5 65.5 33.8 -4.7 17.4 
1975 5.6 52.4 30.1 -3.5 22.0 
1976 9.7 57.6 48.2 -2.3 29.0 
1977 5.4 39.3 38.6 0.1 32.0 
1978 4.8 30.2 40.5 -1.0 43.5 
1979 6.8 67.8 76.8 -2.7 49.9 
1980 7.9 159.4 110.2 -2.8 54.0 
1981 -1.9 120.9 95.2 1.2 61.8 
1982 1.3 71.5 99.7 0.8 69.7 
Sources: Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 
1988; W. Baer, The Brazilian Economy (New York: Praeger, 1983). 
THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
In the 1970s, no single event had a greater impact on Brazil's domestic and 
foreign policies than the energy crisis-perhaps one of the most important 
sources offoreign indebtedness, which by the early 1980s had helped turn 
the country into the largest debtor in the Third World. The "boom" of 
1969-73, with its 11 percent annual growth rates, was based on the expan-
sion of manufacturing, which was export-oriented and dependent on 
cheap energy. Table 7.1 highlights some of the major parameters of eco-
nomic performance between 1970 and 1982 and the nature of oil price 
increases during that period. 
Energy consumption patterns generally favored petroleum-85 per-
cent of it imported-which accounted for 41 percent of Brazil's total 
energy requirements in 1972. In the wake of the 1973 oil price increase 
(1973-83), Brazil had to set aside over 30 percent of its export earnings to 
pay for foreign oil, thus turning an export-oriented strategy of economic 
growth into an export drive to meet import needs.2 The origins of the 
country's current economic crisis can, to some extent, be traced to the 
pursuit of the fundamental objectives of ensuring energy supplies and 
softening the political and economic effects of dependence on foreign 
sources. The first wave of price increases helped transform a bare trade 
surplus of $7 million in 1973 into a $4.69 billion deficit in 1974 (tables 7.1 
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Table 7.2. Cost of Brazil's oil imports 1971-1987 (selected years) 
Average cost Total cost of Cost of all Oil as 
per barrel oil imports imports percentage 
(FOB) (billions) (billions) of imports 
1971 U.S.$ 1.88 U.S.$ 0.4 U.S.$ 3.2 11.6% 
1972 1.99 0.5 4.2 11.1 
1973 2.79 0.8 6.2 12.4 
1974 11.11 3.0 12.6 22.9 
1975 10.49 3.1 12.2 25.2 
1976 11.50 3.8 12.4 30.9 
1977 12.30 4.1 12.0 33.8 
1978 12.44 4.5 13.7 32.8 
1979 17.11 6.8 18.1 37.3 
1980 30.60 10.2 23.0 45.0 
1981 34.37 11.3 22.1 51.0 
1982 33.00 10.5 19.4 53.0 
1983 28.00 8.6 15.4 56.8 
1986 13.00 2.7 13.0 30.0 
1987 17.1 3.8 15.0 25.6 
Sources: George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982) p. 389; Brazilian Monthly Economic Indicators, December 1983; Economic and 
Social Progress in Latin America; W. Baer, The Brazilian Economy (1988). 
and 7.2). Higher oil prices, however, accounted for only $2 billion of the 
total deficit. 
On the one hand, Brazil's energy priorities were linked to the most 
fundamental objectives of the military-technocratic coalition that took 
power in 1964-namely, rapid economic growth and national security. 
President Castello Branco defined national security as "the preservation of 
development and internal political stability," and energy policies lay at the 
core of developmental priorities.3 On the other hand, the inflationary 
pressures of the energy crisis compelled the deceleration of growth targets 
in 1976 and 1979. The social and political corollaries of these strategies 
were costly for an authoritarian regime that sought domestic legitimacy 
through sustained economic growth. The threat, in other words, was not 
merely economic but a challenge to the stability and legitimacy of a 
political model. Preserving large-scale productive capacity in energy-
dependent intermediate goods sectors such as cement, petroleum refin-
ing, petrochemicals, steel, and aluminum, where the state had a com-
manding position, was a central objective. Public enterprises subsidized 
inputs to other sectors, including private enterprise, and provided quasi-
monopsonistic markets for capital goods, engineering, and other products 
and services. 
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In short, the energy shocks had the potential of undermining the 
political and economic basis of support for the "model." The salience of 
energy policies was reflected in personal and institutional adjustments as 
Ernesto Geisel, a former head of the state oil firm Petrobnis (1969-73), 
assumed the presidency of Brazil in 1974. Energy policies in general, and 
the nuclear program in particular, were subject to widespread criticism 
and polarized the scientific community, the technocrats, and the generals 
themselves. 
CHANGES IN DOMESTIC STRUCTURES 
The selection of crisis adjustment mechanisms was influenced more by 
macropolitical objectives than by the opportunities offered by Brazil's 
natural energy endowments. Import substitution, export expansion, and 
external indebtedness were the dominant strategies of adjustment, allow-
ing sustained economic growth between 1974 and 1978, albeit at lower and 
more variable levels than during the preceding five-year period. 4 Import 
substitution in capital goods, petrochemicals and derivatives, steel, metal 
products, and energy opened up unique opportunities for domestic indus-
try, but it was largely sustained by external borrowing. International 
financial markets made massive borrowing attractive as an initial response 
aimed at protecting the growth structure and the continuity of the political 
alliance in place since the 1960s. To avoid curtailing domestic consump-
tion, domestic oil prices were not raised to world levels. Immediate 
income declines were not politically feasible, particularly in the dele-
gitimizing environment reflected in the 197 4 elections, which doubled the 
strength of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. This outcome was 
of particular concern to President Geisel who had recognized the need for 
political liberalization (distensiio). 
External challenges forced the restructuring of domestic priorities and 
enhanced the position of state firms in the productive and financial areas. 
The twin aims of securing supplies and promoting energy independence 
were pursued through policies of substitution for oil through the develop-
ment of alternative energy technologies, such as hydroelectrical, nuclear, 
alcohol, biomass, and coal. The energy crisis thus led to a broader re-
formulation of industrial policy affecting the capital goods, engineering, 
construction, and other industries. The following brief survey of these 
changes in the energy sector will place particular emphasis on patterns of 
accommodation between domestic and foreign resources. It will also 
examine the extent to which state behavior was market-displacing or 
market-conforming. 5 
The expansion of the state as an economic agent throughout the energy 
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sector, much as in other areas of the economy (mining, steel, petrochemi-
cals) was expressed in the prominent role played by state energy com-
panies, particularly Nuclebnis, Petrobnis, and Eletrobnis. Electric power 
generation shifted from private to public hands in a single decade: State 
enterprises, which controlled less than 36 percent of power-generating 
capacity in the 1960s, controlled over 80 percent in the late 1970s, and 
close to 100 percent by the early 1980s. 6 
Petrobnis, Brazil's largest economic concern, was set up in 1954 to 
refine imported oil and generate financial resources to achieve self-suffi-
ciency. It controlled petroleum exploration and imports and expanded into 
distribution and related new fields-often competing with private firms-
through subsidiaries like Petroquisa (petrochemicals), Petromisa (miner-
als), and Braspetro (foreign oil prospecting and technical assistance). 7 
Rather than turning to private-sector firms for transportation and con-
struction, Petrobnis created its own subsidiaries. For over 85 percent of its 
total capital goods requirements, the firm turned to domestic suppliers. 8 
Despite a long tradition of nationalist objectives expressed in the creation 
and evolution of Petrobnis, in an unprecedented reaction to the oil crisis 
Brazil granted exploration rights to foreign companies in 1975. Under "risk 
contracts," which ultimately bore little fruit, exploration was allowed in 
exchange for a share of the oil discovered, thereby undermining the 
historical monopoly of Petrobnis. 
Eletrobnis is responsible for hydroelectric power, which accounts for 95 
percent of electricity generation. Inducements for developing this poten-
tial include the availability of rivers as clean, nonpolluting, renewable 
resources, as well as the possibility of significant reliance on domestic 
capital goods and engineering firms. Although it controls the biggest 
hydroelectric reservoir in the world (70,000 Mw), Brazil has utilized only 
about 15 percent of its generating capacity. The hydroelectrical component 
in the energy balance has increased considerably, from 16.8 percent in 
1969 to 28.3 percent in 1979, and 38 percent in 1985.9 Emphasis on the 
Amazon basin grew after the debacle over the nuclear program in the 
1970s, and in 1984 the world's largest hydroelectric project, ltaipu Bina-
tional, was inaugurated. The environmental effects of some of the projects 
have involved Brazil in major controversies with environmental groups in 
both the North and South.IO 
Large-scale projects using advance technology and imported machin-
ery, with heavy funding from the World Bank and Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, were the norm in the 1960s and 1970s.n Thirty-three 
major plants, each with a capacity of nearly 1,000 Mw, were being built or 
enlarged in the early 1980s.l2 Reflecting the emphasis on domestic supply 
of capital goods, 80 percent of inputs to Eletrobnis came from local 
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sources. The National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) provided effective support for projects achieving a domestic 
share of more than 85 percent. On the other hand, suppliers' credits and 
relaxed import policies in the areas of turbine and hydro generators 
contributed to the high levels of idle capacity at national firms in this 
sector, exacerbating their discontent. 
Since Brazil depended on oil less for electricity generation than for 
transportation and for consumption in the commercial and residential 
sectors, alcohol proved an attractive substitute.l3 Brazil pioneered in the 
development of alcohol fuels-methanol, obtained from coal or biomass 
gasification, and ethanol, from fermentation of sugar cane. By the 
mid-1980s, 7 million cars in Brazil, and 80 percent of all new Brazilian cars, 
were powered by a gas mixture containing 20 percent alcohol. In addition, 
over 1 million cars used hydrated alcohol as their exclusive fuel. State 
efforts in the alcohol sector were directed at strengthening private Bra-
zilian entrepreneurs in the areas of sugar cane production, distilling, retail 
fuel distribution, capital goods supplies, and automobile manufacturing. 
Advocates of alcohol fuels pointed to the savings in foreign exchange, 
the renewable quality, low environmental and transportation costs, gener-
ation of employment and income, reduction of individual and regional 
income disparities, and stimulation of the domestic industry through the 
production of new refinery equipment.l4 However, the eroding price 
advantage of ethanol-fueled cars and the growing social cost of the alcohol 
program, are giving way to renewed demand for oil-fueled automobiles. 
The alcohol program became a test case for the debate over increased state 
expansion, with private domestic and multinational firms challenging 
Petrobnis's aim to retain control over the liquid fuels sector. IS In the long 
run, alcohol did little to alleviate demand for oil imports. 
Coal accounts for only about 9 percent of Brazil's total energy needs; 40 
percent of it comes from domestic sources. Estimates suggest that coal 
reserves will last well into the next century-even with a projected 
consumption level about forty times greater than coal use in the mid-
1980s, and about 2. 5 times higher than the current total energy consump-
tion in Brazil.I6 The state firms Siderbnis (iron and steel), Petrobr:is, and 
Caeeb market gasified coal at subsidized prices. In an attempt to sub-
stitute coal for fuel oil in industry, state intervention in this area was 
limited to providing transitional subsidies to coal producer and consumer 
sectors (notably cement firms), and to improving the transportation in-
frastructure between the two. Charcoal and firewood represented 35 
percent of the primary fuel consumed in 1972, decreasing to 20 percent in 
1980, when charcoal contributed only 2.5 percent. Exploitation of these 
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resources bears some responsibility for the devastation of Brazil's natural 
forests. 
Being a tropical country of vast proportions, Brazil has a great potential 
for solar energy. Similarly, the country is endowed with some of the largest 
oil shale reserves in the world, although research on extracting the proc-
essing technologies has not been given high priority. Other biomass 
alternatives-alcohol derived from eucalyptus, sugar sorghum, manioc-
have been advocated because of their renewability and small capital 
investment requirements, their labor-creating potential in rural areas, and 
the absence of waste disposal problems. As very little oil was being used for 
electricity generation, nuclear power offered no real substitute for oil in 
the energy crisis of the 1970s. Yet an agreement was signed with West 
Germany in 1975 providing for the transfer of eight nuclear plants and the 
complete fuel cycle, stressing self-sufficiency and technological advance-
ment. (A more detailed analysis of the nuclear program follows.) 
The oil price shock in 1979 forced a new series of adjustment strategies. 
The crisis was compounded by rising interest rates that aggravated the 
debt service outflow dominating the current account deficit, and by the 
world recession ofl980-82,17 A concomitant erosion of the regime's politi-
callegitimacy accelerated when powerful industrial sectors assumed the 
leadership of a campaign against centralization and the expansion of state 
activities. The steps taken between 1974 and 1978 had not been successful 
in preventing an erosion of the 1968-73 model; the average growth rate of 
the pre-1973 period declined toward the late 1970s, leading to the three-
year recession ofl981-83. President Joao Batista Figueiredo warned in 1979 
that the oil crisis could compromise the country's stable development and 
international credibility, and he called for increased production of domes-
tic oil, coal, and ethyl alcohol from sugarcane. IS Hydropower was to have 
priority over nuclear generation, previously an untouchable, privileged 
item. While energy policies before 1979 were incoherent and uninte-
grated, the second oil shock led to a more comprehensive approach to 
energy alternatives. 
The statistics suggest a marked qualitative change in the structure of oil 
dependence in Brazil in the last ten years. The volume of imports dropped 
from 950,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1979 to 620,000 bpd in the first 
quarter ofl983. Domestic oil production grew from 340,000 bpd in 1983 to 
609,000 in 1988. The cost of imported oil fell from $8 billion in 1982 to less 
than $4 billion in 1987 (see table 7.2). Dependence on foreign sources 
dropped from 84.4 percent in 1979 to 73.7 percent in 1982, then to an 
estimated 45 percent in 1988.19 Petroleum's share of total energy require-
ments fell from 44 percent in 1975 to 24 percent in 1985. The relative 
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success in oil conservation can be attributed to the substitution of alcohol 
fuels and coal. Yet oil imports continue to account for about 30 percent of 
Brazil's total energy requirements in the late 1980s, up from 25 percent a 
decade earlier. Despite diversification, increased domestic production, a 
drop in international oil prices, and growth in Brazilian manufactured 
exports to the Middle East, a negative balance of trade with that region 
persists into the late 1980s.20 
In early 1982, President Figueiredo approved Plan 2000, which called 
for a slowdown in development of all nuclear facilities. The lguape reactors 
(third and fourth of the eight considered in the agreement with West 
Germany's Kraftwerk Union) were indefinitely postponed.2I The alcohol 
program, instead, received significant governmental incentives. The pro-
jected ll.8 percent annual GDP growth rate was revised, since the econo-
my, which had expanded at an annual average of6.5 percent between 1975 
and 1979, declined dramatically in 1981-82, and electricity consumption 
increased at only half the rate predicted.22 More recently, the new Bra-
zilian constitution approved in 1988 nationalized exploration for, and ex-
traction of, oil and minerals-sectors where foreign firms had previously 
been allowed to operate.23 It also required oil companies to assume the 
financial risk of exploration, previously subsidized by the state. 
The direct effects of energy planning on the foreign debt crisis are 
expressed in the considerable portion of the public debt accounted for by 
state firms in the energy sector. Petrobnis, Eletrobras, Siderbras, and Cia 
Vale do Rio Doce had relied on private foreign banks for 17 percent of their 
investment in the early 1970s, with internal resources accounting for 30 to 
50 percent. The level of self-financing dropped to about 25 percent in 1980. 
Electrical utilities depended on foreign resources for about 30 percent of 
their total borrowing.24 Eletrobras alone was responsible for $12 billion of 
the total debt in 1985. Its subsidiary Furnas had a $2.6 billion foreign debt 
in 1983, and that of N uclebras approached $4 billion in 1988.25 The public 
sector as a whole accounted for close to 80 percent of the $120 billion 
foreign debt in 1988. IMF conditionality schemes and other public and 
private creditors have applied pressure to reduce state enterprise deficits. 
Two tendencies stand out in Brazil's domestic response to the oil crises 
of 1973 and 1979. First, displacement of private sector firms was more 
characteristic of state behavior than were market-conforming efforts, such 
as those in the alcohol sector, petrochemicals, and others, geared to 
encourage private sector participation. Subsidiaries of Petrobras, Nu-
clebras, and other state firms established as joint ventures with foreign 
partners became the most common institutional expression of this effort. 
Heavy state ownership in energy markets, usually justified as a function of 
the nature of the investment and private sector reluctance, is not unique to 
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industrializing countries. Ownership is sought, in part, because it pro-
vides greater national control over volatile international markets, thus 
reducing external vulnerabilities. The state's ability to maintain control is 
strengthened by its comparative advantage over private interests in the 
conduct of foreign policy, by the high degree of standardization of energy 
markets, and by these markets' role as upstream suppliers of other indus-
tries.26 
Second, most of the investments of this period were possible because of 
the thriving financial markets of the 1970s, particularly in Eurodollars. 
These markets were the pillars of Brazil's initial refusal-through price 
controls and other cushions-to allow rising oil prices to impinge on the 
continued growth of basic industries and infrastructure. However, as 
Albert Fishlow's analysis of Brazil's management of the oil crisis suggests, 
foreign-financed public investments were more a sign of state weakness 
than of its strength, and continuous reliance on external indebtedness 
reinforced that state of affairs. Against the contradictions of the domestic 
background, we turn now to the international expression of energy adjust-
ments and to the instruments of foreign policy adopted to manage a new 
international environment. 
ADJUSTMENT IN FoREIGN PoLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Economic growth, or a rising share of the world's GNP, is assumed to 
increase state power and upward mobility in the international arena.27 
Brazil's share of world income increased from 1.16 percent in 1967 to 1. 77 
percent in 1976 and 2. 7 in 1988.28 Moderate as they may seem, these 
changes have placed Brazil on par with Australia, Canada, and some 
smaller European countries with respect to contribution to the world's 
GNP. Yet, whether because of internal political and economic weaknesses 
or external vulnerabilities such as dependence on foreign energy, capital, 
and technology, the country has exercised only moderate international 
influence relative to its growing capabilities. This disparity is particularly 
evident in its accommodating reactions to the OPEC onslaught. 
Brazil was not as active as it could have been in encouraging econom-
ically powerful but oil-poor industrializing states to coalesce in a common 
response to OPEC.29 It did not seek to join or promote a consumers' 
cartel, stayed away from military solutions advocated by a few at the time, 
and opted for extensive borrowing to finance oil imports. It mildly encour-
aged multilateralism while pursuing aggressive bilateral arrangements. It 
resisted attempts to upgrade its international credentials in ways that 
would impose burdens in the name of responsibilities. Brazil's foreign 
policy was conciliatory, determined more by considerations of economic 
132 ETEL SOLINGEN 
growth than by the desire to exert political influence. As Selcher suggests, 
the "business of Brazilian foreign policy is business."3o Brazil's ruling 
coalition regarded the achievement of commercial competitiveness, the 
attraction of foreign investments and technology, and the securing of 
energy supplies as primary strategies, requiring a cautious and restrained 
performance. The guiding principles of "responsible pragmatism" and "no 
automatic alignments" were based on the conception that "material effi-
ciency rather than formal coherence is the standard of policy evalua-
t . "31 lOll. 
The notion of a fundamental interdependence between Brazil's foreign 
policy and energy considerations is the underlying premise of the brief 
assessment of global and regional diplomacy that follows. The view that 
foreign policy, if wisely formulated and skillfully applied, could produce 
economic benefits guided the military-technocratic regime from its incep-
tion in 1964. Diplomatic action aimed at the expansion of foreign markets 
and the attraction of foreign investments became popularly known as "the 
diplomacy of prosperity." The 1973 energy crisis reinforced this preoc-
cupation with economic issues and brought about a reassessment of Bra-
zil's position vis-a-vis OPEC countries, the rest of the Third World, the 
advanced industrialized countries, and its own neighbors. The shift to 
economic diplomacy was accompanied by institutional changes. Many of 
the tasks previously performed by the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) were 
transferred to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry oflndustry 
and Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, and the state companies Petro-
bras, Nuclebnis, and Eletrobnis. 
A major foreign economic policy instrument to offset the impact of oil 
imports on the balance of trade was the promotion of exports to oil 
suppliers. Interbnis was created to promote and sell Brazilian manufac-
tured goods and commodities and even barter them for energy resources. 
By 1978, Brazil had multiplied the value of its 1972 exports to the Middle 
East and Africa by a factor of ten. It was among the world's top ten 
manufacturers of weapons in the early 1980s, with over fifty countries 
providing a market for its armored vehicles, the Cascavel, U rutu, and 
Jararaca. The buyers include Iraq, Iran, and Libya, which had extended 
opportunities to test them on the battlefield, and more recently Saudi 
Arabia. Other military exports include the Astros II rocket and the Tucano 
trainer. Arms and equipment sales of over $1 billion in 1982 represented an 
increased share of all Brazilian exports.32 Brazil's attractiveness as a weap-
ons supplier stems from the simplicity and effectiveness of its technology 
and the lack of ideological strings attached to the sales. 
In addition to raw materials and manufactured goods, Brazil has pur-
sued an aggressive policy of exporting technology and services, par-
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ticularly in oil exploration and construction. By 1976, the Petrobnis 
subsidiary Braspetro had negotiated agreements with and successfully 
drilled wells in Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Angola, Congo, and Colombia. It 
received authorization from the Nicaraguan government for oil exploration 
and research, and it signed a risk contract with South Yemen. The Petro-
bnis trading company lnterbras provided engineering, financing, and 
commercial services to oil suppliers particularly, mostly in government-to-
government transactions. 
Middle Eastern countries remain Brazil's main oil suppliers, account-
ing for about 75-80 percent of total imports in 1986, with Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq respectively 30 percent of the total furnishing. Iran, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Libya, and Kuwait provided another 18 percent.33 The 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war brought about the loss of 400,000 barrels per 
day in 1980, signaling the importance ofVenezuela and Mexico as alternate 
suppliers. In 1981, Brazil signed three energy agreements with the USSR 
for coal technology and the production of methanol alcohol from wood. Yet 
by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Mexico 
were supplying only a little over 4 percent of Brazil's oil imports. The price 
advantage of Middle East oil was the justification for the shift away from 
Venezuelan oil during the 1960s, and it continues to be at the root of 
dependence on Middle Eastern suppliers. Negative trade balances with 
the Middle East persist into the late 1980s.34 
One of the political and diplomatic expressions of these economic 
relationships has been, since 1973, Brazil's movement away from a position 
of "equidistance" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, it supported 
the 1975 United Nations anti-Israeli vote equating Zionism with racism, 
while eighteen other Latin American countries either casted a negative 
vote or abstained.35 Relations with Libya's Muammar Kaddafi provide a 
striking example of policy reversal, from negligible links before 1973 (when 
Kaddafi sponsored Brazilian antiregime exiles) to close military and com-
mercial ties. The results of this strategy of cajoling oil suppliers were 
mixed, despite a modest increase in Brazilian exports to them, since no 
advantage in oil prices was gained, and the expected petrodollar invest-
ments by Arab countries did not materialize. 
In Africa, Brazil was among the first countries to recognize Angola's 
Marxist (MPLA) government, headed by Agostinho Neto, in 1975. Presi-
dent Geisel hoped that Petrobras would play a part in the exploitation of 
the Cabinda oil fields, a matter discussed with the MPLA before recogni-
tion.36 Rather than stressing openly the strategic-economic potential of 
alliances with oil-producing countries such as Angola, Nigeria, and 
Gabon, or of securing a foothold in the little-tapped consumer markets of 
Africa, Brazil used the commonalities of the Portuguese colonial tradition 
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as vehicles to strengthen its association with former Portuguese colonies in 
Mrica. The pragmatic approach dictated by commercial considerations is 
again evident in the growth of bilateral trade with South Mrica, from $7 
million in 1972 to $150 million in 1980. 
Adaptation to the constraints imposed by the regime's model of eco-
nomic development is also reflected in Brazil's regional policies. Many 
concepts from its school of geopolitical thought have been incorporated 
into foreign policy principles.37 Its essence is linking "security" and "de-
velopment" as the military's core mission. Developmental goals, in turn, 
are relat~d to the ability to ensure energy supplies. Issues of integration, 
the conquest of the Amazon heartland, and the South Atlantic Narrows are 
intertwined with priorities such as access to energy and natural resources. 
In his seminal work Projet;iio Continental do Brasil, Colonel Mario 
Travassos argued in the 1930s that by projecting itself into the Amazon 
Basin and Bolivian heartland, Brazil could fulfill its "continental destiny." 
The prominent geopolitician and 1964-regime ideologue General Golbery 
do Couto e Silva, the first director of theN ational Intelligence Service and 
a former strategist at the Escola Superior da Guerra (Higher War College), 
conditioned Brazil's achievement of international influence on the follow-
ing principles: regional and Third World cooperation, national integration, 
expansion into the interior, peaceful external projection, and participation 
in the defense of Western civilization. The Escola Superior da Guerra's 
doctrine of "development and security" has consolidated these theories 
and disseminated their essence through the socialization of the military-
technocratic elite.38 Its orientation has shifted away from cold war consid-
erations and its influence has waned since the late 1960s. 
These regional orientations provide a useful frame of reference for 
analyzing Brazil's relations in South America. Because national security is 
defined in terms of development, industrialization, and integration, stra-
tegic concerns vis-a-vis its neighbors reflect the pragmatism characteristic 
of Brazil's policies toward the rest of the world. In the regional context, 
Brazil has secured a paramount position through a series of agreements 
with the "buffer states" (Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia), thereby creating 
a security perimeter and privileged area of economic activity. Central 
America and the Caribbean are of lesser concern to Brazil, even though 
countries like Guyana and Nicaragua have sought its help in developing 
their own versions of energy models. 
Despite the hegemonic, expansionist labels often applied to its regional 
policies, Brazil has relied most often on negotiation, persuasion, and 
prestige, down playing confrontation. 39 Not surprisingly, since 1973 the 
initiatives toward neighboring countries have been launched in connection 
with energy resource needs. An agreement with Colombia addressed the 
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development of its coal reserves, another with Caracas provided for joint 
marketing of Venezuelan oil, while a tripartite agreement with Colombia 
and Venezuela dealt with development of the Amazon region. Other 
arrangements enabled Petrobras to buy natural gas, petroleum, and elec-
tricity from Bolivia and to conduct oil exploration in Ecuador and Para-
guay. Colombia provides Brazil with coal and is interested in Brazil's 
alcohol and uranium mining technology. In 1978, Brazil and Venezuela 
signed a $2 billion agreement to construct a 9-million-kilowatt dam in 
Venezuela's Guyana region, the world's third largest dam. In 1983, they 
signed a cooperation agreement in the area of nuclear energy for peaceful 
uses, under which Venezuelan technicians began training in Brazil. In 
1982, an agreement was signed with Guyana concerning the hydropower 
station of Wamakuru. 
The Amazon project launched by President Emilio G. Medici in 1970 
was justified on the basis of economic, infrastructural, and rural develop-
mental potential, but was deeply rooted in its perceived military-strategic 
relevance. Andean Pact countries regarded this project as destabilizing 
the previous geopolitical balance in an attempt to "project" Brazil's influ-
ence toward its northern borders. 40 Brazilian diplomacy (and Itamaraty's 
professionalism), however, succeeded in downgrading these perceptions of 
threat through a new series of bilateral treaties of friendship, trade, and 
cooperation, as well as the multilateral Amazon Pact Treaty of 1978. 
Regional projection has been accompanied by the settlement of about 
80,000 Brazilians in Paraguay, northeastern Bolivia, and northern Uru-
guay through informal migrations and land purchases. 41 
Brazil's economic expansion into the buffer states eclipsed Argentina's 
influence. Brazil has four times Argentina's population and three times its 
GNP, historically more stable political leadership, and a more rapidly 
expanding economy. The territorial competition between the two dates 
from the early colonial expansionism of the Spanish and Portuguese 
crowns, which continued after independence in the early nineteenth 
century. 42 Two of the most critical issues in their friction during the 1970s 
were the two countries' respective nuclear and hydroelectric energy proj-
ects. This priority lends substance to the proposition that issues of de-
velopment and integration, to which energy sources are subservient, set 
the tone in the countries' regional and global security and cooperation 
policies. 43 
Until 1960, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil agreed on a system of 
mutual consultations regarding their respective hydroelectric planning. In 
the late 1960s, Brazil expressed its reluctance to submit to the approval of 
the other countries of the Plata Basin what it considered its sovereign and 
unilateral right to exploit its hydroelectric potential. Yet in October of 
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1978, partly in view of vigorous Argentine protests, Brazil, Argentina, and 
Paraguay signed a tripartite agreement on the conditions for the operation 
of the ltaipu hydroelectric plant, to ensure navigation and safe water levels 
on the lower Parana River. The settlement of the dispute over the exploita-
tion of the Parana in late 1979 opened the way for the 1980 visit to 
Argentina by President Figueiredo, the first by a Brazilian president in 45 
years, which resulted in a series of agreements on hydroelectric and 
nuclear power, scientific and technological development, and various 
other economic and cultural issues. 44 The possibilities of Argentine ex-
ports of natural gas to Brazil and of joint petroleum exploration in Argen-
tina were also explored. A series of presidential-level meetings, partic-
ularly between Raul Alfonsin and Jose Sarney, and, more recently, be-
tween Sarney and Saul Menem, has led to significant steps toward eco-
nomic integration since the mid-1980s. 
The role of Brazil in the South Atlantic has been discussed in the context 
of its technical and military capabilities and its economic goals. 45 Histor-
ically a major trade route, the South Atlantic became the vital petroleum 
lifeline for Europe and the United States with the closure of the Suez 
Canal in 1967. Supertankers continued to use that route even after the 
reopening of the canal in 1975. Considering Brazil's dependence on Mid-
dle Eastern and Nigerian oil and the increasing importance of West Africa 
and Angola as export markets, it is hardly surprising that even Brazil's 
South Atlantic strategies are conditioned by economic needs in general 
and energy considerations in particular. These interests seem to outweigh 
the advantages of the proposed South Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
cooperation with Argentina and South Africa, a proposal that has never 
been given serious attention. Brazil cannot afford to ignore South African 
racial policies, not only because of its own ethnic composition but also 
because of its commercial interests in Black Africa and has, therefore, 
shied away from any such agreement. 
In its relations with the United States, Brazil has sought new options to 
deal with problems of development. Under the impact of the energy crisis, 
the trend toward greater autonomy has accelerated, putting an abrupt end 
to the "special relationship" that had existed between the two countries, 
buttressed by the experience of a joint brigade in World War II. Nuclear 
energy and trade became two major areas offriction in the 1970s, intensify-
ing Brazil's search for new trade and investment partners, particularly 
among Western European nations and in Japan. 46 The Carter administra-
tion attempted to prevent, and later to disrupt, the implementation of the 
1975 nuclear agreements with West Germany, which provided for the 
transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies to Brazil. 
In 1977, Brazil abrogated the 1952 military assistance treaty with the 
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United States as proof of its reduced need for foreign military supplies and 
its dismay at U.S. complaints over Brazilian human rights abuses. This 
move was designed to preempt an almost certain cut in U.S. military aid to 
Brazil. Commercial ties with Moscow, Angola, Cuba, and Libya have been 
not only financially lucrative but also a useful signal of independence. 
U.S.-Brazilian relations, however, are still intense, with the U.S. being 
the largest single-country market for Brazilian exports. Under the Reagan 
administration, disagreements over Brazil's nuclear program subsided, 
but Brazil's supply of weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and to Libya was high 
on the bilateral agenda. 47 Debt, trade, services, and technology remain 
the leading areas of dispute at the end of the decade. 
At the level of global interactions, energy vulnerabilities may have 
constrained Brazil's transition to a more assertive participation in world 
politics. Efforts at rationing, oil exploration, diversification, and export 
policies were accompanied by an attempt to placate its preferred pro-
viders. Policies with respect to North-South issues were characterized in 
the 1970s by a reluctance to assume leadership positions and to give 
automatic support to raw materials cartels or regulation offoreign invest-
ment. As Selcher suggests, Brazil avoided taking a political lead in most 
major international issues because such issues are polarizing and have the 
potential of alienating "the diverse and demanding constituencies on 
which it depends." 48 
While Brazil's extraregional policies have attempted mainly to temper 
destabilizing impacts, within the regional context there has been greater 
willingness to exercise influence. The competition for control of econom-
ically important territory is at times considered a major source of tension in 
South America. However, through quiet and consistent diplomacy Brazil 
has been able to minimize regional conflict and at the same time carry out 
its developmental designs along its borders. Even though it declared Latin 
America to be a priority region for its national diplomacy, in practice 
Brazil's more pressing international economic commitments seem to take 
precedence. Its regional policies aim more at enhancing its influence 
through cooperation than at displaying hegemonic designs by challenging 
or threatening the neighboring countries. Yet there is a tacit source of 
threat-its nuclear capabilities. 
NEITHER 'PYGMY' NoR 'PARIAH': BRAZILS NucLEAR PoLICY 
Although stimulated by the 1973 energy crisis, Brazil's plans to acquire 
atomic power can be traced to 1951, when the National Research Council 
(CNPq), under the direction of Admiral Alvaro Alberto, assumed control of 
the nuclear sector. Stressing autonomous development and limitation of 
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mineral exports, President Getulio Vargas in 1952 approved directives to 
the National Security Council calling for "specific compensations"-tech-
nical aid and delivery of equipment and materials-in return for sales of 
uranium and thorium to the United States. However, following the ascen-
dancy of President Joiio Cafe Filho in 1954 and his dismissal of Admiral 
Alberto, two nuclear agreements were signed transferring the monopoly 
over uranium research and extraction to the United States. In the same 
year, Washington prevented the transfer of ultracentrifuge enrichment 
equipment from Bonn to Brazil. 
Presidents Janio Quadros (1961) and Joiio Goulart (1961-64) encouraged 
national research and control of resources and diversification of external 
sources of technology. Translating these political guidelines into technical 
options meant reliance on natural uranium, and French natural uranium 
reactors were viewed as a possible option. At this point, there was agree-
ment between nationalist sectors and the scientific community as to the 
nature of the technical path to be pursued. 49 The military coup in 1964 
marked the beginning of a new phase, favoring reliance on imported fuel 
and technology. By 1968, the decision was made to opt for a pressurized 
water reactor (PWR) of the light water type, later purchased from West-
inghouse as a turnkey. The decision in favor of enriched uranium was 
coupled with a purge of physicists in research centers who favored a more 
autonomous program based on natural uranium, thorium, and domestic 
technology. 
In 1975, Brazil embarked on an ambitious attempt to master the entire 
nuclear cycle through an agreement with the West German firm Kraftwerk 
Union (KWU). The comprehensive arrangement provided for the transfer 
of eight nuclear plants ofl,200 Mw each; mining and uranium processing 
activities, including enrichment; plutonium reprocessing; and a joint 
venture in heavy components fabrication (table 7.3).50 The most promi-
nent arguments favoring this course included fulfillment of energy needs 
in the post-2000 era, reduced dependence on foreign sources of fuel, and 
the presumed multiplier effects of a nuclear industry. The light water, 
enriched uranium path was justified through a mixture of economic and 
technological advantages, notably its lower cost and greater technical 
reliability when compared with alternative cycles. Mastery over the entire 
fuel cycle would prevent dependence on imported fuel supplies, of par-
ticular sensitivity because the United States had ceased its transfers of 
enriched uranium to Brazil in 1974.51 Brazilian industries would take over 
an increasing share-up to 90 percent by 1990-of both power plant 
construction and components manufacture. 
The agreement with KWU was criticized in Brazil on several grounds. 
The jet nozzle enrichment procedure was considered a great risk, as the 
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Ownership 
100% Brazilian government 
51% Nuclebras 
49% Urangesellschaft (FRG) 
75% N uclebras 
15% Interatom 
10% Steag Kemenergie (FRG) 
100% Nuclebr:is 
75% N uclebras 
25% KWU (Kraftwerk Union) (FRG) 
97.6% Nuclebnis 
0.8% KWU 





technology was not commercially proven, and its electricity consumption 
was high. The scientific community backed a more independent ap-
proach, possibly along the natural uranium, heavy water lines (such as the 
Argentine program), stressing the advantages of a thorium-based cycle, 
because Brazil had considerable reserves of thorium, as well as an incip-
ient national technology. Domestic entrepreneurs in the capital goods and 
engineering sectors were far from satisfied with the role they were allo-
cated in the joint ventures with the German partners. In its political, 
economic, and technical nature, the arrangement expressed the encroach-
ment of the economic ministries and their supremacy in shaping sectoral 
policies in tune with the Brazilian regime's broad macropolitical objec-
tives.52 
The exorbitant rise in the cost of the planned nuclear program, from an 
original estimate of about $10 billion in 1975 to a projected $40 billion in 
the early 1980s, generated widespread criticism.53 Compounded by dis-
closures of mismanagement and corruption, mounting economic diffi-
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culties, poor selection of sites, and lack of adequately trained personnel, 
the implementation of the 1975 agreement was delayed and finally sharply 
contracted in the mid-1980s. Criticism also focused on KWU's poor record 
in technology transfer, leading to the resignation of two directors of Nu-
clebras subsidiaries.54 General Dirceu Lacerda Coutinho, director of 
Nuclei (isotopic enrichment), forwarded a critical report to the National 
Security Council, the National Information Services, and to President 
Geisel, without reply, and later testified in a congressional investigating 
committee on German reluctance to transfer technology effectively. 55 
By 1988, the accomplishments of the 1975 nuclear agreement could be 
summarized in the inauguration of (an idle) heavy components factory 
(Nuclep), a fuel element fabrication plant, and two unfinished power 
stations. A uranium concentrate plant designed by the French company 
Pechiney U gine Kuhlman was inaugurated in 1982. Following the May 
1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation agreements, Argentina 
commissioned Nuclep to weld and assemble the lower part of the pressure 
vessel for its Atucha II plant. Through its partnership with KWU, Nuclep 
participated in bidding for the supply of two reactors to Mexico. 56 Brazil 
also signed an agreement in 1980 to provide Iraq with natural and low-
enriched uranium, equipment, personnel training, and technology for 
reactor construction, and it reportedly shipped 240 tons of uranium to 
Iraq.57 Brazil's export potential, however, ultimately may be seriously 
constrained by limited global demand and a thriving competition. 58 
Critics of the nuclear program within the technocracy rallied around 
General Costa Cavalcanti, director of Eletrobnis and ltaipu Binational, 
who advocated the development of Brazil's hydroelectric potential. 59 With 
the appointment of Antonio Delfim Netto, one of the architects of the 
liberal economic policy, as minister of planning, this group succeeded in 
reversing priorities in favor of hydroelectricity in the late 1970s. The 
decline ofNuclebras and the official program with KWU can be contrasted 
with the rise of the National Nuclear Energy Commission under National 
Security Council protection. The commission headed a "parallel pro-
gram," invigorated in the early 1980s, designed to advance indigenous 
nuclear technology. 60 Among its achievements was the inauguration in 
1988 of a uranium enrichment facility under navy control. Its projects, 
unlike those of the German agreement, are not covered by international 
safeguards that would prevent Brazil from diverting fuel or replicating 
technologies to obtain weapons-grade materials. The Brazilian air force 
has a nuclear research institute in the Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial in Sao 
Jose dos Campos, and the army reportedly concentrates on the use of 
nuclear energy for satellite propulsion in its own large research center, the 
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Centro Tecnol6gico do Exercito (Centex).61 In September 1983, Navy 
Minister Admiral Maximiano da Fonseca announced that Brazil would 
begin construction of its first atomic submarine in the early 1990s. 62 
Most analyses of the cluster of incentives that might drive Brazil to 
acquire a nuclear capability have traditionally focused on issues of interna-
tional status, prestige, and independence, particularly independence 
from the United States.63 Neither the "pariah" nor the "pygmy" charac-
teristics of other countries on the nuclear threshold apply to Brazil. 64 Its 
declaratory policy points to the denial of nuclear technology to nonsignato-
ries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as part of a general attempt by the 
nuclear powers to perpetuate international stratification. At least some 
Brazilians may regard an independent nuclear weapons capability as a 
useful diplomatic tool to increase both Brazil's stature among developing 
countries and its leverage vis-a-vis the developed world. Such capability 
would portend, in this view, an upgrading of Brazil's credentials as a major 
contender in the international and regional arenas. However, prestige as 
an incentive may be offset by the need to come to terms with the severe 
socioeconomic effects of many of the grandiose schemes undertaken in the 
1970s. Economic and political viability, not grandeza (greatness), is the 
adjusted objective of the late 1980s. Moreover, there is growing under-
standing among nuclear-capable Third World countries that an overt mili-
tary nuclear capability may be of decreasing strategic value. Once 
capabilities are in place, intentions remain under a cloud of ambiguity, as 
in the case of Pakistan-broadening the repertoire of nuclear postures as 
an instrument of foreign policy. 
Few studies agree on the impact of regional security considerations, 
more specifically the Argentine factor, on Brazilian incentives.65 In the 
aftermath of Argentine defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War, arguments 
citing an Argentine effort to regain lost capabilities acquired greater 
currency in Brazil. Yet the significance of this factor seems to have been 
overstated in light of the relatively benign security environment of the 
Southern Cone of South America, especially in comparison with other 
regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. The series of agreements 
on nuclear technology cooperation between Argentina and Brazil since 
1980 has led to presidential-level mutual visits to sensitive facilities. 66 
Brazil supplied Argentina with the pressure vessel and steam generators 
for the Atucha II plant, and Argentina supplied Brazil with zircaloy tubing 
and lent it 240 tons of uranium for Angra I, part of which was returned after 
production started in Poc;os de Caldas. 
The military establishments in both Brazil and Argentina are often cited 
for efforts to accelerate their respective nuclear programs, but in recent 
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years the levels of antagonism have been low. The Brazilian armed forces 
control strategic technical areas including nuclear technology, telecom-
munications, weapons, aeronautics, and computers. 67 However, the mili-
tary is no monolithic entity, and there are growing ideological cleavages 
concerning broad economic policies, state control, global alliances, and 
the objectives of the nuclear program. The foreign policy of caution and 
restraint on the part offormer Argentine President Alfonsin helped diffuse 
concerns among the Brazilian military. 
Whether the bilateral agreements of the 1980s (including joint develop-
ment of a breeder reactor) reflect tactical cooperation geared to oppose 
foreign pressures on their nuclear programs or signs of sincere rapproche-
ment, the two countries have set in motion a process of mutual accom-
modation that reduces the proliferation incentives linked to regional 
competition. Like economic interdependence and cooperation, prestige 
derived from nuclear competence can be seen as a positive sum game. 
Competition between Argentina and Brazil is more likely to occur at the 
level of nuclear technology exports to other less developed countries, 
particularly in Latin America. However, cooperation in the form of joint 
ventures with third partners, including possibly Cuba, is also feasible. 68 
Nuclear power may not be the most efficient solution to Brazil's energy 
problems, at least in the short run. Economic and sociopolitical realities 
impose severe constraints on capital-intensive nuclear-related activities, 
peaceful and otherwise. Yet, in the words of a Brazilian colonel, "A nuclear 
program is fundamentally, and almost exclusively, a matter of national 
security. The harnessing of energy from a nuclear reactor is secondary." 69 
Brazil has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and there is broad 
domestic consensus, even among critics of the nuclear program, that 
vertical proliferation (additions to superpowers' arsenals) poses a much 
greater threat to humanity than horizontal proliferation (growth in the 
number of nuclear powers); in this view, the NPT is designed primarily to 
perpetuate a discriminatory distribution of power. 
In 1962, under a civilian regime, Brazil proposed to the United Nations 
the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, which eventually 
resulted in the Treaty ofTlatelolco. In 1978, Brazil ratified the treaty but 
chose not to waive the requirements of article 28, paragraph I, and in 
practical terms the treaty is therefore not in force as far as Brazil is 
concerned. 70 From the legal standpoint, once the treaty comes into force 
for a country, it is obliged to negotiate a full-scope safeguards agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Brazil perceives the treaty 
as not impinging on the signatories' right to conduct peaceful nuclear 
explosions. 71 The safeguard provisions of the 1975 West German agree-
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ment were consistent with the guidelines of the Zangger Committee on 
nuclear exports at that time. Brazil did not, however, accept full-scope 
safeguards covering its entire nuclear industry. In practical terms, more-
over, the agreement with West Germany allowed room for movement of 
nuclear materials in and out of safeguarded facilities, under article VII. 
Brazil's position with respect to the NPT and Tlatelolco, its refusal to 
agree to full-scope safeguards, and its insistence on its right to conduct 
peaceful nuclear explosions point to a policy stressing national autonomy 
and strategic flexibility. 72 Cooperation through agreements on hydro-
electrical and other natural resources development, including nuclear 
technology, have served Brazilian interests better than an arms race, at 
both global and regional levels. According to one analysis of military 
competition in South America, Brazil's military expenditures-about 1 
percent of its GDP-are the only ones in the region compatible with 
peacetime growth. 73 
BRAZIL, THE NICs, AND ADJUSTMENT PATTERNS 
During hard times, argues Peter A. Gourevitch, "patterns unravel, eco-
nomic models come into conflict, and policy prescriptions diverge."74 
Brazil's responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s contributed to the expan-
sion of its state enterprises, the deepening of its foreign financial indebted-
ness, the intensification of countertrade strategies, and the sobering of the 
ruling coalition's own evaluation of its macropolitical model of economic 
change. Some of Brazil's solutions increased its external vulnerability and 
fomented friction with environmental and nonproliferation groups in 
North and South alike; the domestic social costs were even higher. If 
anything, the energy crisis highlighted, for Brazil as for others, the inter-
dependence of politics and economics, and of global and domestic, in the 
definition of states' response to external challenges. 
Brazil was only one among those affected by the oil crises, which helped 
truncate the rapid economic advancement of the pre-1973 period. In the 
absence of a multilateral challenge to OPEC, Brazil's ruling coalition chose 
to rely primarily on its own efforts at domestic restructuring. The emphasis 
on domestic strategies of adjustment was largely molded by Brazilian 
decision-makers' perception that the state's capacity to internalize the 
costs of adjustment was greater than its international ability to help shape a 
new regime via, for instance, mobilizing support against OPEC among 
other Third World countries. 75 Brazil's diplomacy was thus characterized 
by a pragmatic and technocratic bargaining style, in which fluid policies 
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tended to rely on bilateral relations as being more dependable than 
multilateral cooperation. 
Beyond the domestic rationale advanced in this paper, three system-
level types of mutually reinforcing explanations can be put forward to 
explain Brazil's selection of instruments of adjustment to the external 
challenges of energy markets. First, its mild reactions may be seen as 
buttressing the contention that developing countries' support for common 
political objectives, such as global restructuring of international regimes 
(in this case by Third World oil producers), can override concerns with 
their own economic performance. 76 In its response, Brazil tacitly yielded 
to a transformed energy market without pressing for the creation of an 
authoritative international regime that would render predictable, if not 
secure, resource transfers to affected developing countries. 
A second explanation may be found in the country's structural position 
in the international political economy. As part of what is at times labeled 
the "semiperiphery," Brazil is caught in the ambiguity that the advantages 
of an upgraded international status may create. 77 Although not yet reaping 
the benefits of being a full-fledged member of the advanced tier, its 
interests increasingly diverge from those of less developed countries left 
behind. It expects to maintain smooth ties with the industrialized world, 
which supplies it with the capital, technology, and export markets on 
which its growth is dependent, while securing Third World export markets 
and sources of raw materials. 
Finally, Brazil's response to the energy debacles ofl973 and 1979-not 
unlike those of other oil importers in the industrialized world-can be 
interpreted as reflecting an inexorable shift of the international system 
from a "military" to a trading world. 78 Diplomacy and reciprocity, financial 
flows, domestic adjustments, and export drives prevailed over more belli-
cose alternatives. 
Brazil's energy predicament-which turned it into the Third World's 
largest oil importer-may be compared to that of other energy-poor 
developing countries with nuclear programs reviewed in this book. These 
countries' relative vulnerability to changes in oil prices and supplies is 
linked to their respective resource endowments, degrees of energy depen-
dence, and patterns of economic development. 79 Less Developed Coun-
tries undergoing rapid structural change and increasing energy consump-
tion are particularly vulnerable. In light of their rising position in the 
international economic system and their energy dependence, they face 
similar challenges, leading, at times, to similar responses. For instance, 
both India and Brazil changed their policies regarding oil exploration and 
self-reliance by inviting foreign companies to participate, but both failed in 
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attracting OPEC investments. Yet vulnerability to foreign oil supplies 
does not seem to be associated with uniform patterns of state intervention 
and entrepreneurship. Thus, the expansion of state firms in Brazil in the 
1970s can be contrasted with the market-conforming strategies of South 
Korea, which allowed private firms greater opportunities in energy mar-
kets. 
Most East Asian nonindustrialized countries (NICs), including South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were struck by the quadrupling of oil prices 
in 1973, but the domestic costs of adjustment were lower for their smaller, 
flexible, trading economies and their relatively more egalitarian social 
structures. Their responses leaned more on fundamental economic re-
structuring and acceptance of lower initial growth to limit imports while 
promoting exports to allow economic recovery, than, as in the case of 
Brazil, on foreign indebtedness.80 Despite these instrumental differ-
ences, however, most NICs responded by maintaining centralized au-
thoritarian political models backed by military force. Their ability to 
impose costs on domestic groups may decrease with political liberaliza-
tion, compelling democratic regimes to search for a different mix of 
domestic and international-including multilateral-solutions. A par-
ticularly constraining factor for Latin American NICs has been their 
external indebtedness, which increases their vulnerability to external 
leverage in shaping political and economic objectives. 
Beyond their common concern with energy considerations, NICs vary 
not only with respect to the vulnerability of their economic infrastructures 
and the state's ability to steer investment patterns, but also in the levels of 
regional security threats. In South America, regional power politics and 
deterrence are far less relevant than are other international considerations. 
The security factor sets Brazil apart from India, Israel, Taiwan, Pakistan, 
South Korea, and South Africa. There has been little serious probability of 
superpower entanglement in the Southern Cone, even in the era before 
glasnost, which reduced even further the incentives for regional military 
competition. 
The availability of alternative sources of energy in Brazil, as in Argen-
tina and India, seriously calls into question the major commitments to 
nuclear power by at least some of the NICs. The decisions to embark on 
such programs were associated more with "pull" (domestic considerations) 
than "push" factors (suppliers' intervention). The programs' political, eco-
nomic, and technical characteristics were shaped by the countries' respec-
tive domestic structural and institutional arrangements. The avenue of 
acquiring a nuclear weapons option through a civilian power program, as 
the case oflndia appears to suggest, inextricably links questions of security 
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with issues of economic growth and technological development. In most 
cases, nuclear power has been seen as a litmus test of independence, 
sophistication, and industrial technological advancement. Yet the contri-
bution of nuclear power to the broader modernization of these countries' 
industrial structure has been limited in most cases, while the nuclear 
sector has absorbed resources far greater than the economic benefits it 
could provide. 81 
Diverging trade, financial, and strategic considerations have placed 
NICs, in some areas at least, at opposing ends of multilateral bargaining 
processes. Domestic structures and policy networks shaped different state 
capacities and proclivities. These two factors, in turn, defined the balance 
of incentives and constraints associated with different strategies, and 
ultimately influenced the nature of a country's adjustments to increased 
interdependence. Changing economic and technological capabilities for 
the group as a whole may reduce external vulnerabilities with regard to 
energy, while global changes-notably the decline of east-West ten-
sions-may provide new opportunities for expansion of their economic 
and political relations, ignoring ideological considerations in much the 
pragmatic style adopted by Brazil during the first oil shock in 1973. 
NOTES 
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of UCLA's Center for International and 
Strategic Affairs and Karl Arnold in particular as well as the University of California's 
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. I also thank Ken Conka, Jan K. Black, 
Jim Dietz, Kenneth Erickson, Patrice F. Jones, Pat Peritore, Wayne Selcher, Scott 
Tollefson, Steven Topik, and Maria Jose Willumsen for their constructive comments. 
1. Such integration occurred not exclusively via exports but also through in-
creased imports of capital goods, intermediate inputs, technology, capital, and foreign 
investment. Albert Fishlow, "Latin American Adjustment to the Oil Shocks of 1973 and 
1979," in J. Hartlyn and S.A. Morley, eds., Latin American Political Economy (Boul-
der: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 54-84. Ceh0 Lafer, Politica Exterior Brasileira: Balan<;o 
e Perspectivas," Dados 22 (1979): pp. 49-&t. 
2. Petroleum imports were no higher than 12 percent of total imports until1973. 
On the draining effects of oil imports, see James H. Street; "Coping with Energy 
Shocks in Latin America: Three Responses," Latin America Research Review 17, no. 3 
(1982): pp. 128-47; Albert Fishlow, "A Tale ofTwo Presidents: The Political Economy of 
Crisis Management," and E. Bacha and P. Malan, "Brazil's Debt: From the Miracle to 
the Fund," in A. Stepan, ed., Democratizing Brazil (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), pp. 83-119. 
3. William H. Courtney, "Nuclear Choices for Friendly Rivals," in Joseph A. 
Yager, Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1980). 
4. Fishlow, "Latin American Adjustment." The average annual rate was close to 
6.5 percent in this period. 
5. In other words, did the state attempt to control energy companies or to 
Brazil 147 
strengthen them without direct intervention? I have adopted these categories from 
Richard S. Samuels, The Business of the japanese State-Energy Markets in Corpo-
rative and Historical Perspectives (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
6. W. Baer, The Brazilian Economy (New York: Praeger, 1983). For a comprehen-
sive view of energy in Brazil, see Kenneth P. Erickson's "The Energy Profile of Brazil," 
in Kenneth R. Stunkel, ed., National Energy Profiles (New York: Praeger, 1981), and 
his "State Entrepreneurship, Energy Policy, and the Political Order in Brazil," in T. C. 
Bruneau and P. Faucher, eds., Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary 
Economic and Political Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 141-77. 
7. Shares in net assets of petroleum refining and distribution were 4 percent for 
domestic firms, 12 percent for foreign ones, and 84 percent for state companies in 1981. 
8. Petrobnis accounts for close to 40 percent of local demand for capital goods 
(Brasil Energia, February 1984). For a comprehensive study of the formative years of 
Petrobnis and their legacy, see John D. Wirth, ed., Latin American Oil Companies and 
the Politics of Energy (Lincoln: University ofN ebraska Press, 1985); PeterS. Smith, Oil 
and Politics in Modem Brazil (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976); and George 
Philips, Oil and Politics in Latin America-Nationalist Movements and State Com-
panies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
9. A Questiio Nuclear-Aspectos Conjunturais de Energia, Brasilia Senado Feder-
al, 1983. See also Indice do Brasil, 1979-1980, 0 Banco de Dados, 1981, p. 36, and New 
York Times, March 3, 1989. For a landmark study of the hydroelectric sector in Brazil, 
see Judith Tendler, Electric Power in Brazil: Entrepreneurship in the Public Sector 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
10. The World Bank in fact withheld a $500 million loan for the energy sector to 
await environmental safeguards. 
11. Thomas J. Trebat, Brazil's State-Owned Enterprises-A Case Study of the 
State as Entrepreneur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
12. There are plans to build seventy new dams in the Amazon Basin and to transfer 
electricity from there to the energy-intensive areas of the southeast. 
13. Diesel and gasoline for transportation account for over 50 percent of total oil 
consumption. 
14. The Proalcohol program, created in 1975, saved about $4.5 billion in crude oil 
imports and created 148,000 new jobs, most of them in the agricultural sector, in 1980 
alone (Monthly Letter, Banco do Brasil, no. 49 [January 1983]: p. 2; Brazil Energy, July 
28, 1982, p. 5). However, its social costs were quite high, particularly in the displace-
ment of agricultural labor in favor of capital-intensive sugar cane. 
15. Michael Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986). 
16. Coal mining started in Brazil in 1966; the increase in production has been 
minimal. Affonso da Silva Telles, "Participa!;!ao do carviio na produ!;!iiO de energia 
eletrica-estudo para planejamento," in L. Pinquelli Rosa, ed., Energia, Tecnologia e 
Desenvolvimento (Petr6polis: Vozes, 1978). 
17. Fishlow, "Latin American Adjustment." Rising oil prices and mounting interest 
rates accounted for over half of the $4 billion deterioration in the current account in 
1979. 
18. Erickson, "The Energy Profile," p. 231. 
19. Brazilian Monthly Economic Indicators, Planning Secretariat of the Presiden-
cy, Federative Republic of Brazil, January 1983, May 1983, January 1984.; Monthly 
Newsletter, Central Bank of Brazil, October 1988. 
20. In fact, the trade deficit with the Middle East more than doubled between 1986 
and 1987. Monthly Newsletter, February 1988. 
148 ETEL SOLINGEN 
21. Third and fourth, respectively, of the eight originally included in the agreement 
with West Germany. 
22. GNP growth does not necessarily depend on exponential growth in energy 
consumption. Nazli Choucri, Energy and Development in Latin America (Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 10. 
23. The latter were given four years to adjust to new regulations, which tend to be 
more flexible concerning raw materials processed in Brazil. 
24. Trebat, Brazil's State-Owned Enterprises. A $500 million loan to Eletrobras 
approved by the World Bank in 1988 has been delayed because of the transfer of nuclear 
plants to Eletrobras jurisdiction (].P.R. S. Jan. 13, 1989). 
25. 0 Estado de Siio Paulo, Oct. 22 and Dec. 21, 1985. Thirty percent of the $9 
billion in direct investment in the Itaipu hydroelectric project was financed through 
external debt. Brazil has been paying $1 billion per year in interest and other charges 
related to the nuclear sector. Correia Brasiliense, July 16, 1986; New York Times, Dec. 
21, 1987. 
26. G. John Ikenberry, "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the 
Oil Shocks in the 1970s," International Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986): pp. 
105-37. Samuels, The Business of the japanese State, p. 18; Harvey B. Feigenbaum, 
The Politics af Public Enterprise: Oil and the French State (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985). 
27. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Knop£ 1986). 
28. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 
and Anns Transfers, 1967-76, (Washington D.C., 1978). 
29. Brazil, India, Taiwan, South Korea, Egypt, and Mexico accounted for 75 
percent of the total rise in LDC oil consumption between 197 4-78; P. Kemezis and E. J. 
Wilson III, The Decade of Energy Policy (New York: Praeger, 1984) p. 54. 
30. Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil in the Global Power System, Occasional Papers 
Series, Center of Brazilian Studies, Johns Hopkins University, November 1979. For 
other authoritative studies of Brazil's foreign policy, see Riordan Roett, ed., Brazil in 
the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1976) and Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil-Foreign Policy of a Future World 
Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976). 
31. Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil's Multilateral Relations between First and Third 
Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 14. 
32. Iraq is said to have paid about $1.2 billion between 1976 and 1981 for Brazilian 
military equipment (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 1981). According to Scott Tollefson, 
reported estimates of$2 billion to $5 billion in annual arms exports for the early 1980s 
are exaggerated ("Brazilian Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: The Search for Autonomy," 
Ph. D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, forthcoming). 
33. Brazil Energy, July 28, 1982. -see also Tollefson, "Brazilian Arms Sales." 
34. Monthly Newsletter, Central Bank of Brazil, September 1988. Over 30 percent 
of Brazil's total imports came from the Middle East by 1981, as opposed to only 5 
percent in 1970. See Baer, The Brazilian Economy, p. 163. 
35. Philips, Oil and Politics. 
36. Latin America Political Report 12, no. 22 (1978): p. 4. 
37. John Child, "Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America," Latin America Research 
Review 14, no. 2 (1979). 
38. M. Travassos, Projecao Continental do Brasil (Sao Paulo: Cia. Editora Na-
cional, 1947). 
39. This statement applies less to the early 1970s-particularly with regard to 
Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile-than to the post-1974 era. The hegemonic 
Brazil 149 
aspects of Brazilian foreign policy are stressed in Juan E. Guglialmelli, Argentina, 
Brasil y la bomba at6mica (Buenos Aires: Tierra Nueva, 1976); William Perry, Contem-
porary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power 
(Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1976); Phillip Kelly, "Geopolitical Tension 
Areas in South America: The Question of Brazilian Territorial Expansion," in R.E. 
Biles, ed., Inter-American Relations: The Latin American Perspective (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1988); and J. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels 
among Neighbors (New York: Praeger, 1985). On Brazil's reluctance to assume a 
hegemonic role in South America, see Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Southern 
Cone Subsystem," in Pope Atkins, ed., South America in the 1990s: Evolving Interna-
tional Relationships in a New Era (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming), 
and William Perry, "Brazil: A Local Leviathan," in Rodney Jones and S. Hildreth, 
eds., Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 
1986). 
40. Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1968-85 (New 
York: OxfOrd University Press, 1988); David J. Myers, "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the 
Nuclear Option," Orbis, Winter 1984: pp. 881-911. 
41. Howard Pittman, "Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile," in E. G. Ferris and J. K. Lincoln, eds., Latin American Foreign Policies: Global 
and Regional Dimensions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981). 
42. The conflict over the Banda Oriental resulted in the creation of Uruguay as a 
buffer state. In the 1932-35 Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, Brazil and 
Argentina supported opposing sides struggling for control over territory of presumed 
economic importance. 
43. Hydroelectric projects are seen not merely as an answer to national energy 
requirements but as a developmental goal in themselves, due to their presumed 
infrastructural, industrial, and other socioeconomic spinoffs. 
44. The completion of ltaipu in early 1983, however, sealed off the higher Parana 
from navigation southward, diminishing the economic importance of the Argentine 
section of the river and reducing the electricity production capability of the Argentine 
Corpus dam. 
45. Margaret Daly Hayes, Brazil and the South Atlantic: Perspectives on an 
Emerging Issue, Occasional Papers Series, Center of Brazilian Studies, Johns Hopkins 
University, n.d. 
46. Riordan Roett, "The Political Future of Brazil," in William H. Overholt, ed., 
The Future of Brazil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 71-102; Thomas E. Skid-
more, "Brazil's Changing Role in the International System: Implications for U.S. 
policy," in Roett, Brazil in the Seventies. 
47. A series of accords signed by Secretary of State George Shultz in Brazil in 
February 1984 approved U.S. participation in a $4 billion hydroelectrical project and a 
$50 million helicopter coproduction deal; Los Angeles Times, Feb. 7, 1984. On tensions 
regarding nuclear policy, trade, and human rights, see Robert Wesson, The United 
States and Brazil (New York: Praeger, 1981) and Albert Fishlow, "The United States 
and Brazil: The Case of the Missing Relationship," Foreign Affairs 60, no. 4 (Spring 
1982): pp. 904-23. 
48. Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil in the World: Multipolarity as Seen by a Peripheral 
ADC Middl·~ Power," in E. G. Ferris and J. K. Lincoln, eds., Latin American Foreign 
Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 81-102. 
49. The lnstituto de Energia Atomica (Siio Paulo), Instituto de Pesquisas Radi-
oativas (Belo Horizonte), and Comite Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEN; Rio de 
Janeiro) were created in this period. 
150 ETEL SOLINGEN 
50. West Germany would receive 20 percent initially of any ore discovered and a 
larger share at a later date. 
51. Brazilian negotiators argued also that reprocessing and enrichment would lead 
to considerable savings in uranium consumption and to a reduction in waste-related 
problems. It would also provide the knowledge required to obtain weapons-grade fuel; 
Jornal do Brasil, Feb. 17, 1979. Jose Goldemberg, Energia nuclear no Brasil (Sao 
Paulo: Hucitec, 1978); Joaquim F. de Carvalho, 0 Brasil Nuclear (Porto Alegre: Tche!, 
1987). 
52. Etel Solingen, Bargaining in Technology: Nuclear Industries in Brazil and 
Argentina (in preparation). 
53. By 1980, the cost of the second and third plants (Angra II and III)was calculated 
at $3.1 billion each, over twice the original estimate. The costs of a nuclear-generated 
kilowatt shot up from $200 in 1970 to $2,800 in 1983. A former director ofNuclebnis 
engineering subsidiary Nuclen, Joaquim de Carvalho, claimed that by the late 1970s 
the program was no longer geared to the production of economically priced energy but 
to building plants "at whatever cost." Brazil Energy, July 10, 1980; March 24, 1981; 
October 10, 1981. 
54. Cesar Cals, minister of mines and energy, declared in 1971 that "nuclear plants 
do not obey energy criteria but criteria of absorption of technology"; Jornal do Brazil, 
Aug. 8, 1981. Yet Joaquim de Carvalho, former director of Nuclen (Nuclebnis Engi-
neering), claimed that Nuclen serves only to coordinate the production of German-
designed components and supervise their assembly-"nothing more"; Brazil Energy, 
March 24, 1980. 
55. Worldwide Report-Nuclear Development and Proliferation, F. B.l. S. no. 193 
(June 24, 1983): pp. 14-15. The poor performance of Westinghouse's Angra I exacer-
bated sensitivities regarding effective technology transfer. Mter twelve years of delay, 
Brazil's first, has never been fully operational due to technical deficiencies that brought 
the utility Furnas to file a suit against Westinghouse. 
56. Brazil Energy, Dec. 24, 1981. 
57. Brazil Energy, June 24, 1981. 
58. For a full description of Brazil's nuclear industrial capabilities, including export 
potential, see Etel Solingen, ''Technology, Countertrade and Nuclear Exports," in 
W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade: The Challenge of the Emerging Sup-
pliers (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990). 
59. Capital costs represent 70 percent of a power station. In Brazil, the generating 
costs of nuclear facilities were between two and three times those of the hydroelectric 
sector; Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, Nuclear Energy in Latin America: The Brazilian Case, 
U.N. University, 1980. 
60. Latin America Weekly Report, Feb. 11, 1983. According to Myers, "Brazil: 
Reluctant Pursuit," and F. B. I. S. reports, CNEN director Rex N. Alves, the liaison with 
the National Security Council, was reportedly the man behind the delivery of uranium 
to Iraq. 
61. Latin America Regional Reporters, Brazil, Feb. 5, 1982. 
62. 0 Estado de Siio Paulo, Sept. 24, 1983. 
63. A long-standing effort to increase autonomy was reinforced by the American 
violation in 197 4 of a 1972 agreement to supply enriched uranium for the Westinghouse 
plant. 
64. Richard Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation," Foreign 
Policy no. 26 (Spring 1977): pp. 157-83. 
65. Ernest W. Lefever, Nuclear Arms in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1979); George H. Quester, Brazil and Latin American Nuclear 
Brazil 151 
Proliferation: An Optimistic View, UCLA Center for International and Strategic Af-
fairs, ACIS Working Paper 17, 1979; Courtney, "Nuclear Choices"; John H. Rosen-
baum, "Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations," in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds., Nuclear 
Proliferation and the Near Nuclear Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 
255-77. For an alternative view of the impact of the regional system on proliferation, 
see Ashok Kapur, "The Proliferation Factor in South America: the Brazil-Argentine 
Cases," in International Nuclear Proliferation-Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional 
Aspects (New York: Praeger, 1979); and Regina Lucia de Moraes Morel, Ciencia e 
Estado-A politica Cientifica no Brasil (Sao Paulo: T.A. Queiroz, 1979). 
66. The meeting between Presidents Figueiredo and Jorge R. Videla, the first visit 
to Argentina by a Brazilian president since 1945, was considered a turning point in the 
relationship between the two countries. It resulted in a series of cooperative agree-
ments on hydroelectricity, natural gas, alcohol, and nuclear technology. 
67. Simon Schwartzman, Ciencia, Universidade e Ideologia-A Politica do Con-
hecimento (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981). 
68. After 1979, Brazil accelerated its nuclear cooperation program with Venezuela 
and Chile in an attempt to trade nuclear technology for oil and utilize Nuclep's idle 
capacity. 
69. Erickson, "The Energy Profile." 
70. Until certain requirements are fulfilled, namely, ratification by all Latin Amer-
ican nations (Argentina and Cuba have not yet ratified the treaty). John R. Redick, 
"Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America," in Roger W. Fontaine and James D. 
Theberge, eds., Latin America's New Internationalism-The End of Hemispheric 
Isolation (New York: Praeger, 1976), and "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation 
in Latin America," in George H. Quester, ed., Nuclear Proliferation-Breaking the 
Chain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981): pp. 103-34. 
71. The contention has been that the latter are important in developmental proj-
ects such as the extraction of oil from shale; the linking of the Plata, Amazon, and 
Orinoco rivers to integrate South America; and the construction of dams and canals. 
Even in 1967, the Brazilian interpretation ofTlatelolco's article 18 was that it allows 
signatories to undertake "by their own means or in association with third parties, 
nuclear explosions with peaceful purposes including those presupposing devices sim-
ilar to the ones utilized in military weapons"; Kapur, "Proliferation Factor." 
72. Courtney, "Nuclear Choices for Friendly Rivals." 
73. Emilio Meneses, "Competencia Armamentista en America del Sur 
1970-1980," Estudios Publicos (Santiago), no. 7 (1982): pp. 5-42. 
74. Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times-Comparative Responses to Inter-
national Economic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
75. In this sense, Brazil's reactions closely resemble those of statist models like 
France, in its emphasis on national control over energy production and supply, state-
induced commercial and barter agreements with suppliers, and the adoption of an 
ambitious nuclear energy program; G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics 
and the Capacities of American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
76. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict-The Third World Against Global 
Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
77. Peter Evans, Dependent Development-The Alliance of Multinational, State 
and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Immanuel 
Wallerstein, "Semi-peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis," Theory 
and Society, 3, no. 4 (1976): pp. 461-84. 
78. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 
1986). 
152 ETEL SOLINGEN 
79. Joy Dunkerley et al., Energy Strategies for Developing Nations (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
80. Fishlow, "Latin American Adjustment." South Korea's foreign indebtedness, 
however, grew considerably as well. 
81. Solingen, Bargaining in Technology. 
8 
Cuba 
JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ 
In June 1960, the Cuban revolutionary government seized the refineries 
operated by three international oil companies and severed all relationships 
with its traditional energy suppliers. The economic collapse that would 
have been predictable in imported energy-dependent Cuba as a result of 
these events was avoided by swift action of the Soviet Union in setting up 
an "oil bridge" to supply Cuba from Black Sea ports. 
More than two decades later, Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union 
for energy products continues and, in effect, has deepened. Although 
Cuban oil production has increased significantly in the 1980s, it continues 
to account for a very limited percentage of consumption. Reliance on a 
single supplier for the overwhelming majority of energy imports makes 
Cuba vulnerable to Soviet supply disruptions or manipulations. Nuclear 
power, which could ease dependence on hydrocarbon imports, will have 
little impact on Cuban vulnerability, as the only source of nuclear hard-
ware and fissionable materials is the Soviet Union. 
This paper explores the relationships between energy, security, and the 
economy in revolutionary Cuba. In the first section a rough balance of 
energy production, imports, and consumption is developed. I The next 
section explores the national security implications of Cuba's dependence 
on imported fuels and discusses the impact of such dependence on foreign 
policy, drawing on a factual example of oil supplies allegedly being with-
held until the Cuban government made certain policy changes. The third 
section analyzes the role of energy in the economy, reviews the special 
relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union regarding oil pricing, 
and speculates on Cuba's energy future in view of uncertainties about the 
willingness of the Soviet Union to continue to supply the country with 
growing volumes of oil and oil products. 
As a result of its topography and geology, Cuba is poorly endowed with 
energy resources. The narrow, elongated shape of the island precludes the 
existence of large water masses capable of producing hydroelectricity. 
Despite considerable exploration, the deposits of hydrocarbons that have 
been found are grossly inadequate when compared with total needs. 
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Imported oil and oil products, and to a lesser extent coal, have historically 
filled the gap between energy demand and domestic production. Nuclear 
power will have no effect on the energy balance until the early 1990s at the 
earliest. 
DOMESTIC ENERGY PRODUCTION 
Domestic sources of primary energy in Cuba during 1959-87 for which data 
or estimates are available include oil, natural gas, hydroelectricity, eth-
anol, bagasse, fuelwood, and charcoal. For commercial fuels (oil, natural 
gas, hydroelectricity, and ethanol), published annual production data 
appear to be good indicators of domestic availability. This is not the case for 
noncommercial fuels (bagasse, fuelwood, and charcoal), which are often 
consumed directly by the producers and thus do not register in the 
statistical system. For bagasse, production data are not available but can be 
estimated under some limiting assumptions; for fuelwood and charcoal, 
published data probably underestimate actual production by a substantial 
margin. 
Commercial oil production in Cuba began in 1915 with the discovery of 
the Bacuranao field; another commercial field was discovered at Jarahueca 
in 1943. Output from these two fields was small, averaging about 4,000 
metric tons (MT) per year during 1950-54. The discovery of the important 
Jatibonico field in 1954 pushed production to an average of about 30,000 
MT per year during 1955-58 and gave rise to a flurry of concession 
applications and exploratory drilling activities by domestic and foreign 
companies. Small fields were discovered subsequently at Catalina, 
Cristales, and Guanabo. However, as most of the exploratory wells either 
turned up dry or found petroleum in quantities too small or too low in 
quality to justify commercial exploitation, the exploration boom subsided. 
The revolutionary leadership in 1959 was convinced that Cuba had vast 
oil reserves not exploited by foreign oil companies operating there, since 
the companies could reap higher profits from refining and marketing 
imported crude. At the end of October 1959, the Cuban government 
seized the exploration records of the oil companies and, with financial and 
technical assistance from the Soviet Union and Romania, undertook an 
ambitious program aimed at boosting oil production. 
Initially, the program had very limited success. Oil production for 
1960-67 averaged 50,000 MT per year, exceeded 200,000 MT per year in 
1968-69 when output peaked at the Guanabo field, then steadied at about 
140,000 MT per year during 1970-74, as production declined at mature 
fields (table 8.1). Production gains from the newly discovered Boca Jaruco 
and Varadero fields east of Havana pushed output above 260,000 MT per 
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Table 8.1. Cuban production of commercial energy, 1959-1987 
Oil Natural gas Hydroelectricity Ethanol 
(000 MT) (million cubic meters) (000 mwh) (000 kl) 
1959 28 20 124 
1960 25 20 187 
1961 28 7 177 
1962 43 25 89 
1963 31 50 116 
1964 37 100 145 
1965 57 57 143 
1966 69 131 149 
1967 113 109 170 
1968 198 81 180 
1969 206 75 185 
1970 159 75 91 
1971 120 5.8 88 66 
1972 112 6.9 74 70 
1973 138 14.5 62 70 
1974 168 19.5 89 71 
1975 226 17.2 62 67 
1976 235 21.3 53 69 
1977 256 17.0 73 77 
1978 288 10.6 83 77 
1979 288 17.5 104 80 
1980 274 17.8 97 84 
1981 259 13.3 60 78 
1982 541 10.6 43 87 
1983 742 8.3 63 86 
1984 770 3.4 70 87 
1985 868 6.9 54 93 
1986 938 5.7 59 97 
1987 895 23.9 44 101 
Sources: Oil: 1950-5&--U .S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, various volumes; 1959-67-
Cuba Economic News 4, no. 34 (1968), p. 4; 1968-87-Cuha, Comite Estatal de Estadfsticas, 
Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes. Natural gas: Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various 
volumes. Hydroelectricity: United Nations, Statistical Office, World Energy Supplies 1950-1974 
and Energy Statistics Yearbook, various volumes. Ethanol: 1959---Cuha Economica y Financiera, 
Anuario Azucarero de Cuba 1959; 1960-61---Cuha, Ministerio del Comercio Exterior, Anuario 
Azucarero de Cuba 1961; 1962--Cuba, Junta Central de Planificacion, Principales 1ndicadores de 
la Actividad Econ6mica 1962; 1963-81-Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes. 
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year during 1975-80. Dramatic increases in oil production have been 
recorded in the 1980s, with output reaching 868,000 MT in 1985 and 
938,000 MT in 1986. Cuba planned to produce 1 million MT of oil in 19882 
but fell short of this goal, producing only 717,000 MT.3 The 1986-90 plan 
calls for annual oil production to reach 2 million MT by 1990.4 
Prior to 1968, small quantities of natural gas coproduced with petroleum 
were generally flared. In that year, commercialization began with the 
completion of two small gas pipelines connecting the Cristales field with a 
thermoelectric plant in Ciego de Avila; production statistics were first 
reported in 1971. Natural gas production peaked at about 20 million cubic 
meters during 1974-76 and declined steadily thereafter. In 1987, produc-
tion shot up to 23.9 million cubic meters. 
Cuba's hydroelectric resources are limited: Its rivers have low heads, 
carry relatively small volumes of water, and are subject to uneven rates of 
flow during the year. Installed hydroelectric generating capacity during 
the 1950s was approximately 3-4 megawatts (Mw) in six small plants. In the 
mid-1950s, construction began on a 42.6-Mw hydroelectric plant at the 
Hanabanilla River; the plant came on-line in 1962-63 and reached full 
generating capacity in 1967-68. 
In the 1950s, before the Hanabanilla plant was completed, annual 
electricity generated by hydroelectric plants averaged about 14,500 mega-
watt-hours (Mwh). Their output averaged nearly 100,000 Mwh per year 
during 1964-67 and declined subsequently to an average of about 70,000 Mwh 
per year. Output recovered to about 100,000 Mwh in 1979-80. In the 1980s, 
output of hydroelectric plants has averaged less than 60,000 Mwh per year. 
One of the sugar byproducts produced in Cuba in significant quantities 
is alcohol, and distilleries are commonly integrated with sugar mills. 
Ethanol production during the 1950s averaged slightly over 100,000 kilo-
liters (kl) per year, rising to over 150,000 kl per year in the 1960s. Produc-
tion declined sharply after 1969, to about 75,000 kl per year, as a result of 
government policies that diverted molasses from ethanol into cattle feed 
production. Ethanol production averaged about 85,000 kl per year during 
the first half of the 1980s. 
Bagasse, the moist mass of stalks and leaves that remains after sugar 
cane is ground to extract its juice, is the leading domestic source of energy. 
Bagasse is used as a fuel exclusively in sugar mills because its bulkiness and 
low caloric value make it uneconomical to transport. 
Official data on bagasse production, and on bagasse used as fuel, are not 
available. However, we have estimated the availability of bagasse as fuel 
using official data on sugar cane milled and assuming: (1) a fixed bagasse-to-
milled cane ratio of 0.25; and (1) full use of the bagasse as fuel. Following 
this method, we estimate annual bagasse production at approximately 10.8 
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million MT per year in 1959-69, 20.0 million MT in the record-setting 1970 
sugar harvest, 12.1 million MT in 1971-75 and 15.5 million MT in 1976-80. In 
1981-87, production of bagasse has averaged over 17 million MT annually. 
Traditionally, fuelwood has been used in Cuban rural homes for cooking 
and as fuel in some local industries, such as bakeries. In the sugar industry, 
fuelwood is used to start up sugar mills before bagasse becomes available 
and to make up for bagasse shortages during the milling process. 
According to official Cuban statistics, annual fuelwood production aver-
aged 208,000 cubic meters during 1958-59, 1,143,000 for 1960-69, and 
1, 653,000 for 1970-76. In 1981-87, fuel wood production has averaged more 
than 2.3 million cubic meters annually. 
Charcoal, made from mangrove and other coastal shrubs, was an impor-
tant home cooking fuel in urban areas until the mid-1940s, when it began 
to be replaced by kerosene, propane, and electricity. Production of char-
coal peaked in 1940 at about 222,200 tons and declined thereafter to 55,000 
tons in 1953 and 37,700 in 1958. Production rose again to 55,300 in 1959 
and reached a peak between 1960 and 1965, averaging 168,200 tons. 
Charcoal declined to 99,800 short tons in 1966-69, and 72,500 tons in 
1970-76. Data after 1976 are not available. 
Table 8. 2 estimates the supply of domestic energy during 1959-87 by 
combining production data converted to a standard unit, thousand metric 
tons of oil equivalent. 5 For the entire period, bagasse provided nearly 80 
percent of domestically produced energy, with its contribution rising as 
high as 92 percent in 1959 and 88 percent in 1970. Also readily noticeable 
are the increased importance of oil and the decline in the contribution of 
ethanol and charcoal to domestic energy supply. In 1981-87, oil contrib-
uted about 17 percent of total domestic energy supply, compared with less 
than 6 percent in the first half of the 1970s and 8 percent in the second hal£ 
Because of the disproportionate importance of bagasse and wide year-
to-year fluctuations in bagasse production, no clear trends in the expansion 
of domestic energy supply can be discerned. During 1959-69, domestic 
energy supply was basically stagnant, hovering around 2.4 million MT of 
oil equivalent; excluding 1970, when bagasse output shot up as a result of a 
record-high sugar crop, domestic supply in the 1970s expanded modestly, at 
the rate of about 4 percent per annum. In 1981-87, domestic energy supply 
continued to expand, but underwent severe year-to-year changes; the steady 
increase in oil production was offset by fluctuations in bagasse availability. 
ENERGY IMPORTS 
Official Cuban data on imports of energy products for 1959 and 1962-86 are 
given in Table 8.3. (Data for 1960-61 are not available, as Cuban foreign 
Table 8.2. Cuba's domestic energy supply, 1959-1987 
(Thousand metric tons of oil or equivalent) 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Oil 28 25 28 43 31 37 57 69 113 198 206 159 120 112 
Natural gas - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 6 
Hydroelectricity 17 17 6 21 42 84 48 llO 91 68 63 63 74 62 
Ethanol 65 97 92 46 61 76 74 78 89 94 96 47 35 37 
Bagasse 2,000 2,124 2,428 1,642 1,410 1,660 2,267 1,642 2,267 1,892 1,821 3,570 2,303 1,946 
Fuelwood 32 71 239 180* 115 143 131 129 133 194 245 198 219 231 
Charcoal 35 ll9 84 109 116 103 105 78 71 62 41 30 41 48 
Totals 2,177 2,453 2,877 2,041 1,775 2,103 2,682 2,106 2,764 2,508 2,472 4,067 2,797 2,442 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Oil 138 168 226 235 256 288 288 274 259 541 742 770 868 938 895 
Natural gas 12 16 14 18 14 9 15 15 ll 9 7 3 6 5 20 
Hydroelectricity 52 74 52 44 61 69 87 81 50 36 52 59 45 50 37 
Ethanol 35* 35* 35 36 40 40 42 44 41 45 45 4.5 49 49 51 
Bagasse 2,124 2,213 2,267 2,321 2,500 3,000 3,260 2,750 2,960 3,280 3,067 3,498 2,980 3,046 2,987 
Fuelwood 249 231 230 278 318* 313 338 330 334 340 325 331 317 322 309 
Charcoal 48 50 55 48 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 48* 
Totals 2,658 2,787 2,879 2,980 3,237 3,767 4,078 3,542 3,703 4,299 4,286 4,754 4,313 4,458 4,347 
Sources: Oil, natural gas, hydroelectricity, ethanol, see Table 1. Bagasse: Estimated based on data on sugar cane milled from Cuba, Junta Central de 
Planificaci6n, Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes, and Comite Estatal de Estadfsticas, Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes. Fuelwood 
and charcoal: Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes. 
*Estimated. 
Table 8.3. Cuban energy imports, 1959 and 1962-1986 
(Thousand metric tons) 
1959 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Oil and oil 
products 3,152 4,483 4,088 4,598 4,597 5,058 5,107 5,226 5,675 6,030 6,834 6,691 7,161 
Crude oil 1,710 3,720 3,709 3,496 3,483 3,826 3,713 3,851 4,156 4,261 4,757 4,749 5,243 
Oil products 1,442 763 379 1,102 1,114 1,232 1,394 1,375 1,519 1,769 2,077 1,942 1,918 
Fuel oil 1,199 424 159 766 791 850 975 1,006 975 1,148 1,409 1,315 489 
Diesel fuel 17 106 11 186 181 251 312 272 447 483 488 545 1,303 
Gasoline 55 176 155 85 74 62 38 17 10 46 86 13 49 
Lubricants 171 57 54 65 68 69 69 80 87 92 94 69 77 
Coke, coal, 
and briquets 118 75 97 122 128 102 138 106 121 123 126 140 104 
Coal 58 47 69 90 91 64 72 58 69 65 51 52 45 
Coke 60 28 28 32 37 38 46 48 52 58 75 88 59 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Oil and oil 
products 7,786 7,768 8,240 9,245 9,611 9,564 10,203 10,753 11,386 12,107 12,240 13,270 12,891 
Crude oil 5,875 5,797 5,783 6,201 6,359 6,131 6,025 6,355 6,247 6,861 7,235 8,046 7,366 
Oil products 1,911 1,971 2,457 3,044 3,252 3,433 4,178 4,398 5,139 5,246 5,005 5,224 5,525 
Fuel oil 492 1,328 1,487 1,799 2,199 2,287 2,820 2,954 3,438 3,784 3,435 3,421 3,822 
Diesel fuel 1,252 481 802 997 751 848 952 1,135 1,298 1,091 1,231 1,311 1,227 
Gasoline 49 44 70 151 188 207 250 203 263 249 224 384 391 
Lubricants 118 118 98 97 114 91 156 106 140 122 115 108 85 
Coke, coal, 
and briquets 88 98 87 89 140 99 136 134 168 131 140 154 145 
Coal 46 57 42 42 60 53 83 75 108 75 85 90 83 
Coke 42 41 45 47 49 46 53 59 60 56 55 64 62 
Sources: 1959, 1962: Calculated from Junta Central de Planificaci6n, Direcci6n de Estadistica, Comercio Exterior de Cuba, volumes for 1959 and 1962. 
1963-1986: Junta Central de Planificaci6n, Boletin Estadistico de Cuba, various volumes, and Comite Estatal de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico de Cuba, 
various volumes. 
160 JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ 
trade statistics for those two years have not been published. For 1987, data 
on imports of oil products are not yet available.) 
Cuban imports of oil and oil products rose by 78 percent between 1959 
and 1969 (from 3.2 million to 5. 7 million MT), averaging about 4.5 million 
MT per year. From 1969 to 1979, imports rose by nearly 69 percent, to 9.6 
million MT. 
In the 1980s, imports of oil and oil products continued to increase, 
peaking at 13.3 million MT in 1985 and declining in 1986 to 12.9 million 
MT. A portion of the liquid fuels imported by Cuba-perhaps as much as 3 
million tons in some years-was reexported to Western countries to obtain 
hard currencies. Imports of coal, coke, and briquets were essentially 
stagnant during the entire period 1959-80, averaging around 100,000 MT 
per year. In the 1980s, imports of these products averaged about 140,000 
MT annually. 
In Table 4, we have attempted to compare the contribution of imports to 
total apparent supply of liquid fuels (crude petroleum and petroleum 
products). Since the Soviet Union has been, for all practical purposes, 
Cuba's exclusive supplier ofliquid fuels since mid-1960, we have estimated 
Cuban imports of oil and oil products in 1960 and 1961 on the basis of Soviet 
export data. 5 
In the early 1970s, Cuba began to sell oil products, refined in Cuba from 
imported Soviet crude, in Western Europe for hard currency. 7 Initially, 
only small volumes of refined products, such as naphtha, were involved. 
By the 1980s, the volume of reexports had grown to such an extent that 
during the period 1983-85, reexports of oil products were Cuba's most 
important hard-currency export, accounting for over 40 percent of such 
earnings. Over this three-year period, sugar exports-traditionally the 
main source of export revenue-contributed 21 percent of hard currency 
earnings and all other exports about 39 percent. 
Except for naphtha exports, Cuba does not publish statistics on the 
volume of liquid fuel reexports. However, using as a very rough approx-
imation the average export price of Cuban shipments to Western Europe, 
estimates of the volume of non-naphtha oil exports can be made. Those 
estimates, given in Table 4, suggest that Cuba exported about 720,000 MT 
of oil and oil products in 1980-81, nearly 1. 4 million MT in 1982, 2. 9 million 
MT in 1983, over 2. 7 million MT in 1984, nearly 3.4 million MT in 1985, 
and 2. 4 million MT in 1986. These estimates are in line with a reference in 
the Cuban literature that in 1984, about 23 percent of total oil imports were 
reexported.B (Since 1984 oil and oil product imports were 12.24 million 
tons [table 8.3], a 23 percent share of reexports translates into an export 
volume of 2.8 million tons). 
Imported products have an overwhelming importance in the apparent 
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Table 8.4. Cuba's apparent supply of oil and oil products, 1959-1986 
(Thousand metric tons) 
Domestic 
production 
Domestic Apparent as percentage 
production Imports Exports supply of supply 
1959 28 3152 3180 0.9% 
1960 25 4000 4025 0.6 
1961 28 4000 4028 0.7 
1962 43 4483 4526 1.0 
1963 31 4088 4119 0.8 
1964 37 4598 4635 0.8 
1965 57 4597 4654 1.2 
1966 69 5058 5127 1.3 
1967 113 5107 5220 2.2 
1968 198 5226 5454 3.6 
1969 206 5675 5881 3.5 
1970 159 6030 6189 2.6 
1971 120 6834 6954 1.7 
1972 112 6691 9 6794 1.6 
1973 138 7161 25 7274 1.9 
1974 168 7786 75 7879 2.1 
1975 226 7768 36 7958 2.8 
1976 235 8240 49 8426 2.8 
1977 256 9245 268 9233 2.8 
1978 288 9611 274 9625 3.0 
1979 288 9564 241 9672 3.0 
1980 273 10203 722 9754 3.0 
1981 259 10753 719 10293 2.5 
1982 541 11386 1383 10544 5.1 
1983 742 12107 2921 9928 7.5 
1984 770 12240 2754 10265 7.5 
1985 868 13270 3388 10750 8.1 
1986 938 12891 2432 11397 8.2 
Sources: Domestic production-table 1. Imports-table 3. Exports-Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, 
"Cuban Oil Reexports: Significance and Prospects," Energy JournalS, no. 1 (1987): p. 4, (updated 
by the author). 
supply ofliquid fuels (domestic production plus imports less exports). For 
the first half of the 1960s, domestic production of crude oil accounted for 
less than 1 percent of the apparent supply ofliquid fuels (table 8.4). In the 
second half of the 1960s, the domestic share rose to 2.4 percent, peaking at 
about 3.6 percent in 1968-69. Mter falling below 2 percent in 1971-73, the 
domestic share rose to nearly 3 percent in 1975-80. In 1982, domestically 
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Table 8.5. Cuban energy supply, 1959-1986 
(Thousand metric tons of oil or equivalent) 
Domestic 
production 
Domestic Net Apparent as percentage 
production imports supply of supply 
1959 2,177 3,232 5,409 40.2% 
1960 2,453 4,070 6,523 37.6 
1961 2,877 4,070 6,947 41.4 
1962 2,041 4,535 6,576 31.0 
1963 1,775 4,156 5,931 29.9 
1964 2,103 4,684 6,787 31.0 
1965 2,682 4,687 7,369 36.4 
1966 2,106 5,129 7,235 29.1 
1967 2,764 5,203 7,968 34.7 
1968 2,508 5,340 7,848 32.0 
1969 2,472 5,759 8,231 30.0 
1970 4,067 6,116 10,183 39.9 
1971 2,797 6,922 9,719 28.8 
1972 2,442 6,780 9,222 26.5 
1973 2,658 7,209 9,867 26.9 
1974 2,787 7,773 10,560 26.4 
1975 2,879 7,831 10,680 27.0 
1976 2,980 8,252 11,232 26.5 
1977 3,237 9,039 12,276 26.4 
1978 3,767 9,435 13,202 28.5 
1979 4,078 9,392 13,470 30.3 
1980 3,542 9,576 13,118 27.0 
1981 3,703 10,128 13,831 26.8 
1982 4,299 10,121 14,420 29.8 
1983 4,286 9,278 13,564 31.6 
1984 4,754 9,593 14,347 33.1 
1985 4,313 9,990 14,303 30.2 
1986 4,458 10,561 15,019 29.7 
Sources: Domestic production-table 8.2; imports-table 3. 
produced oil accounted for 5.1 percent of apparent supply, of liquid fuels; 
during 1983-84, the share of apparent supply accounted for by domestic 
production was 7.5 percent and slightly over 8.0 percent in 1985-86. 
Table 8.5 combines data on domestic energy production and imports to 
estimate that Cuban apparent energy supply expanded by 178 percent 
between 1959 and 1986, reaching a level of approximately 15 million MT of 
oil equivalent in 1986. The expansion pattern was not steady, however, 
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showing both rapid growth spurts and periods of supply stagnation or even 
decline. 
Examination of the data in table 8.5 suggests that during the revolution-
ary period, the dependence of the Cuban economy on imported energy 
increased markedly. While domestic energy production accounted for 
almost 40 percent of total supply in 1959-61, it represented less than 32 
percent in 1962-69 and further deteriorated to an average of about 27 
percent in 1971-81. (In these calculations, 1970 has been excluded since it 
was an abnormal year in terms of sugar output and, therefore, of bagasse 
production.) In what may be a significant positive development for the 
Cuban economy, domestic energy production during 1982-86 exceeded 30 
percent of apparent supply. 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
In comparison with production and import statistics, Cuba's energy con-
sumption statistics are scarcer and weaker. Time series data on total energy 
consumption, on consumption by sectors, or on consumption by industry 
are not available. The only official data published regularly refer to the 
contribution of different energy sources to energy consumption. 
Taken together, biomass, ethanol, and oil products fulfill the bulk of 
Cuba's energy needs. Although there have been small year-to-year fluctua-
tions, their combined share has remained remarkably constant at over 90 
percent. The predominance of these energy sources is confirmed by the 
following data on the contribution of different sources to energy consump-
tion published some time ago in a popular periodical:9 crude oil, 38 
percent; oil products, 27 percent; bagasse, 23 percent; others, 12 percent. 
Data on energy consumption by economic sectors are very scanty. The 
same popular periodical mentioned above reports the following percen-
tage composition of energy consumption:IO industry, 59 percent; con-
struction, 4 percent; transportation, 15 percent; agriculture, 7 percent; 
community and personal services, 23 percent; others 4 percent. 
Within the industrial sector, the sugar and electricity industries are the 
largest consumers of primary energy. The sugar industry uses essentially 
all bagasse production as well as significant amounts of fuelwood, oil 
products (fuel oil), and electricity. 
Between 1958 and 1985, Cuban electric generating capacity expanded 
over eightfold, from 297 Mw to 2,608.8 Mw.n With the exception of the 
Hanabanilla hydroelectric plant (with generating capacity of 45 Mw, or 1. 7 
percent of total electric generating capacity) all Cuban electricity generat-
ing plants were thermoelectric, fueled primarily with oil products. (Plants 
in some sugar mills may be fueled with bagasse during the milling period.) 
164 JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ 
It has been estimated that in the 1970s, electricity generation used from 
one-fourth to one-fifth of the total oil and oil products consumed.I2 
Relying on official statistics on gross electricity generation and oil 
consumption per kwh generated, it can be estimated that in 1984, elec-
tricity generation consumed nearly 3 million MT, or 30 percent of total 
consumption, of oil and oil products.l3 Over time, there has been a steady 
increase in the share of electricity consumed by the industrial sector, 
which amounted to 44 percent of total electricity produced in 1985, with 
residential consumption accounting for about 31 percent and commercial 
activities for about 21 percent. 
NucLEAR PowER 
By the end of the century, Cuba plans to generate more than a quarter of its 
energy from nuclear power,l4 a commitment that could have a significant 
impact on the energy balance beginning in the 1990s. 
As conceived in the early 1970s, the Cuban nuclear power program 
foresaw construction of the first nuclear power plant on the shore of the 
Arimao River, several miles northeast of the city of Cienfuegos; con-
struction was to begin in 1977-78 and the plant would be operational by 
1985.15 Hardware and technical assistance, as well as financial assistance, 
would be provided by the Soviet Union and other member-nations of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In early 1978, a new 
location for the plant was announced, presumably because geological 
problems were uncovered at the first site. The new location is approx-
imately ten miles southwest of Cienfuegos, in the vicinity of the town of 
Juragua. A second plant has been slated for the northern part of Holguin 
providence in eastern Cuba, but there is no information on its exact 
location. Holguin and Cienfuegos are areas in which extensive industrial 
investments are planned for the next few years and electricity demand is 
expected to rise significantly. The province of Holguin, in particular, is the 
setting for the Cuban nickel industry (Nicaro, Moa, Punta Gorda), a heavy 
user of electricity. A third plant is to be built in the western part of the 
island, at a location not yet disclosed. 
The reactors for the Juragua nuclear power plant are standard Soviet 
export 440-MW pressurized water reactors. The prototype was built in 
Novovoronezh, and the model has been exported by the Soviet Union to 
Eastern European CMEA countries and to Finland. Information on the 
type or size of reactors envisaged for the Holguin plant has not been 
published but, given the total generating capacity of the Cuban electrical 
grid, it is unlikely that a reactor larger than 440 MW would be feasible. As 
are all pressurized water reactors, those to be built in Cuba will be fueled 
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with slightly enriched uranium (3 to 4 percent U-235), to be provided by 
the Soviet Union. 
Available information indicates that infrastructure and support facilities 
for the Juragua plant-including roads, port facilities, housing for pros-
pective employees and Soviet technicians, and a secondary school-have 
either been completed or are close to completion. Construction of the 
structure to house the first reactor and associated hardware began in 1983, 
and the second reactor in 1985.16 In February 1986, it was reported that the 
plant's first reactor will become operational in 1990,17 with the subsequent 
reactors at the site-up to fOur-to be completed at two-year intervals.18 
Considering that over 90 percent of Cuba's oil and oil products needs 
are met through imports, there is significant incentive for Cuba to diver-
sify its energy sources and to reduce dependence on oil products for 
electricity generation. The incentive to reduce petroleum consumption 
has become more acute in the 1980s, as Cuba has worked out an arrange-
ment with the Soviet Union whereby it can reexport, for hard currency, 
Soviet oil and oil products it has imported but not consumed. President 
Castro has stated that each 440-MW nuclear reactor will displace 600,000 
MT of oil products per year,19 about one-fifth of the estimated 3 million 
MT of oil products consumed each year in electricity generation. A Cuban 
source has reported that the annual "savings" of 2. 4 million MT of fuel oil 
associated with the Juragua plant (four reactors) are equivalent to 70 
percent of fuel oil consumption in electricity generation, implying a 
consumption of 3. 4 million MT of fuel oil per year in electricity genera-
tion.2o 
ENERGY AND SECURITY 
Cuba's heavy dependence on imported energy products is hardly a sur-
prising finding and by itself is devoid of much significance. The real 
question is whether or not Cuba is vulnerable to disruptions in the flow of 
energy products. Cuba's reliance on the Soviet Union for virtually all of its 
energy imports affects Cuba's security and ability to conduct an indepen-
dent foreign policy. To what extent is Cuba vulnerable to disruptions in 
energy supplies? 
Cuban energy suppliers. Prior to the revolutionary takeover of 1959, 
Cuban imports of oil products originated exclusively from the West. The 
United States was the main supplier of crude oil, diesel fuel, gasoline, and 
lubricants, and along with Aruba and Curacao, it provided the bulk of the 
fuel oil imported. The United States and Western Europe provided essen-
tially all imported coal and coke. 
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These import patterns were upset in 1960. On February 13, 1960, the 
Cuban revolutionary government and the Soviet Union concluded a com-
mercial and payments agreement that provided for the barter of Soviet 
goods, including oil and oil products, for Cuban sugar and other goods. As 
oil shipments from the Soviet Union began to arrive in April1960, interna-
tional oil companies operating refineries in Cuba (Esso, Texaco, and Royal 
Dutch Shell) continued their normal purchases of crude from their affili-
ates-the makings of an oil glut. On May 17, 1960, the Cuban National 
Bank informed the foreign oil companies that each would have to purchase 
and process 300,000 MT of Soviet crude during 1960. This move was 
ostensibly taken to help Cuba's dwindling dollar reserves, since the Soviet 
crude was obtained through barter and did not require payment in con-
vertible currency. The oil companies balked and the government retaliated 
on June 29, 1960 by seizing the refineries. From then on, Cuba-U.S. 
economic and political relations deteriorated rapidly, with the Soviet 
Union and its allies taking over in supplying Cuba with oil, oil products, 
and coal. 
For the period 1962-86 (as noted earlier, imports data for 1960-61 have 
not been published; nor are origin-of-imports data available for 1965-66), 
the Soviet Union provided well over 99 percent of Cuba's imports ofliquid 
fuels. (In 1978, the Soviet Union's share was 96.8 percent; unfortunately, 
Cuba's import statistics do not specify the source of the non-Soviet imports 
in 1978.) 
A portion of the imports reported as originating from the Soviet Union 
in fact may have been imported from Venezuela under a swap agreement, 
signed in November 1976, that resulted in savings on transportation costs. 
Under the agreement, Venezuela ships up to 20,000 barrels per day (bpd) 
of crude to Cuba to replace Soviet crude; in return the Soviet Union 
supplies a matching amount of crude to Spain, Venezuela's traditional 
customer.21 In 1977, the swap amount was limited to 5,000 bpd; it rose to 
10,000 bpd in 1978-80 and reached the full 20,000 bpd by 1984.22 Appar-
ently the Soviet Union requested an increase in the volume of petroleum 
in the swap but Venezuela did not accede.23 However, in mid-1985 it was 
reported that Venezuela had agreed to double the volume of the swap with 
the Soviet Union to 40,000 bpd.24 Reports of a similar (triangular) sales 
agreement involving Mexico, Cuba, and the Soviet Union have circulated 
in the oil trade press since 1978, but the existence of such a deal has not 
been confirmed. 25 
Although Cuban statistics are less clear on this point, it appears that 
since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has been the source of most Cuban 
coke and coal imports. During 1962-64, the only years for which coke and 
coal import statistics by country of origin are available, the Soviet Union 
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provided less than 40 percent by weight of total imports; Albania and 
North Vietnam supplied anthracite, and Poland bituminous coal and coke. 
Beginning in 1967, the volume of Soviet exports of these products to Cuba 
(as reported in Soviet foreign trade handbooks) coincides very closely with 
Cuban imports.26 Official Polish trade data last record bituminous coal 
shipments to Cuba in 1965 and coke shipments in 196727 
Adoption of nuclear power for electricity generation will reduce the 
importance ofliquid fuels in the energy balance. However, since Cuba has 
no known deposits of fissionable materials and no facilities to enrich 
uranium, the country will have to rely on imported enriched uranium from 
the Soviet Union. In other words, while adoption of nuclear power for 
electricity generation will broaden the energy base, the vulnerability to 
external supply manipulation will prevail. 
Energy and foreign policy. There is evidence that in 1967-68 the Soviet 
Union used the "oil weapon" to force changes in Cuban foreign policy.28 
Beginning in 1965, differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union re-
garding the correct revolutionary strategy vis-a-vis Latin America inten-
sified. While Cuba favored armed struggle and support of guerrilla 
movements to gain influence, the Soviet Union was the proponent of a 
more traditional strategy of normalizing diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions with Latin American governments. At the first conference of the 
Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), hosted by Cuba in July-
August 1967, Castro attacked Soviet support of established governments 
and challenged Soviet revolutionary commitments.29 
Meanwhile, negotiations between Cuba and the Soviet Union on a 
trade protocol for 1968, which should have been concluded in the fall of 
1967, dragged on. Reportedly, Soviet oil shipments in the fall and winter of 
1967 became irregular and began to have an adverse effect on the economy. 
On January 2, 1968, Castro spoke publicly about the fuel shortages and 
imposed a strict rationing system. In his speech, Castro noted that the 
Soviet Union had made a "considerable effort" to provide Cuba with fuel 
but "by all indications the current possibilities of that nation to meet 
Cuba's growing needs are limited."3o At the same time that oil deliveries 
to Cuba slowed down, the Soviet press announced that production of oil 
and oil products "was so high that the Soviet Union would increase exports 
of these products to Latin America, including Brazil and Chile, two nations 
with which Cuba had bitter disputes."31 
Through the spring ofl968, the two sides hardened their positions, with 
the Soviet Union replacing its ambassador to Cuba and Castro denouncing 
a pro-Soviet "microfaction" of members of the Cuban Communist party 
and ordering their expulsion. Energy conservation and the need to do 
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more with fewer resources to save the revolution became the rallying point 
of the Cuban leadership. The Cuban-Soviet trade protocol, finally signed 
in late March 1968, provided for a modest increase in trade but no 
immediate relief to the oil shortages. On August 23, 1968, however, Castro 
supported publicly the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and entered 
into a new accommodation with the Soviets. From here on, Cuban foreign 
and domestic policies have been in remarkable agreement with those of 
the Soviet Union, and Soviet fuel exports to Cuba have flowed uninterrup-
tedly. 
Nuclear nonproliferation. An argument could be made that the only major 
foreign policy issue on which Cuban and Soviet views do not mirror each 
other is nuclear nonproliferation. Cuba has adamantly refused to adhere to 
either the Treaty ofTlatelolco or the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, 
Cuba is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
has signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering the Juragua 
plant. 
Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the heads of state 
of five Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and 
Mexico) called for hemispheric consultations to create a nuclear weap-
ons-free zone in Latin America. After prolonged negotiations, such an 
agreement went into effect in 1969, when the requisite number of nations 
had ratified it. The agreement has not reached hemispheric coverage, 
however, since some eligible nations (Cuba, Guyana, St. Lucia, Dominica, 
and Belize) have not yet signed and one nation (Argentina) has not ratified. 
All of the nuclear weapons states have signed protocol II, binding them not 
to deploy nuclear weapons in Latin America. 
In August 1965, the Cuban government stated that it would not partici-
pate in the negotiations of an agreement to denuclearize Latin America 
because the United States deploys nuclear weapons and maintains military 
bases in the area. This position was further explained in a formal response 
to the president of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization 
of Latin America, in which Cuba set forth three conditions for participation 
in the negotiation of such an agreement. Cuba demanded that the United 
States: (1) remove its military base in Cuban territory at Guantanamo; 
(2) dismantle military bases in Latin America and stop deploying nuclear 
weapons in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal; and 
(3) discontinue its aggressive policies toward Cuba. Despite numerous 
efforts by the secretary general of the Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to engage Cuba in mean-
ingful discussion, the latter has steadfastly maintained these conditions. 
In 1978, the Soviet Union reversed a decade of opposition to the 
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Tlatelolco treaty and announced that it would sign protocol II (open to 
signature by nuclear weapons states). This decision was significant since 
the Soviet refusal to sign the agreement had appeared to be motivated by 
solidarity with the Cuban position. There was speculation that as a result of 
the close relationship between former Mexican President Lopez Portillo 
and Castro (Mexico is the prime force behind the Latin American nuclear-
free zone movement), Cuba might be persuaded to adhere to the 
Tlatelolco treaty, but so far its position is unchanged. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty. In early 1968, the U.N. General Assembly 
opened discussion on a multilateral agreement to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons. According to the instrument that resulted-the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)-have-not states 
agreed not to develop nuclear weapons in return for a commitment from 
nuclear weapons states to transfer, without discrimination, nuclear tech-
nologies for peaceful purposes. All states without nuclear weapons agreed 
to place their nuclear installations under a system of safeguards admin-
istered by the IAEA and to permit IAEA to inspect nuclear facilities. 
During the U.N. debate of the NPT, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa 
stated that "Cuba would never give up its inalienable right to defend itself 
using weapons of any kind, despite any international agreement."32 This 
view, which reflected in part Cuba's hostility toward the United States, 
was consistent with the earlier Cuban rejection of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty ofl963 and the Outer Space Treaty ofl967 and was also a slap at the 
Soviets, who, with the United States, were the cosponsors of the NPT. 
Cuba's rejection of the NPT, which is grounded on the same reasons as the 
Tlatelolco treaty, remains unchanged; Cuba's views were restated by Vice 
President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez at the May 1978 U.N. General Assem-
bly Special Session on Disarmament. 33 
More recently, Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart, executive secretary of the 
Cuban Atomic Energy Commission, summarized Cuba's rationale for not 
signing the NPT or the Treaty ofTlatelolco: "As is well known, Cuba has 
abstained from entering into these international agreements-without 
questioning their importance-because of issues of principle: the perma-
nent hostility, threats, blockade, and aggressions suffered during the last 
twenty-six years from the only nuclear-weapon state in the hemisphere, 
the United States, who also illegally usurps, against our will, a part of our 
territory. It is clear that as long as these circumstances remain, it would not 
be either dignified or acceptable for our nation to make unilateral con-
cessions. "34 
The chief objective of the IAEA international safeguards system is to 
ensure that nuclear equipment and fissionable materials earmarked for 
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peaceful purposes are not diverted for military purposes. This end is 
accomplished through an early detection system that relies heavily on 
review of records maintained by nuclear reactor operators and periodic on-
site verification of records by IAEA officials. Signatories to the NPT must 
place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; nonsignatories 
may voluntarily enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA as well. 
On May 5, 1980, Cuba and the IAEA entered into an agreement to 
safeguard the Soviet nuclear plant to be built in Juragua and its fissionable 
materials. According to Section 2 of the agreement, "the Government of 
Cuba undertakes that none of the [hardware and fissionable materials 
transferred for the power plant] ... shall be used for the manufacture of 
any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose or for the 
manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device."35 Like all standard 
safeguards agreements, the Cuba-IAEA pact also provides for an inventory 
of nuclear hardware and fissionable materials and their movements into or 
out of Cuban territory, with inspections by IAEA officials. 
Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been a strong supporter and practi-
tioner of nuclear nonproliferation; it was a moving force behind the NPT, 
has openly encouraged its adoption by other nations, and has signed 
Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. As a member of the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Club, or London Club, the Soviet Union has entered into a 
cartel with fourteen Western and Eastern nations to regulate the sale of 
nuclear hardware and fissionable materials. In exports to CMEA countries 
and to Finland, the Soviet Union maintains control over fissionable mate-
rials and states that it intends to retrieve the irradiated fuel for reprocess-
ing. This arrangement is described by a Soviet official as follows: "Nuclear 
power development in the CMEA member countries .... [has] led to an 
arrangement whereby the U.S.S.R. carries out isotopic enrichment in 
uranium-235, fabricates and supplies to CMEA countries "fresh" fuel for 
their nuclear power plants and takes back the spent fuel for reprocessing. 
All this creates favorable conditions for compliance with the provisions and 
requirements of the NPT." 36 Further, Soviet export reactors are the type 
from which it is extremely difficult to divert fissionable fuel. 37 
In effect, the sale of nuclear technology and materials to Cuba repre-
sents an important departure in Soviet nuclear export policy. The Soviet 
Union previously has insisted that recipients of nuclear hardware and 
fissionable materials sign and ratify the NPT. Finland and all the Eastern 
European CMEA countries are signatories, as are Libya and Iraq, two 
countries often mentioned in connection with Soviet exports of nuclear 
hardware. It is unclear how heavily the Soviet Union has pressured Cuba 
to sign the NPT. On the one hand, given Cuba's strong, overt opposition to 
the NPT, coercion to sign the agreement would harm Cuba's international 
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image, providing further evidence that Cuba does not have a foreign policy 
independent of Moscow. On the other hand, Cuba's rejection of the NPT 
does not fit with the Soviet Union's nonproliferation record. The Soviet 
Union appears to have opted for a compromise: permit Cuba to remain 
outside the NPT but make sales contingent on Cuba's conclusion ofiAEA 
safeguards agreements, and extend to Cuba the policy whereby the irradi-
ated fuel is eventually returned to the Soviet Union for reprocessing. 
Nuclear safety. A final security-related concern is the possibility of nuclear 
accidents. The safety issue is important since an accident at the nuclear 
power plant being built at Juragua could affect not only the Cuban territory 
but other neighboring states as well. 
The Aprill986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the 
Soviet Union dramatically illustrated the level of destruction possible at a 
commercial nuclear power facility. Chernobyl also highlighted the dif-
ferences in approach to nuclear safety in the West and in the Soviet Union. 
In the West, the cornerstone of nuclear reactor safety is to build redundant 
systems to counteract a wide range of possibilities. The Soviet approach is 
to take the greatest care in the design and construction of plant and 
equipment ("engineered safeguards") and to minimize redundant systems 
by limiting them to "credible" (all but low-probability) events. 
It is clear that the Number 4 reactor at Chernobyl, the unit involved in 
the Aprill986 accident, lacked the pressure-tight containment structure 
common for nuclear power plants in the West. Had this reactor been so 
equipped, the containment structure might have confined much-per-
haps most-of the radioactive materials that were spewed into the at-
mosphere. During the most serious nuclear accident in the United States, 
the 1979 malfunction at Three Mile Island, a prestressed concrete con-
tainment structure played a crucial role in preventing the escape of radioactive 
material, although the enormous amount of energy released at Chernobyl 
might well have breached even the strongest containment structure. 
There is no definitive information on whether the nuclear plants to be 
built in Cuba will be equipped with three common safety features in 
Western-built plants: containment structures, emergency cooling sys-
tems, and up-to-date instrumentation. Until a few years ago, Soviet-
supplied nuclear power plants lacked the secondary containment shells 
routinely built around Western-supplied plants. In accord with the Soviet 
view of the impossibility of loss-of-coolant accidents and core meltdowns, 
Soviet reactors also lacked redundant systems favored in the West for 
cooling down reactors in case of accidental overheating. Finally, there have 
been reports that the control rooms of Soviet power plants are equipped 
with instruments and computers obsolete by Western standards. 
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The No. 5 reactor at Novovoronezh in the Soviet Union, a 1,000-MW 
pressurized water reactor that began operations in early 1981, was con-
structed with a containment structure. Some American observers sug-
gested that the containment unit at the Novovoronezh site was related to 
the large size of the reactor and was not necessarily indicative of a shift in 
Soviet philosophy. Other observers suggested that the motivation behind 
the containment structure was the Soviet intention to gain a larger share of 
the nuclear export market outside CMEA. Indeed, a high-ranking Soviet 
nuclear safety expert is reported to have said in 1978 that "The fifth unit at 
Novovoronezh will have a containment structure as an experiment. But it 
is a vain expenditure of money." 38 However, there is evidence that at least 
some of the Soviet VVER-440 reactors currently under construction in 
Eastern Europe will be equipped with some sort of containment struc-
ture, although the exact specifications are not known.39 
Scattered information suggests that, like these VVER-440s, the Juragua 
reactors in Cuba will be built with containment structures. References to 
safety features of the plant by the Cuban government officials are vague, 40 
and do not permit a conclusive determination as to whether the con-
tainment will meet Western standards. It is clear, however, that some sort 
of massive structure is being built around the reactors. I( as suggested, the 
Cuban reactors will have containment, it is puzzling that the Cuban 
government has not chosen to make that clearly known to its citizens and 
those in neighboring states. Nor is there solid information available on 
whether emergency cooling systems or modern instrumentation will be 
part of the Juragua plant. 
The destruction from a nuclear accident of Juragua would depend, of 
course on the severity of the accident, the extent of the radioactive 
leakage, and wind direction and speed. Most likely to be affected is the 
city ofCienfuegos (population over 100,000), approximately ten to fifteen 
miles from the site. Beyond that possibility, the Juragua plant lies within 
150 miles of twenty-nine of the forty-seven urban centers with more than 
20,000 inhabitants in 1985, including Havana as well as provincial capitals 
Santa Clara, Matanzas and Camaguey.41 In a major accident, the U.S. 
mainland42 and other Caribbean nations could also be at risk. 
The Chernobyl accident raised U.S. consciousness of the implications 
of a nuclear accident in Cuba. Immediately after the Soviet Union officially 
announced that an accident had taken place at Chernobyl, members of the 
U.S. Congress from Florida tried to learn more about the safety of the 
Juragua plant. The approaches ranged from letters to the Organization of 
American States to seek its involvement on behalf of the highest safety 
standards, to appeals to President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary 
Gorbachev for immediate halt to the construction at Juragua, to requests 
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to Cuban President Fidel Castro for assurances about the safety of the 
plant. President Castro chose in June 1986 to respond directly to one U.S. 
congressman discussing the features of the plant. 43 Later, at a national 
address on July 26, 1986, President Castro spoke about the safety of the 
nuclear reactors being built in Cuba: "[The Juragua plant] is of Soviet 
technology, built with painstaking quality and with the highest safety 
indexes, so that we can affirm that that nuclear power plant will be safer 
than any nuclear power plant built in the United States, and with a proven 
technology at the international level." 44 
Since July 1986, the United States and the Soviet Union have been 
holding discussions on the safety of the J uragua plant. 45 After a meeting in 
September 1986, U.S. Secretary of Energy Herrington stated that Soviet 
authorities had agreed to supply the United states with technical data on 
the reactors being built at Juragua. 46 There have been no public reports on 
the status of the information exchange agreement. 
ENERGY AND THE EcoNOMY 
In September 1974, at a time when Western developed and oil-importing 
developing countries alike were struggling with the adjustment problems 
caused by a four-fold increase in the world price of oil, Castro boasted that 
Cuba "with the generous help of the Soviet Union, has not known the 
energy crisis." 47 Castro was correct in his assertion; however, in retro-
spect, it would have been more accurate to say that Cuba had not yet 
experienced the energy crisis. It could be argued that because of sub-
sidized Soviet oil, the Cuban economy has been slow to adjust to the 
realities ofhigh-priced energy. Uncertainties about the willingness and/or 
ability of the Soviet Union to continue to supply fuel at concessional terms 
over the long run present a serious challenge for the Cuban economy. 
Pricing in socialist foreign trade. Socialist countries that are members of 
the CMEA follow different pricing practices in trading with Western 
nations and with other socialist nations. In dealing with Western coun-
tries, as a rule they accept and adjust to world market prices. In intra-
CMEA trade, however, external prices are generally based on average 
world market prices for an extended earlier time period, typically five 
years. These average prices may be adjusted by mutual consent to account 
for such factors as quality differences and differentials in transportation 
costs. The official rationale for the use of such averages to determine intra-
CMEA prices is the desire to delete from the pricing system the capitalist 
influences of speculation, business cycles, and monopoly. 
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Intra-CMEA oil pricing. When OPEC nations increased oil prices in 
1973-7 4, Cuba and the rest of the CMEA nations did not feel the impact at 
once since they received the bulk of their supplies from the Soviet Union, 
presumably at prices fixed for the entire period 1971-75. In his first major 
speech after the 1973 oil embargo, Castro alluded to the rise in oil prices in 
the world market but did not indicate concern about their impact on the 
Cuban economy. 48 On December 21, 1973, the Cuban official newspaper 
Granrna carried a report from the Soviet news agency Tass in which the 
Soviet vice-minister for foreign trade was quoted as saying: "The Soviet 
Union will fulfill completely its commitments with the Socialist countries 
regarding deliveries of crude oil and oil products and it will not increase 
prices despite the sharp rise of prices in the world market." 49 
However, the Soviets called a special meeting of the CMEA Executive 
Committee in January 1975 to review the methodology for pricing raw 
materials, including oil. The result of the meeting was the adoption, at the 
Soviet Union's insistence, of a new pricing policy whereby intra-CMEA 
petroleum prices would be adjusted annually rather than only during the 
first year of each five-year period, as had been customary. For 1975, the 
intra-CMEA price was set on the basis of world market prices during the 
three-year period 1972-7 4; thereafter, prices would be adjusted to reflect 
world prices in the previous five-year period. These modifications of intra-
CMEA pricing rules, which were made retroactive to January 1, 1975, 
appear to have caught most CMEA members by surprise. Oil price 
adjustments had been expected for 1976-80, but not for 1975, the last year 
of the 1971-75 plan period. 
It should be stressed, however, that even with the change in pricing 
policy, the intra-CMEA petroleum price in 1975 was much lower than the 
world market price. According to estimates, Cuba paid approximately 
$5.82 per barrel for Soviet crude and products in 1975, compared with a 
prevailing world market price for crude of approximately $11.53 per bar-
rel. 50 Similarly, in 1980, the year of the second oil price shock, Cuba paid 
approximately $15.30 per barrel for Soviet oil-roughly half the world 
market price of around $30 per barrel.5I In 1981 and 1982, the Cuban 
import price for Soviet oil continued to increase (to about $21 per barrel) 
but remained substantially below the world market price of about $33 per 
barrel in 1982. After that, however, world market prices plummeted by 
more than 50 percent, to about $15 per barrel in early 1986. It appears that 
the price advantage for oil purchases from the Soviet Union disappeared 
by 1983 and that, at least during 1984-86, Cuba paid a higher price for 
Soviet oil ($28. 50 per barrel in 1985 and $31.90 per barrel in 1986) than the 
world market price. However, since Cuba obtained oil from the Soviet 
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Union through barter-without having to use hard currencies-it could 
benefit from reexporting part of the Soviet oil for hard currency. 
The effect of the intra-CMEA moving average pricing formula for oil 
effective since 1975 is to pass through changes in world market prices, but 
with a lag. The delayed impact shows up in data on the value of energy 
imports relative to total imports. Despite the 1973-74 OPEC oil price 
increases, Cuban imports of energy products (primarily oil and oil prod-
ucts) in1974 represented a lower percentage of the value of total merchan-
dise imports than in 1973 (9.0 percent versus ll.1 percent), approximating 
the share they had held in 1963-71. While energy products, share of total 
imports began to rise in 1975, the increase was quite gradual, except for a 
significant jump in 1978. Nonetheless, energy imports accounted for 
nearly 23 percent of the value of total imports by 1981 and for over 33 
percent by 1986. In 1986, energy was the single most important category of 
imports, surpassing capital goods. (It should be recalled, however, that 
some of these imports-as much as one-fifth-are in fact reexported and 
have become one of the key sources of hard currency earnings.) 
Cuba's imports of oil and oil products, though small relative to Soviet 
exports to CMEA countries, have been rising steadily. From 1962 through 
1965, the Soviet Union provided Cuba with an average of 4.4 million MT of 
crude and petroleum products per year. From 1966 through 1970, the 
yearly average was 5.4 million MT per year; from 1971 through 1975, 7.2 
million MT; and from 1976 through 1980, 9.5 million MT; and during 
1981-86, over 12 million MT. In the 1980s, Cuba took an estimated 6.5 
percent of total Soviet petroleum exports and more than 13 percent of 
Soviet exports to CMEA.52 
After the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union began to encourage CMEA 
members to diversify sources of oil supplies and to import from Middle 
Eastern and African suppliers.53 In the early 1970s, increased domestic 
and export demand for Soviet oil, together with a slower rate of production 
increases, raised questions among some analysts as to whether or not the 
Soviet Union could satisfy its own and CMEA's future oil demands.54 A 
controversial CIA study released in early 1977 predicted that the Soviet 
Union would become a net oil importer by 1985.55 While it is generally 
acknowledged that the CIA forecast was too pessimistic, there is wide 
agreement among experts that the rate of increase in Soviet production has 
slowed considerably. The evidence is quite convincing that the Soviets are 
having to invest ever larger amounts of capital for shrinking marginal 
returns in oil production. 56 
In any case, there is a question as to whether the Soviet Union will 
continue to supply petroleum to CMEA in soft currencies. Clearly, the 
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Soviet Union could obtain much-needed convertible currencies if it sold 
oil in the world market rather than to its allies. 
After taking a hard-line stance at the thirty-fourth CMEA session in 
June 1980, the Soviet Union in the end agreed to increase energy deliv-
eries to CMEA in 1981-85 by 20 percent over the volume received in the 
previous five-year period. Apparently the Soviet Union's intention was not 
to increase petroleum shipments by 20 percent, but rather to increase total 
energy supply (petroleum, coal, electricity, and natural gas) by this 
amount while maintaining oil shipments at 1980 levels.57 In 1982, the 
Soviet Union reduced soft-currency oil shipments to Eastern Europe 
(except Poland) by about 10 percent, and redirected exports to hard-
currency markets. This move forced Eastern Europe to implement strin-
gent energy conservation programs and to seek other sources of oil. 
Meanwhile, between 1981 and 1984, Soviet oil exports to hard-currency 
Western markets grew by about 60 percent. 58 
Not only was Cuba spared the supply reductions experienced by East-
em Europe, but Cuban petroleum imports from the Soviet Union actually 
increased from 11.7 million to nearly 13.1 million MT between 1982 and 
1986, a 12 percent gain. 
No official information is available about the intended level of Soviet 
petroleum shipments to Cuba in the future. However, one source has 
reported that the Soviet Union has committed to supplying 11 million MT 
annually, while another has indicated that Cuba will be permitted to 
export, for hard currency, any amount it does not consume of the 10 million 
MT per year it is to receive from the Soviet Union. 59 
Cuban apparent consumption of petroleum averaged around 10.5 mil-
lion MT annually during 1981-86. With domestic production expected to 
amount to about 1 million MT per annum, imports from the Soviet Union 
of some 10 million or 11 million MT will more than cover domestic needs 
and leave a sizable portion for reexport. However, only under the most 
optimistic domestic production and import scenarios would Cuba be able 
to approach its 1983-85 exports of about 3 million MT of petroleum. 
Realistically, foreseeable gains in domestic oil production and con-
servation would probably only add marginally to exportable oil balances. 
Energy conservation. Revolutionary Cuba's overall record in energy con-
servation has been far from impressive. This is not surprising given the 
frequent (and contradictory) changes in energy policy, as well as lack of 
economic incentives to conserve. In the 1980s, the possibility of reexport-
ing imported petroleum not consumed domestically has given a new 
impetus to energy conservation. Energy conservation has been elevated in 
terms of national priorities. 
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The five-year plan for 1986-90 calls for special efforts to reduce by 1990 
the energy consumption:national production relationship by 10 percent 
from that in 1985.60 Some of the energy conservation measures put into 
place in the 1980s appear to be having a positive impact. For instance, the 
Cuban National Bank reported that in 1984, approximately 180,000 MT of 
petroleum was saved nationwide. 61 In 1985, the energy conservation 
program reportedly reduced consumption by an additional220,000 MT62 
Energy substitution and nuclear power: Given the uncertainties regarding 
the future supply and price of Soviet oil and oil products, it is clearly in 
Cuba's interest to diversify its sources of energy and to move away from 
reliance on oil. However, Cuba's short-term options are limited. Barring 
spectacular breakthroughs in harnessing solar energy, nuclear energy 
appears to be the only viable new energy source to which Cuba could turn 
in the near future. Cuba's leadership has rationalized the decision to turn 
to nuclear power as follows: 
If one considers the fact that a large quantity of oil, which is almost com-
pletely imported, is used to generate electrical power in such a volume, and 
the prices for this kind of fuel at present and in the future are taken into 
account, as well as the cost of transportation, it then becomes obvious why 
the utilization of nuclear electric power has been taken as the basis for 
electrical power engineering development in our nation as the sole non-
traditional technology which has been developed at the present time to a 
sufficient extent for the needs of the expanding national economy. 63 
Indeed, electricity generation, which uses about 30 percent of total 
liquid fuels, is the most obvious candidate for sizable reductions in con-
sumption. Beginning in the 1990s, the 440-MW nuclear reactors at 
Juragua-which reportedly will displace 600,000 MT of oil products 
annually-could make a significant contribution to the overall energy 
balance. However, while the Juragua plant is being built, Cuba is also in 
the process of adding thermoelectric generating capacity: 1130 MW during 
1986-90 and at least 450 MW during 1991-95.64 These additions will keep 
the electrical industry a major user of oil products through the end of the 
century. 
While nuclear power could contribute positively to the Cuban energy 
balance, it will not solve Cuba's energy vulnerability. To be sure, if the 
current construction timetable is adhered to, nuclear reactors could repre-
sent as much as one-fourth of electric generating capacity by 1995 and 40 
percent by the year 2000.65 Clearly, nuclear power will reduce Cuba's 
dependence on oil for electricity generation and thus its vulnerability to an 
oil import cutoff. However, since fissionable materials for nuclear power 
178 JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ 
will also be imported-like oil, from the Soviet Union-Cuba's vul-
nerability to external energy supply interruptions will remain high even if 
the energy mix is changed by nuclear power. 
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South Africa 
MARGARET F. COURTRIGHT 
The nexus between South Africa's energy and security cannot be separated 
from its position as a pariah in international politics. Notwithstanding 
efforts to ingratiate itself with the United States and Europe in the early 
post-World War II period through economic ties and acceptance of mili-
tary installations such as Britain's Simonstown Base, South Africa was never 
integrated into the Western alliance despite its strategic location at the tip 
of continent. I As years passed, its international political standing deterio-
rated. This in turn magnified its vulnerabilities to the vagaries of the 
international energy market, as some exporters offuels refused to maintain 
diplomatic ties. Adjustment proved to be a major challenge, but the white 
regime has exhibited remarkable energy resilience. As an international 
outcast, South Africa was forced to think through energy vulnerabilities 
well before the oil crises of the 1970s forced others to to do likewise. As a 
consequence, it attained self-sufficiency in some energy sectors. 
The challenge emerged early in the postwar period. Even before the 
Afrikaners' rise to power through the National Party in 1948, South Africa's 
estrangement from the world manifested itself as early as the first session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, when India and the Soviet Union 
attacked Pretoria for mistreatment of its Indian population and later for 
apartheid. As decolonization swept the African continent, efforts to isolate 
the white regime accelerated. The newly liberated states severed diplo-
matic relations to bring to bear international pressure to force modification 
of racial policies.2 
Over time, countries both within and outside Africa advocated econom-
ic and transportation boycotts to isolate the regime. In 1960, the Con-
ference of Independent African States called for closure of ports and 
airports to South African transport. In 1963, the U.N. General Assembly 
implemented an arms embargo, which it made mandatory in 1977. By the 
mid-1970s, the Program of Action Against Apartheid, supported by some 
100 members of the General Assembly, called "for the breaking of all 
diplomatic relations with South Africa, an arms and oil embargo, the 
suspension of all nuclear cooperation, the cancelling of all loans, invest-
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ments and technical assistance, the refusal of landing rights to South 
African aircraft and the closing of all ports to South African ships. "3 
THE ENERGY CHALLENGE 
If boycotts and embargoes were to be imposed, if hostility was to be the 
general rule, South Africa concluded that dependence on other countries 
must be minimized. As a consequence, in 1946 it incorporated SASOL, 
the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation, to safeguard the coun-
try against international oil boycotts. In 1949, it founded the Atomic 
Energy Board to explore the utility of the atom. Benefiting the country in 
these efforts were gifts of nature-large reserves of coal and uranium. 
Coal is South Africa's primary energy resource. It was first mined in 
1864 at Moteno, after diamonds were discovered there, and large-scale 
exploitation began at the turn of the century, when the country produced 
close to 1 million tons annually. Today South Africa is one of the world's 
major coal producers, with reserves approaching 110 billion metric tons, 
half of which is readily exploitable given current technology. The republic 
also benefits from the relative ease of mining. While three-quarters of coal 
mines are underground, one-half of all finds are at relatively shallow 
depths, less than 100 meters. In the 1980s, coal has supplied roughly 80 
percent of the the country's energy needs. With much of the new electrical 
generating capacity built at the mine shaft, coal fires 96 percent of the 
21,000 Mwe (megawatts electric) of the country generating capacity.4 
Beyond electricity, coal produces liquid and gas fuels. Indeed, South 
Africa has become a world leader in such technology. SASOL I began 
production in 1955 utilizing high-pressure Lurgi gasifiers to manufacture a 
synthetic gas-a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. After sulphur 
compounds are removed, the remaining gas becomes the raw material for 
the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. Plans for SASOL II emerged during the 
1973 oil embargo and for SASOL III after the 1979 fall of the Shah oflran.5 
The plants went into operation in 1980 and 1982, respectively. Collectively 
producing 45,000 barrels per day6 of oil equivalent, these sources today 
provide 6-8 percent of South Africa's total energy requirements. 
South Africa's large uranium deposits are an additional means of safe-
guarding its energy independence while influencing world energy mar-
kets. Estimated to be 191,000 metric tons of natural uranium at $30 per 
pound and 356,000 MT at $50 per pound, South Africa's reserves total14% 
of those in the non-Communist world. 7 As part of the ore that was mined 
for gold, uranium became part of the country's exploited mineral land-
scape after the early 1920s. However, the mineral did not become commer-
cial until1952, when the West Rand Consolidated Mines opened a division 
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to extract uranium as a byproduct of gold mining. Production developed 
rapidly during the 1950s and then proceeded to roller coaster down, 
reversing its direction only in the 1970s as nuclear energy production 
expanded worldwide. From 2, 786 tons of U 30 8 in 1976, South African 
production rose to 6,131 tons in 1981. Since then, production has declined 
slightly, reflecting the decline in nuclear plant construction worldwide. 
Given its large uranium endowment, coupled with a sophisticated 
engineering and ~ientific establishment, it was inevitable that Pretoria 
would consider the generation of atomic power. The West's energy and 
weapons requirements allowed South Africa leverage to achieve nuclear 
agreements for technical cooperation with Britain and the United States. 8 
The 1957 accord reached with Washington provided for training of scien-
tists and technicians and the sale of a small research reactor, Safari-I, 
fueled with American enriched uranium. 
The legitimacy of the rationale for nuclear energy in such an energy-rich 
corner of the world rests on a combination of factors. Although nuclear 
power plants could not address Pretoria's greatest vulnerability-a cutoff 
of oil, which supplies the transportation sector principally-energy pro-
jections in the 1970s suggested that the atom was more economical over the 
long term than coal, which could be exported more profitably. Reactors 
would also serve as an avenue for contact with the West at a time when 
Western domestic and international orders for nuclear power plants were 
beginning to decline. 
Because atomic power was not labor-intensive-having no need for a 
large work force to provide a continuous feedstock as in coal-fired plants-
nuclear energy diversified Pretoria's dependencies on its black workers. 
Because nuclear fuels are so efficient, the country would be less vulnera-
ble to labor unrest, notwithstanding precautions Pretoria took to address 
cutoffs through its several-year stockpile of mined coal. Finally, there was 
the incentive to emulate the path taken by other advanced industrialized 
countries, which saw the atom as the the road to technological advance-
ment. 
With these incentives, nuclear power plant construction began in 1976 
for two 922-Mwe reactors at Koeberg, ordered from the French con-
sortium of Framatome, Alsthom, and Spie Batignolles. Difficulties in 
obtaining a nuclear core delayed startup. The United States begged off 
from an early commitment, reflecting a turn in South Africa's fortunes in 
the Congress. This de facto embargo, which began in 1975, formally 
terminated in 1980 with the application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Act. Failing in its effort to manufacture a core, Pretoria persuaded France 
to deliver one under threat of nonpayment for the reactors. 9 Today the 
plants supply roughly 4 percent of Pretoria's energy requirements. 
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Beyond the atom and coal, indigenous petroleum, hydroelectric fuel-
wood, and petroleum substitutes account for minor contributions to South 
Africa's energy profile. Solar electrical generation is negligible. Petroleum 
remains the republic's Achilles heel. Prospectors have explored the coun-
try intensively for oil, to little avail. Offshore drilling has been more 
successful, but the finds, such as the borehole at Mossel Bay, producing 
900 barrels of oil and 90,600 cubic meters of gas per day, have been 
commercially insignificant. 
South Africa thus remains dependent on petroleum imports. To meet 
the challenge of embargoes, it has stockpiled several years' supply of oil. To 
address long-term needs, Pretoria has pursued petroleum substitutes. 
The Department of Agricultural Services has promoted sunflower oil as a 
diesel fuel substitute in rural areas, but it has undertaken little actual 
production for this purpose. Ethanol, obtained from fermentation of vege-
table matter, including sugar cane, wasted wood, and maize, has received 
more attention. Sentrachem, a major chemical firm, plans to build ten 
ethanol plants to produce 1 million tons per year. This could serve as a 
substitute for 10 percent of the republic's diesel and petroleum needs in 
the future. 
The three hydroelectric stations contribute less than 1 percent of the 
country's total energy requirements. The Henrik Verwoerd plant (320 
Mwe and Vanderkloof installation (220 Mwe) along the Orange River and 
the Drakensberg station (1000 Mwe) along the Tugela River are un-
economic for the production of electricity alone. However, they make 
sense as a means of water storage and as a supplement to electricity 
generation at times of peak load. Fuelwood is a traditional source of energy 
in many rural areas, with utilization rising slightly through the 1970s and 
1980s to about 2. 7 million metric tons of coal equivalent. Such figures 
probably understate actual use, since some wood is simply gathered as 
needed, a practice that has led the government to complain that savannah 
forests are being depleted. 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKET 
Because South Africa is both importer and exporter of energy, it is less 
vulnerable to international price gyrations than other states in this book. 
Still, its reliance on imported petroleum subjects it to political gyrations. 
Pretoria does not publish import statistics; neither do exporters volunteer. 
Petroleum supplies roughly 12 to 15 percent of the country's energy needs. 
Until the energy crises of the 1970s, the republic's vulnerability was not 
particularly acute because of the failure of earlier embargos, proposed by 
the Conference of Independent African States in June 1960, by the Organ-
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ization of African Unity (OAU) at its inception in 1963, and by the United 
Nations, beginning with a resolution 1899 in November 1963. 
With the 1973 oil crisis, the challenge of obtaining stocks from abroad 
became more acute. In November 1973, the OAU, meeting in Addis 
Ababa, proposed a five-point program linking African support for the Arab 
cause against Israel with the struggle against minority rule in southern 
Africa. The OAU secretary-general pointed out that 9 percent of South 
Africa's oil imports came from the Persian Gulf and declared that the time 
had come for Arab states to use the oil weapon against the white regimes of 
southern Afiica. The following week, an Arab summit conference at Algiers, 
angered by South Afiican support for Israel during the war, adopted a 
resolution that included a call fur a total Arab oil embargo against Pretoria. 
In spite of these calls, South Africa maintained access to Iranian oil, 
albeit at higher prices, until the 1979 revolution. Prior to the Shah's fall, 
Tehran provided 85 percent to 90 percent of South Africa's petroleum 
imports. to This ended with the Khomeini regime. Further complicating 
matters were "end-user" clauses in Arab contracts with transnational 
companies, forbidding the shipment of oil to Pretoria. However, Arab 
states-notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Oman-never fully implemented 
the embargo. 
Pretoria addressed the crisis by relying on reserves backed up by 
conservation measures, price increases, rationing, and investments in 
petroleum substitutes. As time passed and oil shortfalls became oversup-
ply in world markets, Pretoria found it even less difficult to gain access by 
paying premium prices and by relying on transshipments. Still, the matter 
of access remains a continuing challenge, all the more so since consump-
tion is increasing, particularly among urban blacks. 
Oil is not the only energy dependency Pretoria has confronted. Not-
withstanding its domestic uranium reserves, it has had to rely on world 
markets for high-and low-grade enriched uranium to fuel its research and 
power plants, respectively. The United States has terminated its exports in 
an effort to thwart the regime's nuclear weapons ambitions and to protest 
apartheid. South Africa has turned instead to European suppliers, notably 
Belgium and Switzerland, perhaps China as well. Meanwhile, it is increas-
ing domestic production capacity. 
South Africa has also chosen to rely on hydel power from neighboring 
Mozambique's Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project on the Zambezi River. 
Construction began while Mozambique was still a Portuguese colony. 
South Africa provided substantial financial support, which continued 
following Mozambiquan independence. The productive capacity of the 
project is rated at 4,000 Mwe, but so far it generates considerably less. In 
1979, one of the last "normal" years, the Electricity Supply Commission 
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bought 1,400 Mwe from Cabora Bassa, representing 6 percent of South 
Africa's electrical requirements. During the following decade, there were 
brownouts in the Transvaal, resulting from attacks on transmission lines by 
the Mozambique National Resistance and power interruptions by the 
Mozambique government to protest Pretoria's support for antigovernment 
guerillas. An improvement in relations has since allowed supply to re-
sume-to the benefit of both nations since plant output exceeds Mozam-
bique's domestic needs. But because of Mozambique's role as a Front Line 
State and its past willingness to accept financial losses in its opposition to 
apartheid, this source of energy is likely to remain unreliable. 
As an energy-rich country, South Africa exercises leverage in interna-
tional energy markets, with coal being a major export. Transactions in coal 
steadily increased during the 1970s energy crises, reaching 29.1 million 
tons per year in the mid-1980s. The growth in exports reflected rising 
world prices for both oil and coal, the latter increasing from R6 per ton in 
1973 to R 20.9 per ton by 1978.11 By the end of the 1970s, the European 
Community was importing approximately 23% of its coal from South 
Africa, reflecting the republic's one-quarter contribution to the global coal 
export market. When political pressures cut into the market in the 1980s, 
South Africa compensated by shifting exports to former U.S. markets in 
the Far East, although at the expense of extensive price cuts. 
Pretoria's large uranium reserves have made it a major player on the 
international uranium market also. Although the country does not publish 
uranium export data, some estimate that South Africa supplies approx-
imately half the uranium oxide needs of European nuclear power plants as 
well as an important fraction of Japan's requirements. During the 1960s, 
when uranium oxide prices were depressed, South Africa decided that 
enriched uranium would be more profitable export than uranium ore. In 
1970, it announced a new enrichment procedure-a modification of the 
German jet-nozzle process-and the formation of the Uranium Enrich-
ment Corporation to develop it.l2 In 1975, a small pilot enrichment plant 
at Valindaba began operations with the capability of producing 40,000 
separative work units per year, although it does not appear to have oper-
ated at this level. In February 1978, Pretoria laid plans for a "semicommer-
cial" plant following a halt in the U.S. supply of enriched fuel for Safari I. 
Built near Valindaba with the capacity to produce 50 metric tons a year, the 
plant went into operation in 1988, helping to fuel the Koeberg reactors. 
THE NUCLEAR ENERGY-NUCLEAR WEAPONS LINK 
South Africa's uranium reserves and manifest technological expertise in 
enrichment technology supply it with the feedstock for a potential nuclear 
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weapons program. Given a scientific community expert in explosives and 
the availability of elementary nuclear weapons design in the world's public 
literature, there is little doubt that Pretoria has the ability to manufacture 
nuclear weapons if it chooses. It is an open question whether is has already 
assembled a full-blown nuclear device or the component parts of one. 
The Valindaba enrichment plant has been off-limits to international 
inspection, on the grounds that it would compromise South Africa's en-
richment technology. Suspicion focuses on its possible role in a weapons 
program. Pretoria gave credence to these concerns in 1972 and 1973 annual 
reports of the Atomic Energy Board. The 1972 report declared that inves-
tigations into the "peaceful application of nuclear explosions were being 
pursued." Although no such research was cited in pronouncements after 
1973, the absence has not allayed concerns about the republic's intentions. 
The matter of South Africa's nuclear weapons ambitions has been of 
particular international concern since the late 1970s. Three events fueled 
speculations. The first was an August 1977 Soviet satellite observation, 
later confirmed by the United States, that engineering work in the Ka-
lahari Desert bore an uncommon resemblance to preparations for an 
underground nuclear detonation. When the United States, France, Great 
Britain, and West Germany demanded explanations, Prime Minister 
Vorster denied that there was a test site and claimed that "South Africa did 
not have, nor did it intend to develop, a nuclear explosive device for any 
purpose, peaceful or otherwise." 13 
The second event was the September 22, 1979, observation by the 
American Vela satellite of a double flash oflight characteristic of a low-yield 
nuclear explosion. The observation took place in the South Atlantic, off the 
South African coast, but was not confirmed by other evidence such as 
radioactive debris. Officially, it remains a mystery. The third occasion was 
Pretoria's April1981 anouncement that it had produced uranium enriched 
to 45%, which would fuel the Safari I research reactor. The announcement 
raised concern because improving upon this enrichment to a weapons-
grade 93 percent does not impose insuperable technological barriers, and 
American analysts conclude that Pretoria's ability to produce nuclear 
weapons may be dated to 1980-81.14 
Other indices of Pretoria's intentions may be found in its refusal to sign 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pretoria had expressed sup-
port for the NPT draft resolution, declaring that "as one of the major 
producers of uranium in the Western world, South Africa would do abso-
lutely nothing in the context of uranium sales to foreign buyers which 
might conceivably contribute to an addition to the ranks of the nuclear 
weapons states." In recent years, to maintain its membership in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, South Africa has stated its readiness 
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to join the treaty, but as of this writing has yet to do so. Its failure to sign the 
accord, coupled with its racial policies, contributed to its ouster from its 
permanent position on the AEA board of governors in June 1977, and it has 
not participated in the organization's general conference since 1979, when 
its credentials were rejected. 
Several motives lay behind Pretoria's antagonism toward the NPT. 
Beyond its official pronouncements that the accord was discriminatory and 
would exclude achievement of the peaceful benefits of the atom, South 
Africa, as a uranium producer, was also concerned that an open-ended 
commitment to allow international safeguards would infringe on its econo-
my. Defense, however, was the principal unstated concern. Pretoria had 
grounds to doubt that the international community would come to its 
assistance in the event it was threatened by a nuclear weapons state, 
notably the Soviet Union, an active supporter of liberation movements. 
Assuming that South Africa has available to it highly enriched weapons-
grade uranium from its Valindaba plant-which, unlike the Safari I re-
search reactor, is not subject to safeguards-what are the incentives and 
disincentives to going forward with a military nuclear program? Some see 
simply capability as incentive enough. Leverage in international diplo-
macy is another. Even the threat to go nuclear, if not in fact doing so, may 
provide Pretoria with the club needed to extract concessions from the 
West. 
The military utility of the weapon is more dubious. To be sure, if South 
Africa were challenged by the Soviet Union or some other military force, 
the bomb might be a useful deterrent.I5 But with the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from Angola, such challenges seem remote. Against guerilla opera-
tions-the immediate threat-nuclear weapons would have little utility. 
The radiological consequences of use on South African territory weighs on 
the side of caution. As for use against neighboring states, this would bring 
precisely the kind of reaction South Africa has long tried to prevent: 
universal ostracism and a uniting of countries, including the superpowers, 
against the regime. Further, the nuclear capability seems unnecessary, 
given South Africa's sophisticated conventional armed forces and a military 
industry that has produced the Cheetah fighter aircraft. 
Pretoria might chose to go forward with a nuclear test, however, under 
the stimulus of political and bureaucratic pressures. Elevating the morale 
of the white population through a detonation is a conceivable motive. To 
mitigate international reaction, Pretoria might rely on India's explanation 
of the weapon as a "peaceful nuclear explosion." It is questionable, how-
ever, whether the world reaction would be as muted as it largely was in the 
Indian case, because Pretoria's position, both politically and strategically, 
bears little semblance to that of New Delhi. Still, the white regime may yet 
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see the benefits as worth the cost, concluding that this is the only path to 
the world's respect. 
Could outside pressure dissuade Pretoria? It may have worked in 1977, 
when the Washington intervened to prevent what it believed were prepa-
rations for a nuclear detonation. Whether a similar exercise would be 
successful now is more questionable, since Washington's political leverage 
has diminished as it has reduced ties. Could neighboring states exercise 
leverage unavailable to the West? It is unlikely. With economic ties 
including laborers from Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho working in 
South Africa, with the importation of petroleum products from South 
Africa, and with South Africa ports serving at times as conduits for their 
exports, neighboring countries already have more economic involvement 
with Pretoria than they prefer. Another disincentive might be South 
African concern about nuclear plants as targets of terrorists. Indeed, such 
incidents have been reported in Koeberg, although none resulted in 
serious damage to the plants.l6 The similar risk that a radical white faction 
within the country could gain access to a weapon or fissile materiall7 is a 
problem that the government believes it can protect against. 
Because ofits abundant natural resources and its sophisticated scientific 
establishment, South Africa is more fortunate than many industrializing 
states in its ability to fashion its energy future. To the extent that it is 
dependent, particularly on oil to meet its transportation needs, it has built 
up reserves to meet emergencies. Because it makes major contributions to 
the world market in coal and uranium, it can exercise counter-leverage. 
In the nuclear realm, efforts to isolate Pretoria from the international 
market at best proved successful only in the very short run. Cut off from 
Western assistance, Pretoria used its technical resources to acquire a 
degree of nuclear independence through a sophisticated enrichment ca-
pability-a window of opportunity to develop nuclear weapons. Whether 
it chooses to open this window remains to be seen. 
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Energy and Security 
in Industrializing Nations: 
Prospects for the Future 
BENNETT RAMBERG 
In the aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s, the world nexus among 
energy, economy, and security is indisputable. The oil crisis elicited a 
stream of scholarship addressing the implications, with attention focused 
on the United States and its OECD allies.I To the extent that Lesser 
Developed Countries and newly industrializing nations were examined, 
they usually appeared in aggregate data rather than as case studies.2 The 
preceding chapters have sought to fill the void by reviewing at length a 
unique conglomeration of such nations: India, Pakistan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and South Africa. 
At first glance, these nations may be indistinguishable from a host of 
other countries that sought to remain upright despite the energy tur-
bulence of the 1970s. Like others, our group turned to the atom to 
generate electricity. At the same time, the eight nations here-Cuba 
excepted-manifested a hidden agenda through the years, in which nu-
clear power generation was a vital energy resource, to be sure, but also a 
key to nuclear weapons.3 Some analysts contend that cases such as ours 
could use nuclear energy as a pretext for securing weapons or weapons 
technology and feedstock. 4 Although an arguable point, it is not insignifi-
cant that of the nations examined here, only South Korea and Taiwan 
embrace the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.5 
Atomic power does, of course, serve legitimate energy security needs. 
Over a decade ago, Mason Willrich defined such security as assurance of 
adequate energy supplies to maintain an economy in a politically accept-
able manner. 6 Willrich suggested three paths to energy security. First, 
stockpiling and rationing are remedies for short-term supply interrup-
tions. Whether stockpiling makes sense depends upon the economic 
significance of a fuel, the degree of reliance on imports, the diversity and 
reliability of supply, the availability of foreign exchange, the benefits 
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compared with those of other public works, and-in the case of products 
such as oil, but not nuclear fuels-the availability of warehousing. 
Rationing, an allocation device outside the market system, takes many 
forms. In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
during the 1970s, one method combined gas taxes, thermostat regulation, 
fuel switching (such as substituting coal or wood for oil), car pooling, 
driverless Sundays, gas station closures, fuel distribution on the basis of 
license plate numeration, and speed limits. Although such efforts at 
sharing the burden provided a veneer of equality, elimination of shortfalls 
in the end required a resumption of the market mechanism, backed up by 
foreign supply. 
Stockpiling and rationing, however, are Band-Aids. They cannot ad-
dress a nation's energy needs over the long haul. Security of foreign supply 
through diversification and interdependence offers a second set of alter-
natives: the options of a buyer's market, when multiple international 
energy producers have excess capacity. Willrich suggests that to. further 
encourage such markets, either long-term investment in the importer by 
the exporter and/or industrial assistance by the importer to the exporter 
will create mutual dependencies. The importer may manipulate the de-
pendencies by making the abusive energy exporter hostage to its own 
indiscretions. An importer that responds with investment freezes or na-
tionalization challenges the exporter to inflict a self-induced wound upon 
its international portfolio. 
But such interdependence and other forms of diversification only pro-
vide the importer with a means to spread the energy risk. Self-sufficiency, 
the third alternative, is the sole method that can eliminate risks. Except for 
a very few well-endowed nations, however, autarchy is a chimera. What 
domestic resource exploitation, conservation, tariffs, and quotas on im-
ported energy can achieve is a reduction of dependencies, not their 
elimination. 7 
In the energy security challenges of the eight nations we discuss, per 
capita energy consumption since 1950 often has come close to doubling 
every fifteen to twenty years (table 1). To demonstrate what consumption 
levels might be were our sample states to achieve the "advanced" stage of 
economic development in industrialized states, table 10.1 includes com-
parative figures for the United States and France. 
Whether per capita consumption will accelerate for countries strapped 
with large domestic debts and balance-of-payments difficulties is uncer-
tain over the short term. Indeed, growth in Argentina, Brazil and Cuba 
actually declined between 1980 and 1985. All the same, the long-term 
outlook suggests a steady upward trend because of rising populations and 
heretofore unmet economic needs. 
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Table 10.1. Per capita energy consumption 
(Kilograms of oil equivalent) 
Argen- Pak- s. s. 
tina Brazil Cuba India is tan Korea Mrica Taiwan" France U.S. 
1950 502 124 295 30 30 924 1,282 5,140 
1960 727 210 593 74 134 1,241 409 1,558 5,535 
1970 1,087 299 686 95 450 1,510 702 2,639 7,436 
1975 1,138 453 867 111 112 625 1,680 1,006 2,597 7,199 
1980 1,202 526 982 126 136 941 1,892 1,622 3,010 7,163 
1985 1,192 484 748 178 175 1,130 2,147 1,528" 2,909 6,694 
Sources: United Nations, 1982 Energy Statistics Yearbook, New York, 1984, pp. 61, 68, 71, 73, 
79, 81, 83; ibid, 1985 Energy Statistic Yearbook, New York, 1987, pp. 37, 39, 43, 47, 49, 53; 
Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, Director-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, 1984, p. 324. 
"Per capita consumption per liter. 
"1982 per capita consumption. 
The impact on world energy markets is evident in figures for the period 
between 1970 and 1985, when the Less Developed Countries' fraction of 
world energy consumption (excluding traditional biomass fuels) increased 
from 14 percent to 23 percent. For the same period, the LDC share of 
world oil supplies rose from 13 percent to 23 percent. 8 Changing life styles 
are major stimuli for such growth. Urbanization inspires energy-intensive 
commercial, industrial, and transportation services. It particularly ex-
pands residential electrical demands for lighting, appliances, refrigera-
tion, and air conditioning. LDC demand for natural gas for water and space 
heating and cooking has increased generally by 10-20 percent annually. In 
Pakistan, the growth was 25 percent per annum during 1972-84.9 
Such growth is not surprising when one considers that in rural Brazil, 
India, and Pakistan, for example, dependencies on biomass such as fire-
wood run between 90 and 95 percent.lO With urbanization, these needs 
must be met from other sources. In Taipei's rapidly expanding economy, 
for one, the number of television sets increased from almost nil to seventy-
seven per hundred households between 1962 and 1972; rice cookers from 
five to ninety-nine; and refrigerators from two to forty-eight. Although 
growth slowed in the following decade, in large measure this reflected 
saturation of the domestic market. For example, by 1982 refrigerators 
could be found in 92 percent of Taiwanese urban households. By contrast, 
other residential amenities, notably energy-intensive air conditioning, 
could be found in only 23 percent of city dwellings in 1982, allowing for a 
significant expansion in energy demand to meet this need in the years 
ahead.n Other energy demands are also foreseeable, one being the 
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Table 10.2. Imports as a percentage of total energy utilization 
s. s. 
Argentina Brazil Cubaa India Pakistan Koreab Africa Taiwan France u.s. 
1950 71.9 78.5 100.6 12.2 50.0 13.9 43.5 5.5 
1960 40.3 68.9 104.7 22.5 20.4 14.8 16.1 61.4 9.5 
1970 11.9 67.3 102.2 23.5 62.5 29.1 50.0 90.4 12.4 
1975 17.1 77.6 105.3 23.0 51.3 76.6 32.9 66.5 100.0 20.8 
1980 15.0 76.3 106.0 25.9 46.1 88.0 27.1 83.6 102.1 22.5 
1985 6.4 51.4 122.0 14.9 40.8 90.5 21.9 83.2 85.6 16.1 
Sources: United Nations, 1982 Energy Statistics Yearbook, New York, 1984, pp. 60-61, 64-65, 
70-71, 62-73, 78-79, 80-81, 82-83, 86-87; ibid., Energy Statistics Yearbook, 1987, pp. 24-25, 36-37, 
38-39, 42-43, 46-4 7, 48-49; 1985 Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, Director-General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, p. 324. 
aTbe 100%-plus figures for Cuba reflects utilization of oil imports for energy as well as other 
industrial purposes. 
bOfficial Korean statistics place reliance on imported energy in 1986 at 66.5% to rise to 77.6% by 
2010. See Ton Wan Park's article in this book. 
growing need for gasoline to fuel an expanding use of the automobile in 
Asian countries that today rely on motorbikes. 
When energy dependencies in our case nations are stated in terms of 
imports as a fraction of total consumption, two Latin American nations, 
Argentina and Cuba, define the boundaries (table 10.2). Cuba imports 
virtually all its energy supplies, as it has done for three decades. By 
contrast, Argentina made remarkable progress toward self-sufficiency 
during the same period. During 1960-82, Buenos Aires reduced foreign 
dependence from 64 percent to only 8 percent. Brazil and South Africa 
made modest progress, while the remainder of our sample eases have 
either experienced no important gains or, in the case of South Korea and 
Taiwan, increased substantially their dependence on imports. 
In one fashion or another, the nations examined here have applied 
Willrich's three sets of alternatives. To cushion the impact of supply 
interruptions, there are at least two instances of substantial energy stock-
piling: South Africa maintains a three-year storage of petroleum and South 
Korea, a 150-day supply. There is a spectrum of efforts aimed at diminish-
ing energy dependencies through diversification. Cuba lies to one ex-
treme, deriving 99 percent of its needs from the Soviet bloc; South Korea, 
on the other end, expanded its sources from seven oil exporters in 1980 to 
thirteen in 1982. The remaining case nations range across this spectrum. 
In diversification or changes in the composition of energy profiles, 
nuclear power is prominent. Imported nuclear energy plants, which 
played either a minor or nonexistent role a decade ago, are coming into 
their own (table 10.3). With fifteen plants, India has the largest number in 
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Table 10.3. Nuclear power plants at end of 1988 
Operating 
Under units as 
Operating construction Planned percentage 
of total 
units Mw(e) units Mw(e) units Mw(e) capacity 
Argentina 2 935 1 692 13.4 
Brazil 1 657 2 2,618 6 7470 0.05 
Cuba 0 0 2 880 0 0 0 
India 7 1,243 8 1,880 3 1,235 2.6 
S. Korea 9 5,816 1 920 2 1,900 53.1 
Pakistan 1 137 0 0 1 900 1.0 
S. Africa 2 1,800 0 0 0 0 4.5 
Taiwan 6 5,144 0 0 2 2,000 48.5 
Source: Nuclear News, February 1989, pp. 69, 70, 74, 76, 82. 
operation, under construction, and planned. Korea produces the most 
nuclear energy and is the most reliant, with 53 percent of its electricity 
coming from this source. In the years to come, atomic power will continue 
to grow in many case nations. Indeed, except for Cuba, they are likely to 
become exporters of nuclear components.l2 India and Argentina, for 
example, today manufacture much of their hardware and are beginning to 
produce nuclear fuel.I3 
Apart from nuclear energy, several countries rely on interdependencies 
to diminish their vulnerabilities to supply interruptions. South Africa has 
invested heavily in a hydroelectric project in Mozambique upon which it 
relies and has also attempted to expand a web of European dependencies 
on its uranium reserves. Korea operates joint energy ventures in coal and 
oil abroad and uses its arms industry to gain a foothold in Arab states, 
thereby creating reciprocal dependencies. Brazil exports technology and 
oil exploration equipment to Iraq, Iran, and Colombia and has provided 
nuclear assistance to Iraq. A Brazilian oil venture in Iraq resulted in the 
discovery of the major Majnoon oil field. Demonstrating the fragility of 
such ventures, however, Iraq in 1980 took full possession of the field; in lieu 
of the usual production-sharing agreement, Baghdad offered a guaranteed 
amount of crude deliveries.l4 
Beyond interdependence, many of our case nations follow Willrich's 
third option, development of untapped domestic resources. This alter-
native includes such unconventional technologies as coal liquefaction, 
which provides South Africa with 6 percent of its energy. Among other 
substantial efforts, Brazil is converting sugar cane to ethanol to provide 
fuel for the transportation sector. 15 
Prospects for the Future 197 
Table 10.4. Energy profiles 
Published proven Published crude 
reserves of natural petroleum 
gas, 1984 reserves, 1987 Years of proven Coal reserves 
(million cu m) (thousand bbl) oil reserves (thousand MT) 
Argentina 676 2,180 13 130 
Brazil 95 2,358 11 2,343 
Cuba 
India 575 4,375 20 1,581 
Korea 132 
Pakistan 625 116 8 102 
So. Mrica 8 115 ? 58,404 
Taiwan 21 10 10 200 
France 33 222 11 381 
u.s. 5,202 27,280 9 263,843 
Source: Britannica Book of the Year, 1988 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1988), pp. 806-ll. 
Our cases also exploit traditional domestic resources for conventional 
purposes, each country approaching this with a different profile (table 
10. 4). Some, notably South Africa and India, are relatively rich in resources 
such as coal. In most cases, the reserves of natural gas, petroleum, or coal 
are modest at best. In Cuba, by contrast, such reserves are absent. South 
Mrica has large coal and uranium deposits, and India, large untapped 
hydroelectric potential and coal. Both Brazil and Argentina have unex-
ploited hydroelectric potential. Korea has modest coal deposits, as does 
Taiwan. Pakistan's extensive coal deposits are largely of poor quality, while 
its hydroelectric potential lies at some distance from population centers. 
To the extent it can, each case is attempting to develop domestic resources 
within the limits of available capital and competing public works. 
Given domestic capital limitations, many of our cases will require the 
infusion of foreign investment to develop domestic potential. For this to 
occur, hostility toward foreign development of natural resources must be 
overcome. Resistance, however, is dissolving only slowly. Brazil, which 
opposed such involvement some five decades, has opened its continental 
shelf to external exploration. At first the financial incentives for investors 
were so restrictive that there were few bidders, but after a time, Brazil 
loosened its terms.l6 
As each nation tries to meet its energy needs, several patterns are 
foreseeable. Atomic power will play a role as a civilian veneer for a nuclear 
weapons option, while it has the potential to diversify energy profiles and 
thereby make the case nations more energy-secure. However, atomic 
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power, growing much more slowly than anticipated, cannot make up the 
energy shortfall, and each nation will pursue a distinct strategy to meet its 
needs. South Africa, in addition to developing its large domestic coal 
resources, will seek to exploit Western and neighboring dependencies on 
its energy and mineral resources. India has important domestic reserves of 
coal and hydel power. South Korea and Taiwan will expand and diversifY 
their reciprocal dependencies with oil exporters. Pakistan will look to 
increase efficient use of its oil, natural gas, and hydel potential. Brazil will 
substantially expand its commitment to ethanol and slowly enlarge its 
hydel potential, as will Argentina. Cuba's domestic options are limited; 
even with nuclear generating plants, it will remain heavily reliant on the 
Soviet bloc. For each case nation, energy security will remain a preoccupa-
tion for the foreseeable future. 
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Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School (New York: Random 
House, 1979). 
2. Typical is chapter 4 in International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 
(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1982). 
3. Albert Wohlstetter, et al., Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd, Los 
Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976. 
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